Mad Girls: Charting Cultural Representations of Psychosocial Disability and Contemporary Hysteria(s) by Dorwart, Laura M
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Mad Girls: Charting Cultural Representations of Psychosocial Disability and Contemporary 
Hysteria(s)
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9hn3n0r3
Author
Dorwart, Laura M
Publication Date
2019
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO 
 
 
Mad Girls: Charting Cultural Representations of Psychosocial Disability and 
Contemporary Hysteria(s) 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
in 
 
 
Drama and Theatre 
 
 
by 
 
 
Laura Margaret Dorwart 
 
 
 
Committee in charge: 
 
University of California San Diego 
 
 Professor Julie Burelle 
 Professor Brian Goldfarb  
 Professor Emily Roxworthy 
 
 
 
University of California Irvine 
 Professor Bryan Reynolds, Chair 
Professor Anthony Kubiak 
 
 
 
 
 
2019 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 
 
Laura Margaret Dorwart, 2019 
 
All rights reserved.  
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Dissertation of Laura Margaret Dorwart is approved, and it is acceptable in 
 
quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
            
                 Chair 
 
 
 
University of California San Diego 
2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Signature Page ……………………………………..….……………………………... iii 
 
Table of Contents ……………………………………………...……………………... iv 
 
Vita  .……………………………………………………………………….……...... ... v 
 
Abstract of the Dissertation ..……………………………………………………...….  vi 
 
Chapter One 
The Possibility of Mad Girl Theory: 
Navigating the Literature of Hysteria, Disability, and Girlhood …………………….. 1 
 
Chapter Two 
You’re Too Pretty to Cut: 
Digital Subcultures and the Narrative of Self-Harm ………………….…..………….  29 
 
Chapter Three 
Representations of Borderline Personality Disorder and the “New” Hysteria…….......67 
 
Chapter Four 
Trauma in Emilie Autumn’s Neo-Victorian Performances ………………….…....    126 
 
Chapter Five 
Welcome to Melanie Martinez’s Pop Surrealist D-O-L-L-H-O-U-S-E………….…. 175 
 
Conclusions ……………………………………………………………………...…  222 
 
Works Cited …………………………………………………………………….…    227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
VITA 
 
2011 Bachelor of Arts Cum Laude, Theatre, Barnard College, New York 
City, New York 
 
2017 Master of Fine Arts, Creative Nonfiction, Antioch University Los 
Angeles, Culver City, California 
 
2019 Doctor of Philosophy in Drama and Theatre, University of California 
San Diego 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
Mad Girls: Charting Cultural Representations of Psychosocial Disability and 
Contemporary Hysteria(s) 
 
 
by 
 
 
Laura Margaret Dorwart 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Drama and Theatre 
 
 
University of California San Diego, 2019 
 
 
Professor Bryan Reynolds, Chair 
 
 
 
 
 Mad Girls examines what I term a cast-off girl and posits what her relationship 
to the abject is. My conception is that the cast-off girl exceeds the boundaries of 
girlhood, embodying the perceived aspects of girlhood that are deemed inappropriate 
for public display. She points to that which is unable to be contained. I look at artifacts 
of pop-culture and performance made for and by girls. The girlhood depicted in these 
works comprises images of the eroticized, infantile, and still totally deadly Within 
girl-oriented pop-culture, I have identified and named two phenomena around which 
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the performance of the mad girl is centered: girlsonas and skin speaking. The girlsona 
is a girled archetype and by skin speaking I am referring to how girls’ bodies are often 
foregrounded as proof of some internal complication. 
 To explore the performance of the Mad Girl, I analyze narratives of self-harm 
that are disseminated by girls through social media and other online platforms as a 
form of group identification; representations of borderline personality disorder in the 
films Girl, Interrupted and Prozac Nation, Merri Lisa Johnson’s performative writing 
in her memoir Girl In Need of a Tourniquet: Memoir of a Borderline Personality, and 
ultimately the musical Borderline, as an example of what can go awry when 
psychiatrically disabled individuals are not foregrounded in attempts to represent their 
narratives in performance; and the performative personas of musicians Emilie Autumn 
and Melanie Martinez which are both founded in representations of girlhood-after-
trauma exposed through neo-Victorian themes and adolescent drag. Ultimately this 
dissertation is a call to reexamine the cultural products of the cast-off girl in a our age 
of quickly changing performance venues.
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Chapter One 
The Possibility of Mad Girl Theory: 
Navigating the Literature of Hysteria, Disability, and Girlhood 
In a 2016 Instagram post, self-proclaimed 20-something “tragic queen” visual 
artist Audrey Wollen stands forlornly next to a painting captioned “me in front of 
Asger Jorn’s L'avant-garde se rend pas” (‘The avant-garde never gives up,’ 1962) in 
the process of actually giving up rn [right now]” (Wollen). In another, she captions a 
still-wet negative pregnancy test “praise be.”  In one series, Wollen drapes herself—
while wearing schoolgirl outfits that feature pink cardigans and increasingly tiny 
skirts—over patients’ tables in an assortment of doctors’ offices (and one MRI room), 
with no explanation for her being there, but always inspiring concern (“y r u always at 
the doctor?? R u ok??” someone invariably posts). In several more posts, she 
superimposes her naked body or her crying face (never “pretty-crying” but always 
emphasizing the accompanying snot) onto Renaissance paintings of idealized, 
youthful female figures. And she is nearly always horizontal, often eating or staring at 
a phone. 
“I’ve always wanted to be the girl in the painting,” Wollen tells one 
interviewer who asks about the impetus behind Wollen’s performative practices and 
her online flaunting of sadness, chronic pain, and clinical depression. She describes 
these practices as part of what she calls “Sad Girl Theory.” Wollen is not alone in her 
endeavor; she uses her own body within her art, centering herself within famous 
paintings of justifying her body, and stages the history of girls’ sadness as a political 
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act. At once building off of and critiquing conventional feminist readings of female 
objectification within art history, Wollen asks her virtual audience:  
So let’s flip it around: what if the naked horizontal girl wasn’t a symbol of 
subordination, but a symbol of rebellion? What about the nature of objects can 
be used to our advantage? In anime, there are a lot of characters who are half 
robot, half girl, who are totally infantile and eroticised and still totally deadly. 
What can we learn from her and her use of object-ness? (Wollen) 
 
Wollen's Sad Girl Theory can be considered a response to the liberal feminist ideal 
that views women as the makers of their own success. Wollen counters that it is 
necessary to view the sadness of girls and women as an appropriate and informed 
reaction to patriarchal structures. Sad Girl Theory is a criticism of liberal ideals of 
womanhood that depict "the successful feminist" as famous, rich, and happy and the 
notion that sadness resides within the individual woman, who is responsible for her 
own emancipation. Wollen’s questions closely tracked my own as I embarked on this 
project: How and why do girls perform sadness online and form communities around 
it? How can invisible disabilities read as feminine be made visible and legible? Who is 
the “sad girl” to begin with, who are her predecessors, and why does she matter? How 
can the girl, and particularly the stigmatized girl, be reimagined and restaged? I, 
however, will turn my attention to the Mad Girl; the girl whose sadness is written on 
and for her in what are often extreme or violent ways. 
 This dissertation will examine what I term a cast-off girl and posits what her 
relationship to the abject is. Tate defines abject art as “artworks which explore themes 
that transgress and threaten our sense of cleanliness and propriety particularly 
referencing the body and bodily functions” (tate.org.uk), and asserts that, “The term 
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abjection literally means ‘the state of being cast off’.” My conception of the cast-off 
girl, then, exceeds the boundaries of girlhood, embodying the perceived aspects of 
girlhood that are deemed inappropriate for public display. She points to that which is 
unable to be contained. She is a girl who refuses linear progression to the Freudian 
stages and rejects her own ascension into the symbolic law of the Father, through 
deliberate delays, sideways growth, and overzealous embrace of the trappings of 
childhood (e.g., through adolescent drag, the ruffles of a dollified Lolita, or their 
shadowy cousins, the beating hearts and damaged flesh behind sensationalistic 
headlines about sex being in self-harm). I posit the cast-off girl as both innately 
harmless yet simultaneously disturbing. Why, then, do we proliferate so many copies 
of her, mass-producing them as if to stick them on the ominous side milk cartons? 
 To answer these questions I look at artifacts of pop-culture and performance 
made for and by girls. The girlhood depicted in these works comprises images of the 
eroticized, infantile, and still totally deadly Within girl-oriented pop-culture, I have 
identified and named two phenomena around which the performance of the mad girl is 
centered: girlsonas and skin speaking. 
 The girlsona is a girled archetype. With many archetypes being maternal or 
paternal, girl is not divided into its own archetypes. So girlsonas are cultural 
archetypes of the girl in popular mythology, such as mass media, television tropes, and 
breathless sensationalistic headlines.  Girlsonas manifest is woman-to-girl drag that 
sees adult women don the cultural artifacts of girlhood for the purposes of 
hyperrealism and gendered critique. Girlsonas consist in taking the sensationalistic 
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excess of how girls are perceived (whether as materialistic, appearance-obsessed, 
withdrawn and depressed, flowing over with negative affect, etc.) and wearing it as a 
form of temporal drag. I contend that girls are rarely seen as agential cultural actors 
and that girlhood is not seen as something someone does, it is seen as something you 
are a victim of, so like conventional drag, it turns a mirror to the gendered stereotypes 
that men adopt for the purposes of reflecting on their own imagined womanhoods or 
feminine sides with the added complication of women looking back retrofuturistically 
into the girlhoods they had, wished they had, are reclaiming, or suffered from. 
By skin speaking I am referring to how girls’ bodies are often foregrounded as 
proof of some internal complication. The starving body of the anorexic, for example, 
is seen as a blank canvas on which cultural expectations have overwritten themselves. 
Self-harm is often read similarly, with girls’ scars perceived as proof or aftermath of 
their internal damage. I propose instead that self-harm scars and the like should be 
read as public health issues, the proof of collective cultural expectations and the 
burden they impose on those who bear them, and secondly as the writings of skin that 
is expected not to speak, and attempts (if unhealthy) or silenced actors to communicate 
through the flesh that is foregrounded as the most important thing about them.  
Thirdly, they are often attempt to make invisible disabilities, illnesses, trauma or other 
suffering visible. For example, sexual assault is one of the primary predictive factors 
of self-harm in adolescent girls (Flemming); self-harm scars can thus be read as 
attempts to make legible what society would rather ignore. 
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I contend that girls’ behaviors are often read as symptoms of hysteria (i.e., 
Freud’s Dora) moving from inward to outward. Whereas they could be more 
effectively read from a public health/collective perspective; that is external, moving 
in- as, for example, Dora’s physical symptoms of chronic illness and mental 
symptoms of ill health could be read as the result of the trauma of sexual assault. 
Thus, this project was informed further by Ann Cvetkovich’s twin assertions in 
Depression: A Public Feeling that (1) “depression is ordinary” (i.e., that it is everyday 
and integrated into public life and societal reality, rather than an individual anomaly), 
and (2) like other mental illnesses, depression is neither purely biological nor cultural. 
According to Corey Hickner-Johnson in The Journal of Literary and Cultural 
Disability Studies, 
Cvetkovich maintains that depression should be considered as a social and 
cultural experience and phenomenon, rather than a medical condition begging 
for curative measures. The trouble with medicalizations of depression are that 
they tend to pathologize and stigmatize textured, varied, and diverse 
experiences of the world. This does not mean that depression feels good or 
should be discussed only outside of medical discourses, but rather that it is an 
“interdisciplinary phenomenon.” (91) 
 
For Wollen and Cvetkovich, sadness, chronic pain, illness, and how they are 
linked to girlhood and femininity are ordinary, which means they are shared. 
Wollen’s public persona and the performative ways in which she repackages and 
markets her physical and mental disabilities as part of a neoliberal individual “brand” 
mark her work as part of what Cvetkovich calls an “archive of trauma” (Cvetkovich 
11), much like the sad-eyed cartoon-girls described by Cvetkovich and depicted by 
visual artist Allyson Mitchell. These sad girls, with their large, mournful eyes, ask 
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viewers to empathize with them on everything from self-harm to periods, bad hair 
days, general ennui, sexual trauma, and various other “girl troubles” that often induce 
cultural panic and which are marked by stigma and stereotype. While it may seem 
irreverent to lump ugly selfies in with the ongoing effects of childhood sexual trauma, 
artists like Wollen and Mitchell are responding ironically to the “selfies, sexting and 
self-harm” trope that dominates the popular imagination—including the self-help 
genre, commercial representations of girlhood, and occasionally sociological research 
and feminist theory—in which “girl troubles” are a dumping ground for behaviors 
read as attention-seeking that communicate psychic distress. 
My project, then, is to exhume cultural representations from this dumping 
ground which is full of an assorted mass of girl troubles. Wollen and girls like her are 
producing works that dominant culture has rendered illegible/invisible as performance 
and I seek to resurrect and reframe these in order to assert their artistic and 
performative viability. Across a wide range of media, performances of and by the girl 
are dismissed as existing on a continuum of silly to harmless. The concerns of 
girlhood are dismissed as inconsequential, but when these girls express themselves 
they are often met with concern, censorship, and handwringing. And it seems this 
concern is not geared at the girls themselves, but at the audiences potentially exposed 
to their messages. The girls are cast off and cast aside. My research started by asking 
how it is that girls’ cultural productions, such as banned Instagram hashtags, can be 
simultaneously insignificant and dangerous. There seems to be a broader societal 
concern, while disregarding the individual. A significant portion of adult female artists 
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and performers retain aspects of girlhood through an overzealous embrace of its 
trappings. Girlhood contains an allure and power prompting these artists to hold onto 
it in spite of its perceived illegitimacy. And while girl studies itself has been an area of 
academic discourse, the discipline has frequently been relegated to the position of 
feminist studies’ little sister or the underexplored territory adjacent to “youth studies” 
(aka, boyhood studies). If the home has traditionally been regarded as feminine 
territory, then the territory of the girl is a closed off, cloistered, small, and separate 
space within the home. I aim to account for the phenomenon of failing to attend to 
cultural productions made by, or for, girls (particularly multiply marginalized girls), 
even within works explicitly dedicated to girlhood studies. 
From Sad to Mad  
This chapter will establish the groundwork of Mad Girl Theory, leading up to 
the formulation of my research questions which will drive the analyses of girlhood pop 
culture artifacts and the “girl troubles” they have come to be associated with in my 
subsequent chapters. Mad Girl Theory is an attempt to account for invisible disabilities 
made manifest through artistic and performative practices. These “girl troubles,” the 
psychosocial disabilities they have in many cases come to represent, and the ways they 
are both reified and resisted in performative contexts are center stage in this 
dissertation, which responds to calls by Cvetkovich in Depression: A Public Feeling 
and An Archive of Feelings to weave analyses of trauma and its aftermath more 
seamlessly into the fabric of queer and feminist studies; Alison Kafer in Feminist, 
Queer, Crip to turn a curious and critical eye towards the sites where compulsory able-
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bodiedness and able-mindedness intersect with misogyny and compulsory 
heterosexuality; and Anna Mollow in “Criphystemologies: What Disability Theory 
Needs to Know About Hysteria” to examine the ways in which narratives of suffering 
can be used productively within the academic study of “invisible” (“undocumented”) 
disabilities. The connections between trauma, feminist theory, and disability are 
myriad, as Mollow details in her discussion of the cultural legacy of hysteria, yet often 
go dismissed or ignored altogether: 
Here’s a funny thing about hysteria: although it’s a medical term with 
pervasive cultural life, it almost never makes an appearance in disability 
theory. Peruse the tables of contents, indexes, and titles of the most influential 
texts in the field: the word hysteria is seldom found. This is a crucial omission 
for people who have what I call “undocumented disabilities. 
 
Yet a disproportionate number of disabled women experience sexual trauma and 
domestic violence, and the “invisibly disabled” population is overwhelmingly young 
and female. According to an NPR analysis of unpublished Justice Department data, 
the rate of rape and sexual assault against people with intellectual disabilities is more 
than seven times the rate against people without disabilities and the rate against people 
with other disabilities is more than three times the rate. Among women with 
intellectual disabilities, it is about 12 times the rate (NPR). Furthermore, invisible 
disabilities are often coded as female, whether as an emotional response to trauma or 
pain or an outright dismissal of women’s first-hand accounts of their own experiences. 
In “Gender and the Politics of Invisible Disability,” Nancy J. Hirschman writes, 
“Gender and sexuality are important aspects of this invisibility. Gender norms 
particularly conditioned responses to women with disabilities so as to heighten the 
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invisibility, as in the case of men’s pain complaints being given greater credibility” 
(207). Moreover, a significant number of women’s disabilities, both psychosocial and 
physical—particularly chronic illness and other examples of Mollow’s 
“undocumented disabilities,” but sometimes visible ones as well—can be traced to 
trauma perpetuated by another human being. Meanwhile, people who experience 
interpersonal trauma, such as rape or child abuse, are more likely to develop PTSD 
than people who experience non-assault-based trauma, such as accidents and natural 
disasters (Zoladz). 
From Mollow’s call to fold hysteria into the lexicon of disability studies, then, 
emerges a potential cultural heroine: the girl. The notion of the girl as both a material 
data point and an abstract concept is relevant in this context in several ways: in 
disability’s reputation as a catalyst for infantilization and societal relegation to a 
juvenile role; in the growing, and disproportionate, number of girls and young women 
who experience symptoms of or are diagnosed with psychosocial disabilities; and in 
the stigmatization and pathologization of girls within media narratives about youth 
cultures, cultural trends, and mental illness. These connections make the-girl-as-
archetype a particularly fruitful site for examining performances of, and media 
narratives about, mental illness and the Mad Girl. 
The Hysterical Girl and Bedroom Culture 
The most common scholarly responses to dominant narratives about girlhood 
and its attendant woes echo Elaine Showalter’s explorations of hysteria in The Female 
Malady, in which she traces how debates about and medical and social understandings 
  
10 
 
of hysteria in the late 20th century used fears of stigmatized and marginalized 
femininities as a foundation and influenced subsequent “performances” of female 
madness from women themselves, and in Hystories, with the term referring to cultural 
manias and panics often constructed around cultural anxieties about femininity and 
feminization. Who are the girl-contemporaries of the hysterics described by 
Showalter, and how are they responding to new iterations of the cultural project of 
creating and perpetuating the notion of the female “hysteric”? The present dissertation 
answers these questions by examining (1) self-making projects associated with 
girlhood (particularly online) with an eye to integration of perspectives from disability 
studies and mad studies; (2) the ideological links between self-harm and cultural 
perceptions of female masochism and the pathologization that links both; and (3) 
images of the “girl grotesque” and how they are circulated in film, in subcultures, and 
in live performances. 
Girls’ studies scholars such as Akane Kanai and Claudia Mitchell, like 
disability studies and mad studies scholars, have encountered a number of obstacles 
along the field’s path to legitimacy and critical attention within the academy. Girl 
studies itself has frequently been relegated to the position of feminist studies’ little 
sister or the underexplored territory adjacent to “youth studies” (aka, boyhood 
studies). Sociologists Angela McRobbie and Jenny Garber canonically established in 
1975 the notion of “bedroom culture” as integral to cultural studies of girlhood. Girls, 
they argue persuasively, are often shunted aside in explorations of youth culture and 
subcultural rebellion, or their participation in subcultures such as rock’n’roll, for 
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example, is read as boy-crazy hyperemotionality or an extended ploy to get a 
boyfriend. McRobbie and Garber claim that “bedroom culture”—including listening to 
records, reading magazines, and socializing in semi-private spaces—is in effect girl 
culture.  
While the concept of bedroom culture needs updating, it is still useful when 
analyzing girls’ performances of, and media narratives about, mental illness, so this 
dissertation looks at how the advent of social media and newer forms of engagement 
relate to the inward and outward production of girl culture through its empowerment 
of the “mad girl.” A 2018 survey by the Pew Research Center found that 97% of teen 
girls have access to a smart phone, compared to 93% of teen boys. Also, 50% of 
teenage girls are near constant online users, compared with 39% of teenage boys. 
While boys dominate the internet in terms of gaming (97% of boys play video games 
versus 83% of girls), girls are more inclined to be on social platforms (42% of girls 
you Snapchat versus 29% of boys). There is a pronounced difference between teen 
boys’ usage of the Internet as a gaming platform and teen girls’ usage of the internet 
as a social network (Pew). No matter the breakdown of Internet usage by a gender or 
age, bedroom culture is no longer confined to an isolated house within the home. Teen 
girls and young women often use the internet as a means to socialize, develop support 
networks, participate in subcultures, share creative work, and start careers. In 
particular, the “confessional” style of staging and sharing one’s inner life and personal 
goings-on in art and writing that has becoming increasingly popular alongside the 
advent of reality television is frequently dominated by girls. Girls’ massive digital 
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footprint and their sprawling and often entrepreneurial presence on social media 
networks like Instagram and YouTube (where bedroom culture can make money and 
launch careers) have shifted the notion of bedroom culture considerably, opening it up 
to an interpretation that bends and breaks the rules of the private/public divide and the 
idea that girls are relegated to the domestic interior. Girls’ studies theorists working in 
media and performance studies, such as Akane Kanai, Claudia Mitchell, and Sarah 
Projansky, have examined the many implications of this erosion of the divide between 
public and private in girls’ lives, a divide which, I argue, has significant implications 
for readings of psychosocial disability, as mental illness has historically toed a similar 
line between private shame and public exposure. 
The Discourse of “Girl” 
The language of “girl” and “girlhood” is contested terrain. Central to questions 
of girlhood and subject formation are cultural notions of victimhood/victimization and 
empowerment, with dominant narratives positing these two poles as the only 
possibilities for girls at opposite ends of a binary, an ultimately false dichotomy that 
“tragic queens” like Wollen seek to disrupt. Girl studies scholar Rosalind Sibielski 
posits that there are two contemporary popular discourses surrounding the girl, both of 
which 
construct girlhood as a site of subjectivity-in-progress, in which female 
adolescence is understood in terms of either becoming victim or becoming 
empowered, but in which girls themselves are understood as an endangered 
demographic in need of rescue—whether from society, their own adolescent 
female psyches, or each other. 
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Thus, girlhood is “positioned primarily as a site for adult intervention, with girls 
themselves accorded only a secondary role in the project of becoming girl” (Sibielski). 
Thus, to be “girl” within girl-problem and girl-power discourse, is to be woman-in-
progress (a position that many girl/hood studies scholars refute and challenge) and 
less-than-woman, or to be on the precipice of womanhood and thus constantly under 
the weight of potential crisis or threat.1 
Monica Swindle introduces the question “What is a girl, and what is the affect 
that she produces?” and notes that Simone de Beauvoir “identified the masculine as 
both the positive and the neutral, leaving the feminine always in the place of the 
negative, the Other. Thus, girl is othered to boy; a girl is not a boy; a boundary exists 
between boy and girl.” Thus, the masculine-as-default perspective noted by de 
Beauvoir is reproduced, Swindle argues, in the boy/girl dichotomy. Perhaps even more 
significantly, however, Swindle reiterates that this othering of girls is just as pervasive, 
and perhaps even more problematic, in feminist discourse: “Woman is the other, and 
girl is the subject because she is a girl, but in society (as in much feminist discourse) 
the narrative of becoming a woman participates in the othering of girls” (Swindle). 
The woman is the Other to the man, and when the girl fails to grow up into woman she 
disrupts the order as predicated upon the mail along the male/female continuum. The 
use of the term “girl” in this dissertation is influenced by Swindle’s broad 
interpretation as well as Heather Warren-Crow’s work on the plasticity and fluidity of 
                                                 
1
 “Girl” is a term on the rapid trajectory from the riot grrrl movement to defanged late 1990s and early 
2000s messages within popular music and media of girls’ empowerment and self-esteem: Think Spice 
Girls, Reviving Ophelia, and Powerpuff Girls. 
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girlhood: women who perform girlhoods by choice are in fact “girls” themselves, and 
that girlish affect, pop cultural artifacts, and even images can also be “girls.” “Girl” 
comprises most pre-adulthood females but doesn't exclude adult women. Age isn't 
necessarily directly tied to girlhood in this construction, other than that as she ages, a 
female becomes less likely to be read as “girl,” and if she retains “girlhood” past a 
certain age the performance of this identity complicates social perceptions of her 
subjecthood and individuality and poses a possible threat to social orders. A grown 
woman who retains the affect of girlhood willfully embraces the negative positionality 
of the boy/girl dichotomy and refuses to perform “womanhood” as the Other to the 
male. By refusing to perform her role as the male’s Other in the culturally scripted 
manner, the “girl” disrupts the male-centric continuum. 
Girls in Space 
The heteronormative, able-bodied, and predominantly white nature of girlhood 
studies has recently been critiqued within the field. In “Where the Girls Are: Mapping 
Girls’ Studies,” Mary Celeste Kearney takes stock of the field of girlhood studies, 
noting its lack of attention to intersectionality and within performance studies thus far: 
“Unfortunately, to date, relatively little attention has been given to race, class, 
sexuality, and ability in girls’ media culture. . . . There is a notable dearth of girl-
centered research in the fine arts [which] reinforc[es] the traditional adultist 
perspective in the arts at large” (16).  Other girlhood studies scholars have more 
pointedly critiqued the lack of intersectionality within the field, arguing that the “girl” 
is too often presented inextricably bound to whiteness, able-bodiedness, and 
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heterosexuality as default identity categories. Particularly because much of girl studies 
scholarship is positioned in response to Reviving Ophelia and its counterparts, a call 
exists within girlhood studies to examine other intersectional identities. Reviving 
Ophelia written by Mary Pipher, Ph.D. and published in 1994 was well received by 
the public, evidenced by a three-year stretch on The New York Times Best Seller list, 
including a period in the top rank. The non-fiction book takes a look at the effects of 
societal pressures on American adolescent girls, using case studies from the author's 
experience as a therapist. The book was so commercially successful as to inspire a 
fictionalized Lifetime movie of the same name. 
These critiques have inspired recent work such as the 2016 special issue of 
Cultural Studies/Critical Methodologies, Girls from Outer Space, which focuses on 
counter-narratives of girls who are deemed “different” or are positioned “outside” 
normative culture. Michelle Bae-Dimitradis, in the introduction to the issue, calls for 
scholars working in this field to “mov[e] away from both binary and canonical lenses 
of girlhood that center on White middle-class girl subjects” and to begin to “delineate 
a conceptual revision of the notion of outsideness by shifting from simply victimized, 
within a deficit model, to a complex dimension of girl agency that demonstrates both 
limiting and expanding experiences of the girls.”  
Embedded within these concerns is the larger issue of who is granted access to 
personal growth and, more broadly, who is granted girlhood and representation. The 
stakes are increasingly high: in our capitalist society, girls have become representative 
of the self-inventing, constantly becoming, neoliberal citizen consumer. Marnina 
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Gonick historically situates the emergence and subsequent importance of the girl 
subject in “Between ‘Girl Power’ and ‘Reviving Ophelia,’” arguing that “girls have 
come to represent, for the first time, one of the stakes upon which the future depends” 
(5). Current discourse is an “expression of the uncertainties, tensions, fears, and 
anxieties elicited by the rapid social, economic, and political changes taking place due 
to neoliberal policies” (Gonick 5). These neoliberal ideals adhere to the principle that 
“anyone who works hard can get ahead” and that “women have made great gains 
towards equality;” thus, women “are led to understand their own experience of 
successes and failures as a product of their individual effort” (Gonick 6). However, not 
all girls satisfy the parameters of the idealized neoliberal girl subject fantasy in which 
the ideal neoliberal girl is white, able-minded and able-bodied, educated, middle class, 
and, through the Girl Power narratives available to her, believes she can become 
anyone or anything. It is critical to draw attention to the failings and possible dangers 
of an ideological subtext that ignores systemic barriers and encourages girls to believe 
that self-fulfillment and empowerment are only a product or service out of reach, even 
if the service in question is therapy or something other that promises self-betterment.  
In a similar vein, the phenomenon of failing to attend to cultural productions 
made by, or for, girls (particularly multiply marginalized girls), even within explicit 
works dedicated to girlhood studies, has been noted since the field’s inception in the 
mid-1990s. The insight is just as relevant today, particularly when much of girls’ 
cultural production takes place online and is read as “postfeminist” or “juvenile,” due 
in part to familiar stereotypes about girl culture(s) being relegated to the private and 
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domestic spheres and in part to skepticism about online community-building as “real” 
activism, echoing common anxieties surrounding the girl about whether she is 
“genuine” or “real.” Responding to the claims of scholars such as Simon Frith who 
first theorized girls’ leisure activities and cultural productions as “starting and ending 
in the bedroom,” researchers such as McRobbie began to note the significance of girls’ 
literacy practices throughout history, including journal-writing, crafting, and zine-
making. Claudia Mitchell and Jacqueline Reid-Walsh in the introduction to Girl 
Culture: An Encyclopedia write, “Girls’ literacy practices … are often seen as not as 
serious or equal to the demanding business of reading nonfiction or engaging in boys’ 
play” (2008, xxviiixxix). Jessalynn Keller argues in this vein in “Making Activism 
Accessible: Exploring Girls’ Blogs as Sites of Contemporary Feminist Activism” that 
“girls’ activism is too often made invisible to adult researchers looking for more 
traditional activist practices that feminists have used historically, such as public 
demonstrations, legal challenges, and commercial boycotts” (Keller 18).  
Girls’ cultural productions today, and the ways in which they construct, 
perform, and “try on” selves primarily take place online, and do so by resisting or 
reifying the process that Judith Butler describes in Bodies That Matter, in which “the 
girl is ‘girled,’ brought into the domain of language and kinship through the 
interpellation of gender [which is] reiterated by various authorities and throughout 
various intervals of time to reinforce or contest this naturalized effect” (12). These 
self-making projects and online subcultures, especially those that are centered around 
stigmatized and pathologized practices such as self-harm—a practice that is nearly 
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ubiquitous in the “troubled girl” genre of crisis literature—constitute a particularly 
significant locus of the present dissertation. Responding to the growth of virtual girls’ 
communities, girl studies scholarship has, accordingly, begun, in recent years, to 
emphasize the significance of girls’ communities, and particularly their performed 
identities and self-making practices online. Work like Shayla Thiel-Stern’s 
“Femininity Out of Control on the Internet: A Critical Analysis of Media 
Representations of Gender, Youth, and MySpace.com in International News 
Discourses”2 emphasize the murky waters that girls must navigate in order to perform 
and circulate the affect of “girl” and the objects of girlhood online. These cyberspace-
based practices are, in a Butlerian sense, how one “becomes” girl and defines “what 
kind of girl” one becomes or is read as becoming. Both becomings are closely related 
to neoliberal subjectivities and their emphasis on branding and commodification, as 
well as postfeminist discourse that presents girlhood as a free market of available 
rational choices and which functions as girl power discourse’s social media-powered 
disseminator and third-wave feminism’s slightly embarrassing friend. 
The Feminist Girl 
Adding to the fraught history of “girl” and its tense relationship to the 
academy, second-wave feminists, as has been noted by scholars such as Anita Harris, 
Kearney, Claudia Mitchell, and Catherine Driscoll, were particularly uncomfortable 
                                                 
2
 Theil-Stern posits that cultural narratives about online self-making and performative practices 
available to girls are “Girls are Victims, Too Naïve, Stupid, and Out-of-Control to Protect Themselves”; 
“Narrative Two: Sexy Girlishness Draws Predators”; and “Narrative Three: MySpace Girls Are Mean, 
MySpace Boys Are Murderers” (18). 
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with and distanced themselves from “girl” as a label, and from the concerns of girls, 
except in their presumed futures as women. This was understandable to an extent, due 
to the focus at that time on activism that required participation in political activities 
(public demonstrations, protests, fundraising, running for office, and lobbying, for 
example) that would have been relatively inaccessible to girls, and on issues such as 
equal pay and mobility in the workplace that would only be relevant to girls in their 
presumed futures. However, this emphasis also led to and reflected a rhetorical move 
away from the very notion of “girl”: If a woman was perceived as the lesser “other” of 
man, then the archetype of the girl, with her presumed hyperfemininity and edges that 
had not yet been smoothed out by full integration into a man’s world, was posited as 
the enemy of feminism, representing the immature pasts and stigmatization that 
women wanted to move away from. Kearney writes, “Feminists have a lengthy 
tradition of uneasy identification and, sometimes, disidentification with girls, which 
unfortunately has led many women activists to believe, albeit often unconsciously, that 
girls are irrelevant to feminist politics and scholarship” (6). The rhetoric of second-
wave feminism, and the message that the female condition was in fact political, was in 
part contingent upon juxtaposing women with the frequently pathologized and too-
easily-dismissed (female) youth. For example, as Kearney notes: 
In The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan repeatedly called upon women to 
‘grow up’ so as to reach their ‘full potential’…Friedan opposed the 
‘adolescent’ housewife and [lauded] the fully actualized, ‘adult’ 
feminist…Although Simone de Beauvoir's most profound assertion ‘One is not 
born, but rather becomes, a woman’ begins her exploration of how femininity 
is produced during childhood, an analysis of how one becomes a girl is not her 
objective. (6)  
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This fundamental distrust of and willingness to pathologize, dismiss, or 
otherwise distance oneself and the feminist movement from girls and girlhood has 
contributed to a reticence to examine girls’ cultural productions within feminist 
theory, a gap which has been noted within girl studies scholarship and third-wave 
feminist scholarship as well. Jessica Taft argues in Jessalynn Keller’s Girls’ Feminist 
Blogging in a Postfeminist Age, “Girl activists’ ideas, stories, and theoretical 
contributions thus remain largely hidden from view. They continue to appear in both 
the public and academic domain only as occasional images—as visual objects rather 
than as intelligent and intelligible political subjects” (Keller 47). Psychosocially, 
cognitively, and physically disabled girls are often rendered invisible or stigmatized 
within the broader fields of girls’ and feminist studies, as theorists such as Deborah 
Stienstra, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and Petra Kuppers have noted in their work 
on the ways that disability is either elided within or overshadows larger discussions of 
girlhood.  
Complicating the distancing of second-wave feminists and early feminist 
theorists from associations with, and the political possibilities of, girlhood and female 
adolescence were the reclamation of “girl” and girlishness by both third-wave 
feminists and the “girl power” movement of the 1990s, as well as developments in 
new ways to look at childhood within queer theory. “Girl” as a loaded signifier 
exploded in the 1990s, with the twin movements of “girls in crisis” or “girl problem” 
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discourse3 and “girl power” discourse, initially sparked by the riot grrrl/DIY 
movement and later sanitized and scrubbed for the purpose of commodification,4 
aligning uneasily with third-wave feminist reclamations of practices and perspectives 
previously deemed “girly” and therefore inferior. “Second wave feminism's 
banishment of the word ‘girl’—‘girl was cloying, girl was weak, girl was giggly’—
transforms in the 1990s into third wave feminism's reclamation of girl culture,” 
according to Swindle in her exploration of the girl problem/girl power dichotomy. 
This development within young feminist circles, which began to result in more interest 
in the subject within feminist theory, sociology, and cultural and media studies, was 
“quickly co-opted, packaged, and sold back as a commodified version of empowered 
girlhood by marketers,” argues Swindle.  
Responding to, unpacking, and sifting through these cultural narratives—that 
girls are constantly at risk of descending into hysteria and victimhood or that they 
already have everything they could possibly need—is one of the major projects of girl 
studies scholars. According to Claudia Mitchell and Carrie A. Rentschler in “The Re-
Description of Girls in Crisis:”  
Girlhood Studies scholars respond to an overwhelming portrayal of girls as 
either bad or needing rescue in, for example, mainstream films on mean girls, 
popular psychology texts on primarily light-skinned middle class girls’ 
plummeting self-esteem, and media panics about teen girl sexting….at the 
center of these problems is a media system that too often “loves to 
                                                 
3
 As in the pop psychology, Mary Pipher/Reviving Ophelia philosophy: girl-is-threatened, girl-is-
victim, girl-is-womanhood-reduced-and-under-siege. 
4
 This was a discourse that posited girls as self-determining neoliberal subjects in complete control of 
their own futures, which later developed into the much-maligned “postfeminist” position held by some 
younger girls. 
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sensationalize, victimize, and create panic about girls and young women” 
(Girls Action Foundation 2010) rather than provide accurate information on 
the barriers girls face and the opportunities that exist for achieving change. (8) 
 
The need to provide such accurate information is especially significant for my present 
exploration of girls, madness, and self-presentation in terms of the ways that (1) girls 
respond to these sensationalistic tendencies in the media and even within psychiatric 
discourse and (2) women-as-girls (women who perform “girled” identities or 
participate in subcultures focused on girldom) are choosing to participate in a culture 
with a particularly charged relationship to threat and madness, presented in popular 
culture as perpetually at girlhood’s door, ready to knock. Jennifer Baumgardner and 
Amy Richards ask the question of what the latter category means for the development 
of new feminist and feminine identities, writing that:  
women have begun to re-adopt and circulate the objects of girldom, girling 
themselves, citing girlhood and being discursively constituted as girls, but also 
because they are circulating girl…The boundary around girl has become 
somewhat more permeable lately as the affect girl has circulated to materialize 
other bodies, such as the bodies of women who are now becoming girls, 
prompting girl to signify things other than young female. (28) 
 
The Queer Girl and the Female Grotesque 
The question of how “girl” can circulate and be read as an affect or as a 
performative identity rather than only as an age- and gender-specific positionality has 
been addressed to some extent by queer theorists in work on how resistance to 
normative relationships to time and notions of “development” can function as forms of 
subversion. Hillary Malatino argues, for example, that “Girl culture can be thought of, 
then, as a definite and defiantly queer realm that establishes counter-norms and 
alternative, resistant community by way of rituals that evade majoritarian/hegemonic 
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logics.” The readings of performance artists and musicians who have adopted 
girlsonas in later chapters of this dissertation are heavily indebted to queer theorists’ 
investigations of fractured, disrupted, or otherwise non-normative chronology and 
relationships to time. The analyses of girls and women-as-girls also are informed by 
(1) Jack Halberstam’s notions of shadow feminism (which he defines as “a feminism 
grounded in negation, refusal, passivity, absence, and silence” that “offers spaces and 
modes of unknowing, failing, and forgetting as part of an alternative feminist 
project”); (2) queer time; (3) Gaga feminism, particularly the embrace of failure as 
productive, identity as permeable, time as nonlinear, and rupture as sacred; and (4) 
Kathy Bond Stockton’s “queer child” (like Lolita of the Nabokov novel and the 
ambivalent namesake of the related-but-not-related Japanese subculture), who “grows 
sideways” even as her chronologically normative counterpart grows up.  
Like Stockton’s Lolita in The Queer Child, “growing sideways” from these 
ideas is the notion of the female grotesque, as articulated by Mary Russo in The 
Female Grotesque: Risk, Excess, and Modernity, and how it might be mapped onto the 
figure of the girl. Corinee Guy describes the female grotesque as “a term proffered by 
Mary Russo for female anomaly” (Guy 5) and “claims that the female grotesque exists 
as a scapegoat for masculine insufficiency, as an explanation for the ill-health of 
society, as a demonization of Other, and as a portraiture of authoritative anxiety.  She 
[the female grotesque] distorts language and plays an integral part in purgative and 
reformative processes” (5), linking the concept firmly to Kristeva’s abjection. 
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Furthermore, as Celia Marshik describes in her review of Russo’s work, the female 
grotesque body: 
in its incorporation and integration of abject aspects of society, provides “room 
for chance” within “the very constrained spaces of normalization” (11), 
incorporating “female exceptionalism” and the “monstrous and lacking,” 
taking in both “high” and “low” bodies (22–23). . . .  Russo contests traditional 
readings of these bodies as victimized and powerless, arguing that “the 
assumption of death, risk, and invisibility may be the price of moving beyond a 
narrow politics of identity and place” and possibly can contribute to a more 
heterogeneous society, “a state of intimacy without oneness. (11-12) 
 
This concept of the female grotesque is deeply tied to Kristevan abjection, which 
festers at the site of the cast-off mother and bubbles into fruition in the muck of the 
presymbolic realm, where mother and child were one, the semiotic chora where the 
boundary between subject and object is blurred and language is not yet articulable—
amniotic fluid, the whooshing silence of womb and coffin. In describing the chaotic 
space of the abject, Kristeva evokes images of Woman at her most becoming-woman, 
burdened by the mess of birth, menstrual blood, feces and piss, all that we look away 
from when we turn our hopeful eyes towards the linear path of paternalism and are 
inducted into the symbolic order.  
Sideways Research Questions 
This dissertation’s first research question is the following: What, then, is a 
cast-off girl, and what is her relationship to the abject? What is a girl who refuses 
linear progression through the Freudian stages and rejects her own ascension into the 
symbolic law of the Father, whether through deliberate delays, the “sideways growth” 
in Stockton’s accounts of the queer child, or through overzealous embrace of the 
trappings of girlhood (through “adolescent drag,” the ruffles of a dollified Lolita, or 
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their shadowy cousins, the beating hearts and damaged flesh behind sensationalistic 
headlines about sexting and self-harm)? This dissertation’s second research question is 
the following: If the girl is so innately harmless, why are we so afraid of her? Why do 
we proliferate so many copies of her, mass-producing them as if to stick them on the 
ominous sides of milk cartons? In answering these questions, the focus is not on girls 
who become women but rather on women who become girls, on girl-as-verb, on 
women who girl themselves, thereby returning to that semiotic chora they were always 
expected to betray, whether by becoming the mistresses of their own destruction or by 
accident, through disability, queerness, or deliberate performance of anachronistic 
girlhoods reimagined.  
The analyses of pop culture imagery I use to illustrate the “mad girl,” give us 
material to investigate the research questions by showing what the girl grotesque 
would look like and what the affect circulated by it would be. My chapters explore 
what the girl grotesque disrupts, what she subverts, and what norms she reifies. Could 
a girl grotesque be located in the body of the paralyzed hysteric, Rhoda’s 
anachronistic patent-leather shoes and perfect manners (and poker face) in The Bad 
Seed, deliberately exposed scars on wrists and the dissemination of those images on 
Snapchat, adult women with backs defiantly beribboned and stitched up to look like 
permanent corsets, the big-eyed bored-sad girls sprouting tentacles and clutching 
bloody knives and bubble gum in Ray Caesar’s and Mark Ryden’s pop surrealist 
paintings, or garish purple braids on a Gothic Lolita? Via readings of psychosocially 
disabled girls in art and media, a concept of the girl-grotesque and the “mad girl” is 
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advanced, a concept whose primary characteristics are interrelationality (in literature, 
intertextuality; in headlines, contagious or viral), masochism (not necessarily in the 
colloquial/sexual sense, but aesthetically, as related to fantasy, delay, and disavowal or 
disidentification), and maximalism (or excess, redundancy). Her expression is seen in 
girlsonas and skin speaking. She is the female grotesque’s little sister, but lost. To 
what extent these performative practices are fertile with subversive, productive 
potential is an open question at this point. The last chapter of this dissertation reflects 
on this fraught issue. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter two, “You’re Too Pretty to Cut,” focuses on girl-led digital 
communities and subcultures that form around the practice of self-harm, including 
YouTube depictions that can hurt other self-harmers while also producing attachment 
and affiliation through such taboo practices. The chapter examines self-harm as an 
interdisciplinary phenomenon in light of Cvetkovich’s approach to the so-called 
“depression epidemic” and Lennard Davis’s call to examine disability through a 
biocultural lens. The representation of self-harm in popular culture generates a tangle 
of narratives about girls, selfishness, narcissism, and mental illness. For example, self-
cutting in film “is used as a shorthand for dysfunction, whether sexual pathology, 
individual mental illness in teenage girls, the dysfunction of an entire corrupt society 
or the apparently inherent madness of the female gender” (McPhee, 119). Self-harm 
narratives that are disseminated by girls through social media and other online 
platforms often take the form of the contemporary homonormative “uncloseting” 
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narrative for LGBT teens, contributing to a common whitewashing of self-harm as a 
practice (also reflected in representations of disorders like BPD) and the construction 
of linear before/after identities that elide the painful realities of living with and 
managing self-harm.  
Chapter three, “Representations of Borderline Personality Disorder and the 
‘New’ Hysteria” unpacks the history and onscreen/onstage representations of 
borderline personality disorder (BPD). BPD has been associated in popular culture 
with the archetype of the “troubled” young woman and provides a key entry point to 
the exploration of psychosocial disabilities, which can be represented as material 
entities, biocultural phenomena (Davis), interdisciplinary phenomena (Cvetkovich), or 
kaleidoscopic lenses that reflect cultural attitudes, prejudices, and trends. Just as with 
the general history of hysteria, BPD not only is gendered but particularly associated 
with young, queer, or hypersexualized women and girls, an association thrown into 
sharp relief by scholarship in the feminist history of BPD (Kahn) as well as the anti-
psychiatry tradition in Canadian mad studies (Burstow; Ingram; and LeFrancois). 
Chapter four, “Trauma in Emilie Autumn’s Neo-Victorian Performances,” 
explores Emilie Autumn’s controversial Lolita-like artistic performances in light of 
both neo-Victorian and Japanese Lolita subcultures as well as Morrigan’s “trauma 
time.” Autumn’s performative persona takes the form of a traumatized and 
subsequently institutionalized Victorian girl whose songs address themes of 
molestation and other forms of severe childhood trauma. Using Fisher’s work on 
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“adolescent drag,” the chapter focuses particularly on Autumn’s representations of 
girlhood-after-trauma. 
Chapter five, “Welcome to Martinez’s Pop Surrealist D-o-l-l-h-o-u-se,” 
explores a mainstream counterpart to the previous chapter’s subject. Melanie 
Martinez, a pop star and self-described “Lolita,” uses neo-Victorian themes, bricolage, 
and cultural pastiche to spotlight the ways that mental illness and suicidal ideation in 
young women and girls are often dismissed or stigmatized. The analysis of Martinez’s 
work is informed by scholarship on subcultures of Japanese fashion and Japanese 
manga (Bergstrom) as well as on “dollification” (Hall & Ellis). 
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Chapter Two 
You’re Too Pretty to Cut: 
Digital Subcultures and the Narrative of Self-Harm  
Can we help? Posts with words or tags you're searching for often encourage 
behavior that can cause harm and even lead to death. If you're going through 
something difficult, we'd like to help. 
 After Instagram launched what it called a “self-help campaign” in 2016 to aid 
users deemed at risk for practices such as self-harm and disordered eating behaviors, 
the above “Can we help?” prompt is what users encounter if they search for hashtags 
like #selfharmmm or #secret_society123, both of which are replacements for the 
blunter, already censored hashtags #selfharm, #cutting, #icutmyself, and so on. 
Depending upon the response, the prompt leads users to various options such as 
“contacting local law enforcement,” calling suicide hotlines, or activities under the 
rubric of “giving yourself a break” (“Guidelines”), such as looking at the clouds, 
taking a hot shower, and doodling. Under the new guidelines, users can also report 
another user’s post that includes images or descriptions of self-harm by marking “It’s 
Inappropriate” with the reason being “Self-injury.” Instagram was lauded within 
popular discourse as potentially saving lives by providing these warnings and 
opportunities to report fellow users. Actual images or posts that show or describe self-
harm cuts or scars risk deletion, and users who propagate those images technically risk 
being banned, though Instagram is, largely, still relatively unregulated. YouTube, 
Facebook, and Tumblr made similar promises to censor their content to varying 
  
30 
 
degrees, with YouTube providing the option of either complete censorship or an age-
restriction content warning before every video featuring discussions of self-harm. 
These efforts on the part of Instagram, Tumblr, YouTube, and Facebook were 
launched in response to what users saw as an alarming rise in online subcultures 
dedicated to the discussion and representation of self-harm, particularly among girls 
and young women. As with many things related to young girls, girls’ concerns are 
regarded as less than and immature while paradoxically also in need of censorship and 
prolonged media pearl clutching. The cast-off girl is disallowed from speaking for 
herself, her message being at once inconsequential and potentially harmful. The media 
narrative disturbingly lumped self-harm (used specifically here to mean the practice of 
self-cutting)—often described as the quintessential example of adolescent “drama”—
into the same categories as adolescent girls’ predilections for Snapchatting and 
partying, while anorexia and bulimia receded in terms of journalistic panic. 
Provocative headlines throughout the 2010s in particular have repeatedly declared 
adolescent girls under siege due to the trifecta of sexting, selfies, and self-harm 
(Gabriel), with the latter in particular described as a “shocking” teen trend and as 
inherently linked to the use of social media (Nannar). These efforts at warnings and 
censorship, however well-intentioned, have left many mental health rights activists 
skeptical or outright critical, claiming that the censorship would only serve to further 
stigmatize and alienate those undergoing psychic distress and potentially could lead to 
criminalization and institutionalization. At the very least, they wondered what was 
causing all the drama. If teen self-harm is such a common practice, why are these 
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posts in particular such a source of public hysteria and anxiety? The hysteria isn’t 
limited to posts that include cuts, but anything tangentially related to or vaguely 
referencing self-harm, even in one’s history. Why can’t these very publicly offered 
narratives potentially serve as public health projects, providing a springboard for 
further communication with girls rather than closing “us” (and them) off? If well-
meaning adults are so concerned about discovering the reasons behind self-harm, why, 
then, were these narratives so heavily censored? The immediate, if naïve, answer 
might be that the adults are worried about copycat phenomena and in doing so the 
well-meaning intention seems to be at least to display an affect of caring. But, this 
reflexive answer might be too simplistic or even self-serving, leaving us with deeper 
questions about other motivations. 
My aim in this exploration is not therapeutic. This is not to deny the psychic 
distress that sometimes leads to or is caused by the practice of self-harm or the 
abatement of that distress that sometimes accompanies clinical treatment for, or 
cessation of, the practice. It is also not liberatory or radically anti-psychiatry; in other 
words, I'm not seeking to posit self-harm as either an explicitly feminist practice or as 
a unilaterally and deliberately transgressive, politically productive response to 
oppression and the workings of disciplinary power. I am, however, working towards a 
less immediately reactionary and emotionally charged understanding of the loaded 
practice of self-harm, particularly of the girl culture that has evolved around it, and to 
examine current representations of the practice through the lens of performance and 
performativity in order to interrogate its possible meanings beyond the reductive and 
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sensationalized narratives often offered by dominant psychiatric and media discourses. 
In this vein, three questions guide this chapter: (1) Within the masochistic aesthetic 
and along the spectrum of the performative practices of self-harm, who is speaking 
and, relatedly, who is allowed to speak? (2) If self-harm is a performance, who is its 
audience? (3) How do conceptions of self-harm, particularly those that hystericize and 
pathologize, reflect and perpetuate our cultural fears about girls and girl culture(s)? 
Following Self-Harm 
I began to explore these questions in 2015, when I started a poetry and visual 
art Instagram under a pen name. As I gained followers, I noticed that the 
overwhelming majority of them were girls or young women, from teens up to mid-
twenties. As my network grew, I discovered that a fairly large minority, approximately 
1/3, of the posts dealt with issues of depression and trauma, with a smaller but vocal 
and prolific minority within those openly discussing self-harm: practicing it, avoiding 
it, recovering from it, or making art and memes based on it. Because these circles are 
populated disproportionately by teen girls, and because I was potentially being read as 
one myself, I felt viscerally uncomfortable both at being read as girl and at being what 
felt like “bombarded” with images of self-inflicted violence.  
Such feelings of repulsion, fear, and deep concern are common when it comes 
to self-harm, especially when self-harm is enacted or discussed by girls or young 
women. Noting the visceral reactions of her colleagues at a conference where video 
excerpts from the New French Extremity film In My Skin (Dans ma peau), which 
explores issues of female masochism and self-inflicted violence, were shown, Angela 
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Failler wonders in “Narrative Skin Repair” “why representations of self-harm might 
be difficult or even unbearable to witness and, second, what the implications of this 
are for the potential to cultivate empathic understandings of self-harm and of those 
who practise self-harm.” In “Carved in Skin: Bearing Witness to Self-Harm,” Jane 
Kilby asks a similar question about the difficulty of being the “audience” to the 
practice of self-harm: 
The act of self-harm renders skin a deeply eloquent form of testimony, where a 
plea is made for social recognition. . . . Yet there is something particularly hard 
to witness here. . . .  Arguably, then, there is something about this “voice” that 
defies witnessing. . . . What is the nature of self-cut skin such that it is difficult 
to bear witness to? What is the nature of witnessing such that there is a 
resistance in the testimonial project of self-cut skin? (98) 
 
Examining the way these images activated shame, guilt, and disgust for me, as well as 
nostalgia, led me to a deeper interest in the tie between self-harm, girlhood, disability, 
and notions of illness, wellness, and censorship.5 The feeling of nostalgia struck me as 
particularly odd; presumably the nostalgia was a yearning for kinship, connection, and 
recognized identity—perhaps linkable to the act of self-harm itself. In particular, the 
conventional media narrative of “girls encouraging each other to cut” online, such as a 
2015 Globe and Mail article titled “The cluster effect: Is self-harming contagious?”, 
though not 100% inaccurate in every case, is worth probing, as it is far too reductive to 
explain what’s really going on in these co-creative circles (Hoffman 57). Girls in these 
communities are not only posting images of fresh cuts or sharing laments. The 
                                                 
5
 As a teen myself, I occasionally haunted “pro-ana” forums (at their peak at the time). Though I had no 
eating disorder, I was viscerally and voyeuristically fascinated by the strange communitas-through-
liminality formed by these groups of girls who worshipped what they referred to as the twin goddesses 
of “Anna” and “Mia.” 
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communities are far too complex to be dismissed as anxious girls following a trend; 
these are communities featuring visual artists, poets, songwriters, advice vloggers, 
photographers, models, minor “celebrities,” and public figures. The media at large 
misses that this is a community of like-minded girls acting upon shared behaviors. The 
disseminated message is not merely instructions on how to effectively cut, but a 
complex web of cutting related behaviors and advices: how to stop cutting, how to 
suppress the urge to cut, how to reduce frequency, how to cut safely, and even how to 
talk about cutting without resuming the practice. These communities are often 
censored for touching upon cutting regardless of the communities’ individual stances 
on cutting. 
All the girls whose posts are analyzed in this chapter explicitly seek out 
followers and public feedback, work as community leaders, give out personal 
information, make no attempt to hide their identities or any of their online activities, 
and operate as public figures to varying degrees of moderate to extremely high 
visibility. They are running a hybrid, difficult-to-define network of peer support, self-
branding, capitalist venture, and public journaling, as well as a contemporary iteration 
of DIY/zine culture. Furthermore, the average “girl” in these groups is getting older; 
while pro-ana and pro-mia (pro-anorexia and pro-bulimia) groups were seemingly 
populated primarily by adolescent girls, the most well-known participants in self-harm 
communities are technically adults (depending on the region) between the ages of 17 
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and 23, though they often identify as girls and circulate the objects, aesthetics, cultural 
forms, and affects associated with girl culture.6 
Self-Harm Communities and Scholarship 
Pro-ana and pro-mia (pro-anorexia and pro-bulimia) blogs and websites 
developed in the early 1990s, reaching their peak in the mid-to-late years of the same 
decade, prompted a similar kind of media panic. While self-harm communities (very 
few of them ever describe themselves as “pro”-cutting) comprised primarily of girls 
have thus far received little scholarly attention, feminist theorists have occasionally 
taken up pro-ana forums and blogs as sites of inquiry, particularly into the 
performance of gendered selves within these communities, with scholars concluding in 
turn that they reinforce patriarchal norms about beauty and “taking up space,” that 
they provide a complex virtual space for girls to work out their own identities in 
response to dominant beauty standards, or that they actually help young women work 
through different possible selves during a period of identity diffusion, as well as 
documenting the groups’ complicated relationships to agency and control over one’s 
body. Of the cultural purposes these groups serve, Marisa Helena Silva Farah and 
Cecilia Hanna Mate write in “Practices of Anorexia and Bulimia as an Aesthetics of 
Existence” that 
Having their own blog is a rite of passage for these young women as they 
reaffirm their belonging to a collective identity and strengthen their individual 
                                                 
6
 Pro-ana and pro-mia refer to the promotion of behaviors related to the eating disorders anorexia 
nervosa and bulimia nervosa. Organizations have widely different stances: as non-judgmental 
environments for anorexics, a place to discuss their illness, and to support those who choose to enter 
recovery; others claim that anorexia is a “lifestyle choice” rather than a mental illness. 
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identities. This is evidenced by the creation of new designs and forms of 
accounts to express ideas and experiences which favor the development of a 
new matrix to be followed—the blog created—and an expression of identity 
network. 
 
Remarkably, these blogs are often substitutes for the actual act of self-harm, yet are 
nonetheless monitored and censored for fear that they may spread the contagion of 
desire to self-harm. They strengthen individual identities outside of the act of cutting, 
yet the fear of a cluster effect and collective response encourages outsider intercession 
into these communities. 
Emerging self-harm communities employ similar strategies aimed at providing 
means for girls’ self-expression, with similar focuses on art-making, emotionality, 
intimacy among members, and outreach (giving and getting advice and support), and 
with similar narratives about ambivalent relationships to the medical industry 
(particularly psychiatrists and psychologists) and family members (who engender the 
fear both of not being heard and of the ramifications of being heard). The most 
comprehensive study of these communities is Eda R. Uca’s Ana’s Girls: The Essential 
Guide to the Underground Eating Disorder Community Online, in which Uca explores 
the primary ideological perspectives shared by various ED online support groups: 
“none of your business” (individualism and personal choice, bodily autonomy); “it’s a 
lifestyle, not a disease” (pushing against the biomedical model of anorexia), and “ana 
as religion,” complete with sacred texts, including prayers to the goddesses of An(n)a 
and Mia. Pro-ana and pro-mia groups are distinct from, but in many ways the cultural 
predecessors of, the emergent subculture of self-harm. For one thing, anorexia is 
publicly perceived similarly to the practice of self-harm in terms of its reputation as 
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tied to “dramatic” or “attention-seeking” behaviors. However, anorexia is both 
arguably more dangerous in the long-term than is the practice of self-harm (and less 
likely to be noticed immediately). Societal reactions to the practices/disordered 
behaviors are also different, with conventional beauty standards making significant 
weight loss a socially desirable behavior to a point, while self-harm among girls 
(which was previously treated as a “masculine” or “aggressive” behavior) is met with 
immediate disapproval and pathologization when discovered, leading to differences in 
the communities that form around the practice. Biomedical models of mental illness 
have also been popularized throughout the 2000s, while attachments to spirituality and 
religion have decreased among millennials (pewforum.org), meaning that many online 
self-harmers have a more ambivalent attitude (i.e., identifying their own practices as 
addictions, things they would like to stop, or as a mode of self-care or healing from 
mental illness or psychic distress) towards their practice of cutting than did pro-
anorexic young women towards their practices of fasting, binging, or purging. 
Though body modification and self-mutilation have a long history within 
spiritual and ritualistic practices (Hewitt 2), in more recent years the practice of self-
harm has been stigmatized among the public and clinicians alike, as it is frequently 
associated with attention-seeking behaviors, “dramatic” tendencies, or failed attempts 
at suicide, which may help to explain some of the hystericized responses to its 
seeming online popularity, and which is difficult to extricate completely from the 
practice’s association with girls and teen “angst.” Patricia A. Adler and Peter Adler 
point to this tendency towards stigmatization in The Tender Cut: Inside the Hidden 
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World of Self-Injury: “The simplest and least sympathetic interpretation of self-harm is 
that it is self-serving: motivated by the desired for gain in forms that might include 
attention and sympathy from family or doctors” (13). This stereotype is complicated, 
exacerbated, and potentially ‘confirmed’ by subcultures that are read as promoting the 
practice or as using the practice to ‘go viral’ or gain followers. Because of the 
practice’s stigma, it has faced censorship from its first online appearances, raising 
ethical questions about what bodily practices and functions (bleeding? Those 
associated with psychic distress?) should remain private. Building off of Erving 
Goffman’s and Susan Sontag’s work in the same vein, Lorita Coleman Brown’s 
exploration of why certain disabilities or illnesses are particularly stigmatized, in 
“Stigma: An Enigma Demystified,” gives a clue as to why self-harm in particular is 
treated with such repulsion and suspicion: “Certain physical characteristics or illnesses 
elicit fear because the etiology of the attribute or disease is unknown, unpredictable, 
and unexpected” (155).  
Self-harm scars, like other attributes with no known single cause, evoke 
anxiety in witnesses partly because they potentially open up their own bodily and 
emotional vulnerabilities. This stigmatization and aura of mystery is perpetuated not 
only by the public, but by medical professionals as well, with many of them 
confounded, angered, or irritated by the practice, considering it a baffling distraction 
from others’ physically manifested and socially legitimated problems and leading 
them to deprioritize the care of patients with a history of self-harm or to treat those 
patients with suspicion, as Leigh Dale notes in Responses to Self Harm: An Historical 
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Analysis of Medical, Religious, Military and Psychological Perspectives: “Some and 
perhaps many medical professionals see those patients as ‘neither ill, nor victim,’ as 
the title of Rosana Machin’s 2009 study of the emergency department of a public 
hospital…puts it. At the very least, many who encounter those who self harm . . . are 
puzzled” (Dale 5). Adler and Adler note that, very recently, views of the practice have 
begun to shift again, partially in response to the proliferation of youth cultures that 
claim the practice as a coping mechanism: “Self injury’s movement in the twenty-first 
century from under the medicalized rubric of mental illness to the voluntary choice of 
deviance has further destigmatized it for some. To be seen as ill is to be derogated; to 
be seen as self-healing is normal” (12). While this perspective partially obscures the 
ambivalent “middle position” occupied by many self-harmers in relationship to their 
self-harm—seeing it as both personal choice and as a potentially unhealthy response to 
distress, and both advocating for its acceptance and fellow self-harmers’ recovery—it 
does reflect the current shift in discussions around the practice. 
In Psyche on the Skin: A History of Self-Harm, Sarah Chaney traces the history 
of self-mutilation practices such as ancient castration and medicinal bloodletting, 
which was not pathologized until the twentieth century alongside the emergence of 
psychiatry, to their contemporary iterations and particularly their reception within 
digital cultures. Associated with borderline and sometimes schizophrenic inpatients 
until the mid-1990s, self-harm gathered awareness as a practice among girls and 
young women in the second half of the decade. Caroline Kettlewell’s 1999 memoir 
Skin Game, similar to Marya Hornbacher’s bestselling anorexia and bulimia memoir, 
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Wasted, in the previous year, presented cutting as a rite of passage in the coming-of-
age trajectory of a troubled girlhood. Accompanied by pop psychology texts like 
Marilee Strong’s A Bright Red Scream and cautionary tales like Steven Levenkron’s 
teen novel The Luckiest Girl in the World and Patricia Mccormick’s YA novel Cut, a 
popular image developed of the quintessential contemporary “cutter” as fragile and, 
usually, as a girl, one who was troubled, required treatment, and needed the protection 
of Father Medicine. 
 Self-harm’s association with adolescent girls is not entirely socially 
constructed or unjustified, though the assumption that it is virtually exclusive to girls 
has been subsequently disproven. Nevertheless, a 2008 study in the Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology found that “56 percent of adolescent girls 
reported doing some form of self-harm in their lifetimes” (Adler and Adler 18). 
Studies in the 1980s and 1990s showed much lower rates of self-injurious behavior 
among girls. Meanwhile, rates of eating disorders among young girls, while still high, 
have steadily decreased over the same period. Self-harm was racialized in the 
mainstream cultural narrative as white7 and presumed to be especially popular among 
the middle class: The pathologized practice quickly became associated with decadence 
and privilege, as well as a need for paternal authority, not only for the girls who 
practice self-harm, but for those who might see it, be triggered by it, or be 
“contaminated” with it. Chaney notes that “the modern view of self-harm as a coping 
                                                 
7
 Subsequent studies have shown it, unlike eating disorders, to be far more equally distributed among 
racial, socioeconomic, and age groups than was previously believed. 
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mechanism sits awkwardly alongside the paternalistic, protective model applied to 
self-injurious behaviour in youth culture” (206), reflected in part by social-media 
based attempts to “police this continuous flow of online information” (207). Adler and 
Adler posit that “during the 1990s the behavior began to expand…becoming a cult 
youth phenomenon, then a form of more typical teenage angst, and then the province 
of a wide swatch of socially disempowered individuals in broader age, race, gender, 
and class groups” (Adler and Adler 4). Thus, the practice is seen as “spreading” in 
particular because many girls who are now exposing their self-harm are not white, 
middle-class, or able-bodied.  
Rather than assuming that the practice was wrongly racialized as white as a 
default or classed as middle-class as default, or that it is less specific to young girls 
than was previously believed, media panic has assumed that the problem both 
originates from and is spread by girls (Thiel-Stern 145), exposing several 
contradictory underlying and persistent cultural beliefs about girls: They are at once 
threatening and perpetually threatened, socially powerful and vulnerable, the 
consummate consumers and frighteningly prolific cultural producers. 
Girl Problems and Girl Power 
The twin discourses of “girl problems” (or “girls in crisis”) and “girl power 
that developed in the 1990s and proliferated throughout the 2000s serve as a backdrop 
for the media representations of, and responses to, online communities of girls that 
developed around eating disorders, self-harm, and other indications of psychic 
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distress. Rebecca Hains contrasts the two competing discourses in Growing Up With 
Girl Power: Girlhood on Screen and in Everyday Life:  
Girl power can be understood as a discourse that emerged in response to a 
popular set of discourses I call the “girl crisis.” The girl crisis centered upon 
the societal devaluation of girls in U.S. culture, a circumstance that gained 
widespread recognition in the 1990s. Parents, academics, and cultural critics 
became concerned that girls were being treated inequitably. (102)  
 
The seminal girl-crisis text usually cited by media and girlhood studies scholars is 
psychologist Mary Pipher’s 1994 Reviving Ophelia, which explored girls’ alleged 
increase in disordered eating practices, vulnerabilities to sexual assault and domestic 
violence, problems at school, and sexual practices deemed promiscuous or potentially 
harmful. Pipher’s account of girlhood-under-threat by external forces and by girls 
themselves and their alleged pathologies was media fuel for an already-burgeoning 
fear about what girlhood in the 1990s meant, what it looked like, and the ways in 
which it was radically changing. To be a girl, the girl-problem discourse alleged, was 
to be a victim or potential victim. Pipher’s work evolved into a girl-problem genre that 
continues today, propagated by feminist and postfeminist nonfiction writers, pop 
culture commentators, and mental health clinicians. In 2012’s Cinderella Ate My 
Daughter, Peggy Orenstein, who has largely taken up Pipher’s mantle of girls-as-
threat or as under-threat, issues a takedown of princess-obsessed girl culture and 
installs in her audience the perpetual fear of girls’ online communities (“Just You, Me, 
and My 622 BFFs” is one ominous chapter title).  
Indeed, beyond fears about girls’ premature sexualization and vulnerability to 
substance abuse and objectification, by far the most common sentiment expressed in 
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popular nonfiction and pop psychology texts that respond to and perpetuate cultural 
anxieties about girls and their futures centers on their behavior online and the tenor of 
their Internet-based interactions with other girls (peer pressure, competition, and 
“mean girls,” for example). Thus, it is easy to discern, at least on a superficial level, 
why online subcultures and cultural productions centered on practices seen as the 
epitomes of “mad/bad/sad girl” behaviors (such as fasting, binging, purging, or 
cutting) activate those anxieties so pointedly and urgently. Even without the added 
stigmas and fears linked to self-harm and explicit narratives of psychic distress, social 
media is often discursively framed in pathologizing terms: an addiction, affliction, 
obsession, fixation, or epidemic. Nancy Jo Sales asks in American Girls: Social Media 
and the Secret Lives of Teenagers, “Are girls addicted to social media?” (10). She 
answers her rhetorical question by framing social media in the terms of substance use 
and a shared virtual space unique to girls that is walled off to an extent from adults. 
“It’s an extraordinary new reality, and it’s happened so fast;” Sales writes. “For the 
first time, most American girls are engaged in the same activity most of the time. . . . 
When we talk about social media, we say we’re ‘going on’ it, similar to the way we 
talk about going on a trip. We seem to experience it as a sort of mental journey to 
another place” (10). 
It doesn’t help to disarm this conventional media narrative—which links 
toxicity on social media to girls and alleges that that toxicity originates from and is 
spread by girls themselves—when the practices associated with these specific 
subcultures (especially self-harm, but also pro-ana and pro-mia) are often presented as 
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inextricable from girls and girldom. Elad Yom-Tov writes about this phenomenon in 
Crowdsourced Health: How What You Do on the Internet Will Improve Medicine: 
In the course of one of my studies on eating disorders, I used photographs that 
people had posted on a photo-sharing site to characterize those individuals’ 
stances with regard to anorexia. I browsed the images (mostly of emaciated 
women). . . . One of my colleagues passed my cubicle, saw the images I was 
labeling, and remarked “Good thing you only have boys.” (40) 
 
“Good thing you only have boys” insinuates, of course, that girls and girlhood are 
particularly prone to trouble, but also exposes the underlying cultural trend of 
circulating the image of the girl and all her presumed attendant crisis points as the 
barometer of the shifting social landscape. As Anita Harris describes in Future Girl, 
“Girlhood now operates…as a space for worries about unknown futures, about the 
ability to succeed and dominate in changing…cultural landscapes” (2). While girl-
problem discourse exemplifies societal concerns about both girls and major cultural 
shifts (the girl functioning as the sign of the times), girl-power discourse presents the 
solution: capitalism, consumerism, and the tyranny of individual, rational choice (a 
girlified “pull yourself up by your bootstraps”). Self-harm communities, where girls 
openly express extreme sadness online in the face of the allegedly wide array of 
choices available, potentially throw a wrench into the popular notion that choice is 
everything or even possible when it comes to mood, distress, debility, or disability. 
In Postfeminist Digital Cultures: Femininity, Social Media, and 
Representation, Amy Shields Dobson posits the image of the “can do” girl—emerging 
from girl-power discourse and notions of neoliberal subject formation and radical 
individualism—as the idealized contemporary girl, characterized by her dedication to 
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rational choices, assertive agency, and total control over her own subjectivity. Dobson 
contrasts the cultural recognition of “can do girls” and “girls in crisis,” with the latter 
“often marked by asking for feedback or mediating pain through social media, no 
longer just at risk but in active crisis” (62). Referencing girls who participated in the 
popular 2015-2016 “Am I pretty or ugly?” challenge in which young (mostly 
prepubescent and early adolescent) girls asked fellow YouTube viewers to weigh in on 
their relative attractiveness, Dobson questions her own, visceral, disgusted reaction to 
these videos and argues that these girls were seen in media portrayals as “the opposite 
of postfeminist, girl-powered performative digital subjectivities” (61) that focus on 
neoliberal self-branding and immunity from criticism and from the intersubjective, 
relational space that requires feedback. Without asking the girls themselves, media 
narratives declared an epidemic of girls (as evidenced by high rates of participation in 
the challenge) who considered themselves “worthless,” as “needy,” or requiring 
feedback for the basic upkeep of their self-esteem, prompting circulations of media 
“horror” and “dismay” (Dobson 67). Dobson argues further that “The framing of these 
videos as ‘simply an issue of girls’ self-esteem’ obscures law and policy battles 
through which women’s bodily rights are being stripped back at the same time as 
women are responsibilized—charged with managing their own sense of value and self-
esteem” (69). Thus, by presenting the problem as one relegated to the neurochemistry 
or the drama-seeking behaviors of an individual girl, society abdicates responsibility 
for creating the environment and circumstances that fostered those unwanted 
behaviors. Dobson’s arguments about how certain girls’ behaviors, particularly in the 
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digital sphere, are framed as indicative of their value/values, self-worth, and relative 
mental health, can easily be mapped onto the workings of girls’ online self-harm 
subcultures. 
When Girls Speak, Who is Listening/Reading/Witnessing? 
Two of the emergent narratives in girls’ self-harm subcultures are what I have 
referred to as skin speaking and the narrative of the closet. Both of these narratives 
deal with questions of divisions between the public and private spheres and how those 
relate to both trauma and perceptions of girlhood, as well as who serves as the 
audience or witness when girls expose their self-harm or stories of self-harm and 
psychic distress online.  
One prominent subgenre of video-based self-harm narratives (alongside 
Instagram memes and images, the most popular form of participation in online self-
harm communities) by and for girls is the “self-harm excuse” video, and another is the 
“how to tell your parents” or what I refer to as the “uncloseting” narrative. Both of 
these address themes of secrecy, sometimes exacerbating existing cultural anxieties 
about girls and their alleged surreptitiousness: If you self-harm, should you tell 
someone, and if you do, when? Some of the girls claim to have thought the practice 
was normal until they were met with harsh or stigmatizing reactions from parents or 
classmates, thus complicating the idea that the practice itself is spreading virally or 
specifically via the internet. Others say they kept it secret, some advise their peers to 
do so as well, and some emphasize instead the recovery model, referencing both AA-
like ideologies about rehabilitation (“Acknowledge you are powerless over your 
  
47 
 
addiction”) and the contemporary, homonormative LGBT “It gets better” narrative by 
pushing the need to expose oneself in order to “heal” or “get better.” 
One common aspect among most of the girls’ narratives within these 
subgenres, and particularly the “how to tell your parents” or “reaction” subgenre, is a 
desire for an empathetic witness, which complicates the idea of girls’ “bedroom 
culture” as first defined by Frith, which posits that girls’ culture starts and ends in the 
bedroom. What happens when that bedroom culture becomes both virtual and public, 
when journal writing goes viral, or when the bedroom in question has a witness? For 
some, that witness is a parent, teacher, or other adult. For others, the camera is the 
mediator, with the imagined audience of fellow girls and potential self-harmers as a 
collective of witnesses. The significance of witnessing in a subject’s navigation of 
trauma has been noted by Cvetkovich in Depression: A Public Feeling as well as in 
Failler’s and Kilby’s readings of the practice of self-harm. Similarly, Janice McLane 
elaborates self-harm’s potential as an act of testimony (hence, of course, also requiring 
a witness) in “The Voice on the Skin: Self-Mutilation and Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of 
Language.” Self-harm in adolescence and adulthood has been repeatedly statistically 
linked to many kinds of trauma and abuse, particularly childhood sexual abuse. Kilby 
notes that there is a historically recognized “relationship between the disavowed 
trauma of childhood sexual violation and self-cutting” (68). Of the relationship 
between trauma and testimony, Cvetkovich writes, “Shoshana Felman and Dori 
Laub’s work in Testimony speaks to the specificity of testimony as cultural and 
historical genre, an event that seeks a witness but may not find one, an interactive 
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occasion in which the relation between speaker and hearer is crucial to the narrative, 
which becomes performative rather than constative” (14). McLane, in turn, 
emphasizes the primary significance of cutting and its frequent linkage to femininity 
and youth as its refusal of the symbolic order. Cutting the skin, she writes, “gains its 
significance because it represents an exaggerated breaking with language: it supplants 
the promise of language to communicate trauma by rendering the site of pain a 
language in itself” (125). Yet, as a site of trauma, the skin demands a witness, and its 
“speaking” of the unspeakable, or the average witness’s inability to read the language 
being spoken or to speak back, provokes anxiety.  
The three primary affective responses to the exposure of self-harm, on the part 
of both speaker (cutter) and witness, are, according to the girls’ self-harm narratives, 
fear (often resulting in institutionalization or medicalization), shame (for the speaker, 
Why can’t I take it further? or Why do I do this?), and guilt (for the witness, Should I 
have done more to stop it? For the speaker, Why can’t I stop? Or Why can’t I hide it 
better?). These affective responses raise questions about why cutting makes so many 
people so viscerally uncomfortable. Is it, for example, because it is exposed or 
performed (people prefer a “don’t-ask-don’t-tell” policy), or because it was not 
initially performed for the public and it smacks of what really goes down at sleepovers 
and in girls’ bedroom culture? McLane claims that some of this anxiety comes from 
the apparent “unreadability” of self-harm: “As gestural communication, self-
mutilation can reorganize and stabilize the trauma victim’s world, providing a ‘voice 
on the skin’ when the actual voice is forbidden” (124), with many claiming that it 
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“replaces language” (125), representing, perhaps, a form of Cixousian écriture 
feminine or an attempt to “express the inexpressible” by escaping the symbolic order. 
The girls’ narratives reflect this sense of ineffability, often wondering aloud at both 
why they engage in the practice and why it evokes the reactions it does, as well as 
lamenting the fact that it doesn’t always communicate what they want it to.  
Furthermore, sometimes the trauma to be witnessed is not only the act of self-
harm and not only the psychic distress or abuse that may have preceded it, but after the 
self-harm itself in the reactions or non-reactions of others, rendering the socially 
accepted linear uncloseting narrative (self-harm occurs, the secrecy disrupts a girl’s 
life, she “goes public” with it, and she is saved/protected/recovers) more questionable. 
Hannah Vancouver, a popular 19-year-old self-harm YouTube vlogger, unlike many 
of her contemporaries, claims to have never been invested in hiding her self-harm to 
begin with: “I’ve never been much for hiding self-harm, I was always just kind of like, 
fuck it,” she says in one video. In several others, she encourages girls not to hide their 
scars with clothing or jewelry. Yet she expresses disappointment over her parents’ 
lack of reaction and their refusal to witness her pain. In her video “Parents’ Reaction 
to Self Harm,” she says, 
People are like, always asking me for advice about how to tell their parents 
about their self-harm, and I don’t have a lot of advice for it because personally, 
I’ve never really told them. . . . [When my mom found out] she basically said, 
“Ok, you have to stop doing it,” and I basically just said, “OK, I’ll stop doing 
it,” and that was kind of the end of it, but the things is, I didn’t stop doing it. 
I’m not sure if they noticed. I’ve honestly never asked them, what do you think 
about my self-harm? They probably noticed that I was still doing it, but they 
didn’t say anything (Vancouver). 
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The first half of Hannah’s uncloseting narrative follows the don’t-ask-don’t-tell 
trajectory common to self-harm and addiction stories and, often, queer outings as well. 
Betrayed by their body’s truth-telling in some way (mannerisms read as queer, self-
harm scars, slips of the tongue, or physical signs of substance abuse), the “outed” 
person is “found out,” only to be politely asked to slip back in. Having previously 
been hospitalized for an eating disorder and suicidal ideation, Hannah is eventually 
discovered again (again due to the self-harm scars she refuses to hide) at a school 
program called CHOICES that is tailored to students with mental health issues: “My 
teacher was tying a ribbon around my wrist, and she saw. They called me aside. . . . 
I’m kind of glad they noticed it, because they were able to tell my parents for me. 
They basically told me that I needed to stop doing it.” Hannah is both grateful for a 
witness-of-sorts who serves as mediator (“they were able to tell my parents for me”) 
and emphasizes the truth and reality of her practice to her parents, who were initially 
dismissive (“girl problems”) and disappointed that her testimony did not gain a true 
witness. Instead, she was repeatedly told to “just stop,” something she repeats rather 
incredulously, as if the gesture is not only useless but somewhat baffling in its naivete.  
Ultimately, though, Hannah finds a witness for her self-harm testimony: her 
online community-audience of fellow self-harmers past and present, who are all at 
various stages of wanting to stop—or not. Interestingly, like many LGBT teens, unlike 
the veil of secrecy that shrouds the practice of cutting by teens and young women in 
media portrayals, and markedly unlike her history of disordered eating practices 
(according to Hannah, at least), Hannah seems to want her parents in particular to 
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know in any way they can, even if tangentially: “My parents watch my videos and 
they hear me making my videos and they probably hear about things that they never 
knew about before.” She concludes rather dejectedly, “My parents are still very 
suspicious of me when I’m doing it.” This kind of ambivalent relationship to audience 
and witness (hiding one’s practice by omission, while longing for acceptance and 
regularly seeking out viewers or listeners for one’s skin testimony) complicates the 
narrative that pushes for the aftermath of exposure (i.e., 
medicalization/institutionalization, or, in many cases, admonishment to stop the 
practice) as the site of recovery, implying that empathetic witnessing itself is an 
important mode of healing within girls’ self-harm communities. 
Belle DeMasi and Johanna Cadence, two other similarly-aged popular social 
media personalities across a wide variety of platforms, with similar followings and 
themes, are similarly disappointed with the reactions of others to their self-harm. 
DeMasi in particular fully embraces the medical model and the language of recovery 
to describe her history of self-harm and her struggle to remain “clean.” Her 
uncloseting narrative, relatedly, also differs from Hannah’s in her relationship to 
secrecy. While DeMasi, too, longs for an empathetic witness, she identifies herself as 
having purposely hid her closeted “identity” as a self-harmer for quite some time: “I 
did a very good job, I was very hush hush, because at the time I didn’t think it was 
normal, I didn’t know why I was doing it, you know, whatever.” She echoes the 
notions of her illegibility and incredulity even to/about herself, as well as the idea of 
having previously “been in the closet” about her true identity as a self-harmer. She, 
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more directly than Hannah, criticizes her parents’ response and their desire to keep her 
in the closet: “My mom wanted to keep it hush hush and didn’t want to make a big 
deal out of it. I feel like that’s a sense of not understanding, plus being scared and in 
denial. A lot of parents just don’t believe it. A lot of people are like, not MY kid.” 
Though she admits later that she understands the fear and guilt a parent might feel at 
discovering their child’s stigmatized identity, DeMasi advocates that self-harmers 
push their parents to accept and come to terms with their identity as self-harmers, 
drawing clear ties to LGBT narratives of the need to elicit acceptance from one’s 
parents and peers as part of the uncloseting/coming out process.  
Cadence has less empathy for those who, she believes, wronged her in the 
course of her own coming out process. While DeMasi takes on the role of a sage 
advice-giver, and Hannah more that of a leader of a peer (support) group, Cadence is a 
digital storyteller, with her public persona framed around a series of anecdotes and 
personal stories told in the forms of digital diary entries. She begins her story “My 
School Reacted Horribly to My Self-Harm Scars” with a profession of her previous 
belief of her own normalcy and subsequent discovery that there was something she 
either needed to hide or “come out” about or face the consequences. “Because we see 
[our cuts], as self-harmers, we see them all the time, so it becomes a normal thing,” 
Cadence says, “we don’t feel the need to hide it . . . because we forget that other 
people don’t see it as normal. At that time, I thought it was a normal human thing. I 
thought it was something that . . . I thought it was a normal human function in a way.” 
Later, she brushes against the stigma of self-harm when she is isolated at, and later 
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expelled from, school due to her self-harm: “I realized that people don’t react well to 
self-harm. So then I realized that I had to start hiding them. For us, it’s like, a normal 
part of your body, it’s a normal part of your skin, you know?” Ultimately, Cadence 
identifies herself as having an “addiction,” a psychiatrized identity that she previously 
professes not to have known she had. Told repeatedly of the unacceptability and 
abnormality of her behavior, she recognizes her identity, but remains angered by her 
forced extended period in a closeted state. 
In Marina Abramovic’s Rhythm 10 piece, Abramovic publicly self-harms, 
ritualistically slicing the spaces between each of her fingers with ten different knives 
before starting over with the first knife and repeating the pattern. In a reflection about 
the performance for the MoMA archives, she says, 
This was one of my first performances, [in] which I understood that I had 
become a performance artist. In this Rhythm 10 piece, it was kind of 
demanding physically and mentally, but it was the first time what means 
energy of the audience, and how actually this energy I could take and transmit 
it to my own and give it back, and it was the first time that I didn’t feel pain or 
any kind of discomfort doing it, that I understood that in performance my body 
is object and subject, and I could push the limits in front of the public as much 
as I can, much more than if I would do it in my own private life.  
 
While the embodied reality of Abramovic’s practices in this piece are likely not too 
different from those of many of the girls in self-harm communities, her piece, while 
controversial and likely disturbing, is legitimized rather than pathologized. The 
differences between her self-harm and that of its psychiatrized counterparts are, most 
significantly, (1) a patterned, orderly ritual, which implies that the practice is 
temporary and carried out for a particular purpose, unlike the ongoing practice of self-
harm which is seen as “meaningless” or chaotic; (2) her status as an artist, (3) the 
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public nature of her act (she is already “out”), and (4) the fact of an audience (a 
witness). Here, it is the presence of a mediator—an audience—that elevates 
Abramovic’s self-mutilation beyond the category of pathology, allowing it to evade 
the potential of institutionalization or medicalization. In the case of the girls who use 
social media to find such an audience, their speech is delegitimized because it is 
embodied, because it is read as hysterical, because they are girls, because it finds its 
way online (which is regarded as the modern frontier, the threatening wilds), and 
because it communicates psychic distress or a story that provokes anxiety. They speak, 
then, impossibly, which threatens their legitimacy as subjects, as speakers. 
Echoing Butler, Kilby writes about the struggle for the illegible to be made 
legible: 
If the subject speaks impossibly, speaks in ways that cannot be regarded as 
speech or as the speech of a subject, then that speech is discounted and the 
viability of the subject called into question. The consequence of such an 
irruption of the unspeakable may range from a sense that one is “falling apart” 
to the intervention of the state to secure criminal or psychiatric incarceration. 
(125) 
 
If they can’t find a proper witness, then one may be appointed for them. Abramovic’s 
proper witness could be read as the neoliberal art gallery patron; she speaks to a 
legitimized and codified audience. Meanwhile, the self-harming girl participating in 
YouTube vlogs and online communities speaks through her harmed skin to 
new/modern and, as of yet, not fully legitimized, media. The profit potential of her act 
is not as easily seen as Abramovic’s; thus, the state interest of criminal or psychiatric 
intervention intercedes in order to imbue her act with meaning. The viability of 
meaning produced by the self-harming girls’ expression is defined according to the 
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ideals of a capitalist, neoliberal patriarchy rather than through the values (such as 
communitas, self-expression, and suicide avoidance) that the girls themselves evoke 
with such acts. 
Pathologized Online Girl Communities, the Panopticon, and Reversing the Gaze 
Sandra Lee Bartky argues in “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of 
Patriarchal Power” that Foucauldian “docile bodies” are produced in particular, 
gendered ways during the process of women’s development and indoctrination into the 
contemporary disciplinary regime: for example, through scientized beauty regimens 
and routines, and from minute adjustments of the body to take up less physical space 
at any given time to major cosmetic surgeries and body modifications aimed at 
increasing one’s adherence to conventional beauty standards. This disciplinary power 
applies in specific ways, Bartky posits, to feminine subjects. Gendered disciplinary 
practices, she says, “produce a body which in gesture and appearance is recognizably 
feminine” (132), with some examples of those practices being diet and exercise 
(“imposed upon a body subject to the ‘tyranny of slenderness’”) (133); female faces 
and bodies being restricted in their movements and “trained to the expression of 
deference” (135); the development of various kinds of disciplinary practices and 
regimens involved with skin care (including various artifacts, like lotions, creams, 
masks, pomades); and the process of learning to manipulate “a large number of 
devices—the blow dryer, styling brush, curling iron. . . eye liner, lipliner, lipstick 
brush, eyelash curler . . .and the correct manner of application of a wide variety of 
products” (138). The arbiters of morality and adherence to the strict standards in this 
  
56 
 
regime are ubiquitous, existing at the level of everyday routines and of a woman’s 
adjustment of her facial expression so as not to appear too assertive at any given time: 
“The disciplinary power that inscribes femininity in the female body is everywhere 
and it is nowhere; the disciplinarian is everyone and yet no one in particular” (Bartky 
142). These micropolitics play a significant role in potential readings of self-harm and 
in online subcultures dedicated to it. Just as overweight women are admonished to diet 
more fiercely when they expose their bodies or when they “go public” with those 
bodies (as in modeling or crafting a public persona on social media or elsewhere), so 
is the self-harmer subject to more pushback and harsher brushes with disciplinary 
power (from formal institutionalization to consequences and further scrutinization 
from family or school) the more she “goes public” with her practice, either explicitly 
or as part of her everyday life.  
Following Bartky, it would seem that a feminized and hystericized disorder 
like anorexia or a pathologized practice such as self-harm would reinforce and expose 
the power of the panopticon, pushing each girl to monitor and surveil her own body to 
the point of physical harm, but Mebbie Bell argues the opposite in “Re/Forming the 
Anorexic ‘Prisoner’: Inpatient Medical Treatment as the Return to Panoptic 
Femininity,” claiming instead that anorectic practices disrupt the process of the 
production of the docile body, and that it is the routinization and medicalization that 
follow the discovery of such practices that constitute Foucauldian panopticism: 
From a Foucauldian and feminist perspective, treatment mechanisms of 
surveillance and routinization function as a medical panopticon constructed to 
re/form the anorexic woman . . . anorectic practices violate the disciplinary 
boundaries of the contemporary “docile” female body in that they replicate a 
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traditionally male role: control of the female body . . . In turn, the medical 
treatment protocols for anorexia are a means by which women are returned to 
the realm of such masculinist control. (83) 
 
Many popular social media personalities who share their experiences with self-harm 
express views in this vein—that is, that stigmas against and attempts to control their 
self-harm in authoritative ways or through coerced adherence to normative standards 
of beauty, self-presentation, or mental health cause them distress; display a 
fundamental misunderstanding of their behaviors and the reasons behind them; and, if 
anything, disrupt their processes of recovery. I don’t fully espouse this view, as I 
would argue that anorexia and bulimia are in some ways ideological extensions of the 
increasing extremity of allegedly “normative” beauty standards; anorexia and bulimia 
are excessive extensions of a misconstrued thin standard of beauty. 
In self-harm online subcultures, many of the girls’ narratives critique various 
processes of routinization, medicalization, and the workings of disciplinary power in 
their lives. These critiques, which threaten to expose the gaps or inadequacies in the 
institutions in which the girls participate, likely contribute to the panic those narratives 
induce. Refusing to be merely objects of the medical, patriarchal, parental, or 
institutional gaze, they gaze back at school counselors, teachers, parents, therapists, 
nurses, and social myths about their pathologized practices. This reversal of the gaze is 
most obvious in “self-harm excuse” videos (many of which are comedic or tongue-in-
cheek). LollysandCiggies, one popular self-harm and depression vlogger, emphasizes 
that girls who self-harm don’t owe anyone information about their bodies, particularly 
about their scars, and advocates sarcasm, which she uses “when people who I do not 
  
58 
 
like are confronting me and you know they’re only asking you because they want to 
know your business . . . you know, all those people who come to you and say ‘What 
the fuck is that on your arm?’” Some of her suggestions for responses to get them to 
“fuck off” are “I tried to have sex with a porcupine, it didn’t work out very well,” “Oh 
this? You should see what’s on my butt,” “I tried to climb the fence to escape this 
hellhole they call school,” and “I did this as a sacrament to Satan,” all of which push 
back against popular myths about self-harm (that it’s the result of sexual “deviance”’ 
or hypersexuality, teen angst, or participation in Satan worship or “emo” culture, for 
example). Poking fun at popular assumptions about self-harmers’ lack of insight into 
and self-awareness of their own behavior, she adds, “Another really good one is to just 
look at it and look down at your arm, and scream, and just run away. They’ll never ask 
you again,” finishing her litany of “excuses” with “My personal favorite is ‘It’s none 
of your business, fuck off . . you are allowed to be sarcastic to someone who is being 
sarcastic or invasive to you.’” She, like Hannah, argues for self-harmers’ right to live 
inside a scarred body, even a self-scarred one, without having to live as a walking 
trigger warning or disclaimer, using humor to diffuse the popular hysteria that often 
accompanies the sight or mention of scars or that assumes that the mere sight will 
encourage the practice’s implementation by others. Similarly, in the aforementioned 
“My School Reacted Horribly to My Self-Harm Scars,” Cadence lays out the ways 
that she feels the system designed to help her has failed her: namely, in forcing her to 
cover up her scars at all times or be expelled. “I felt like they judged me, like crazy, 
when I left school, or when I got kicked out,” she laments, noting the effects of the 
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isolation she faced at school as a contributing factor to rather than a deterrent from her 
tendency towards self-mutilation. “Instead of making [self-harmers] feel isolated,” she 
says, “we should make them feel loved.”  
Girls’ narratives within self-harm communities often indicate that they are 
hyperaware of the relationship between their practices and the beauty regimens that 
Bartky likens to Foucauldian panoptic controls, noting and critiquing cultural fixations 
on their youth and beauty rather than on the trauma or violation that may have 
precipitated what is read as their disruption or “waste” of that beauty. Chaney notes 
that even clinicians and professional researchers have shared this view of self-harm, 
stating that sociologists Hugh Bryan McKay and Robert Robertson Ross were 
“appalled,” “dismayed,” and “concerned” about the “contrast between the young, 
attractive female population” of an institution in Ontario, Canada, and “the 
‘disfiguring’ nature of their wounds” (Chaney 221). Vlogger Bex Louise, in her video 
“20 Sentences People Who Self Harm Don’t Want to Hear,” resists the notion that a 
threatened loss of conventional beauty will deter anyone from cutting. She attempts to 
dissuade viewers from saying things like “You’re too pretty to hurt yourself” and 
“Why would you want to make yourself ugly?” responding instead that “Beauty and 
what you look like has nothing to do with whether you self-harm or not.” Hannah 
Vancouver agrees in her own “Things Not to Say to Someone Who Self Harms” 
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video, as she says with a sigh, “You’re too pretty to cut. THAT is one that, like, really 
bothers me. It’s nothing to do with how pretty I am.”8  
Additionally, “self-harm excuse” videos often respond to myths that circulate 
and that uphold the necessity of the implementation of disciplinary medicalized power 
in the wake of the discovery of self-harm, such as what the girls claim is the “myth” 
that self-harm represents a failed suicidal gesture, echoing notions of female 
adolescence as immature or incomplete, as in, in this case, an “immature” or 
“incomplete” suicidal act. Many argue that the notion that self-harm represents failed 
suicide is a myth, with the cuts each representing instead a struggle to survive, a cry 
into the void that says, “I am here, I am embodied, I am present” (Kirby 126). Bex 
critiques the popular tendency of associating suicide with self-harm: “‘So like, are you 
not strong enough to end it all?’ I need to breathe right now before I punch somebody 
in the face with this one. Self-harm doesn’t mean that you are suicidal, it doesn’t 
always go in a box together” (Louise). Hannah echoes that sentiment:  
When people say, like, oh, did you try and kill yourself and failed? Self-harm 
is more like a kind of coping mechanism than like an ending sort of thing . . . 
self-harm is more like I’m trying to cope so I don’t try to end things. I have, 
like, a bazillion cuts all up and down my legs. It would have been a really poor 
attempt at killing myself if I’d been trying to do that. 
 
While self-harm is often an indicator for possible future suicidal ideation or 
threats, recent research supports the girls’ personal experiences. Adler and Adler write 
                                                 
8
 As an aside, she adds a bit defiantly, “I think I’m pretty, I don’t know . . . I know you’re not supposed 
to say you’re pretty, you’re supposed to let other people tell you you’re pretty, but I think I’m pretty,” 
in accordance with her public persona, which is framed around a robust sense of skepticism and 
critique, but not a wholesale rejection, of normative gendered and behavioral expectation. 
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that “it must be emphasized that SIV [self-inflicted violence] is not an attempt at or 
gesture of suicide (Walsh and Rosen 1988, 15-53). In fact, self-mutilators who address 
the issue describe their injuring behavior as a decided help in refraining from suicide” 
(22). That is, even if self-harmers do attempt suicide, the practice is less likely to lead 
to suicide than it is to indicate a history of trauma or distress that puts them at risk for 
suicide. Rather than a spectrum with suicide at the far end and self-harm somewhere in 
the middle, self-harm is often, a potential interruption of what might otherwise be a 
path to a suicide attempt. Raychelle Cassada Lohmann writes in Psychology Today: 
Generally people who self-harm do not wish to kill themselves; whereas 
suicide is a way of ending life…. Suicidal acts usually come from a place of 
hopelessness, depression and worthlessness. The underlying mindset between 
someone who is suicidal and someone who self-harms is very different…. On 
the flip side, many people who self-harm view hurting themselves as a way of 
coping with life.  In fact, for some, the self-infliction of pain reassures them 
they are still alive.  
 
Girls in self-harm communities often counter the narrative that they are suicidal, and 
also that self-harm should be read as a “failed” suicide attempt, a lesser form of 
suicide. Rather, self-harm is often an assertion of bodily autonomy and individual 
choice. Self-harm is generally conceptualized as a lesser (i.e., feminine, or immature) 
form of suicide, but it generally stems from an altogether separate motivation. 
Girls Reaching Out for Intimacy, Attention, and Community 
Girls in online self-harm communities reach out openly for intimacy, support, 
and friendship from their peers. This is the flip side of the media’s fear of contagion 
among self-harmers and their potential “victims” and the practice’s reputation within 
psychiatry as fundamentally attention-seeking (many psychiatric nurses openly state 
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that they view self-harming patients as self-centered, rather than other-centered). 
Girls’ online self-harm communities and the affective relationships that circulate 
within them, as well as media and societal reactions to those relationships, echo 
Dobson’s argument that it is often the very desire for feedback itself that is 
pathologized in girls as it potentially exposes the inadequacy or failure of the 
“individual choice” message favored by girl-power discourse.  
A frequent question asked by girls in self-harm subcultures is some variation 
of “Do you love me/will I be loved?” Bex warns people against asking, “You think 
people will love you with those scars?” (Louise), because, she claims, self-harmers 
already live in fear that they will be isolated and unloved. Like the girls engaged in 
Dobson’s “Am I pretty?” challenge, these girls are often open in their need and 
craving for love in the face of their stigmatized practices and all that they might 
culturally imply—for example, a sense of “brokenness,” distress, or vulnerability. It’s 
not just the scars, then, that cause the anxiety: It’s the open desire for love, particularly 
in the face of enduring girl-problem discourse that indicates that girls’ problems exist 
precisely because they long for so much intimacy, so much togetherness and approval. 
Bex speaks directly to the tension between these two competing (but also quite 
similar) discourses about how girls should relate to their bodies when she critiques 
onlookers for saying, upon discovering a self-harmer’s practice, “Whatever, it’s your 
body, you do what you want—that makes them feel really bad because they want to 
know that you care, and when you say ‘do what you want,’ it really seems like you 
don’t at all” (Louise). This desire—for others to care what she does with her body—
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flies in the face of both girl-problem, medicalizing discourse, which would discipline, 
monitor, and routinize a self-harmer’s body, and girl-power, libertarian/radical 
individualistic discourse, which would responsibilize that body as needing to sustain 
and care for itself. It is not necessarily the narration of pain, but the mediation of the 
camera/audience and the explicit, active search for “relationality, connectivity, and 
attention from others in networked publics [that] are . . . increasingly pathologized as 
lacking value or values” (Dobson 62). Girls like Bex, who ask for commentary on 
their bodily practices or aesthetics, are “presumed to have low self esteem, to be 
morally deficient or to lack ‘self-respect’” (Dobson 65).  
Girls in these communities also often ask for feedback, voice their support for 
each other, and openly elicit support, sympathy, and intimacy. Hannah speaks of the 
significance of her audience of peer supporters in one video, saying, “I can perfectly 
talk about self-harm with like to you guys, and my camera, and when I talk to my 
camera, I don’t think of it as my camera, I think of it as talking to you guys. But 
basically when I talk to you guys about it I don’t think about it as very strange” 
(Vancouver). She makes it clear, then, what her audience means to her emotionally, 
what emotional gaps they fill for her, and the significance of their shared intimacy, 
particularly around issues of mental health, in her life. Vlogger Diana, who goes by 
ChaseHappyness and identifies as a recovered self-harmer with social anxiety and 
depression, functions more as an older sister to her viewers, especially those who are 
currently self-harming. In her video about how to hide self-harm at school, Diana 
shares: 
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So with it being back to school season and all . . . I understand that it can be 
really difficult to, first of all, handle situations that will cause you to self-harm, 
and of course hiding them at school from anyone who might see them, to 
prevent anything else from happening. I do not promote, support, I do not 
encourage anyone to self-harm, but I understand it’s reality, it’s what happens, 
and instead of pretending it doesn’t happen, and turning my back towards it, I 
want to give you some tools you can use at school so you don’t get bullied for 
self-harming. 
 
Thus, self-harm communities are an intersubjective space, with active participation 
and reception to feedback from both sides of the performer/audience divide. Many 
“things you shouldn’t say to self-harmers” videos end with variations of “I’m sorry for 
all of you who’ve had these things said to them,” with vloggers expressing sympathy. 
Most self-harm vloggers provide P.O. boxes or residential mailing addresses, personal 
emails, and other forms of direct contact for viewers, encouraging peers to write them 
with questions, suggestions, and requests for new video topics.  “What do you guys 
want to see next? What’s your own experience with self-harm? Is it different from 
mine? Let me know in the comments!” is a frequent sign-off within the personal 
storytelling/advice genre, with girls openly indicating that they are aware of their 
audience and want to please them with their future performances and dialogues. These 
tactics of viewer/reader engagement and open indications of a desire for relationality 
and collective participation are reminiscent of riot grrrl and zine cultures that emerged 
prior to their commodification, co-optation, and diversion into girl-problem and girl-
power discourses. 
Echoing Cvetkovich’s call to expose depression as a “public feeling”—one 
that is acknowledged as shared by many, rather than individually pathologized—the 
performances of “sad girls” and self-harmers online can be read as exposing existing 
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contradictions within media, cultural, and psychiatric discourses around girls and 
possibly interpretations of their behaviors, and, in turn, contradictory pressures that 
affect girls experiencing psychic distress (to be in complete control of one’s body and 
emotion versus to submit to patriarchal/medical authority over one’s body, for 
example). Perhaps, then, the cast-off girl becomes abject and fearful as we become 
less able to mitigate and answer her concerns. Perhaps her concerns are legitimate, but 
our inability to engage with them leads us to read her as needy and desperate. The 
cast-off girl is positioned as a threat to the neoliberal project while at the same time is 
regarded as too inconsequential and, dare I say, “girlish” to actually pose any manifest 
threat. The dismissal of any purported legitimate purpose to self-harm and self-harm 
communities attempts to dismiss the ability of the girl to affect change precisely 
because of the powerful potential of girlhood. Here, I echo Sue McAndrew and Tony 
Warne’s call to begin to rewrite stigmatized affects associated with self-harm such as 
“neediness” or “desperation” to explore what is going on beneath the skin. In “Cutting 
Across Boundaries: A Case Study Using Feminist Praxis to Understand the Meanings 
of Self-Harm,” they argue, “Often women who deliberately harm themselves are 
labelled as ‘attention seeking’ whereas we, similar to a number of other authors, argue 
that a better description might be ‘attention needing.’” Rather than pathologizing and 
censoring girls’ communities based around behaviors which are frequently read as, 
and may very well be, unhealthy or indicative of psychic distress, any of these 
practices can be read as exercises in building agency and community and as 
potentially useful in making explicit the needs of participants for peers and potential 
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mentors or supporters. With their message seemingly un-reconcilable into the 
neoliberal project, the cast-off girl is both disregarded and censored; she is at once 
desperate and not worth our time while at the same time worthy of reprimand and 
psychological counseling. Cutting, skin speaking as I have termed it here, acts 
performatively to establish the consequences of being viewed as inconsequential. The 
complications foregrounded by girls’ bodies act as proof of collective cultural 
expectations and the burden they impose on those who bear them, and secondly as the 
writings of skin that is expected not to speak, and as attempts (if unhealthy) of 
silenced actors to communicate through the flesh that is foregrounded as the most 
important thing about them. 
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Chapter Three: 
Representations of Borderline Personality Disorder and the “New” Hysteria 
Twelve-year-old Frankie in Carson McCullers’ 1946 novel The Member of the 
Wedding wants to go on her sister’s honeymoon. No: she needs to go—and not to take 
her sister’s husband, but perhaps to be her husband. And to be her husband’s wife, and 
perhaps, their adopted daughter. Probably all three. Frankie talks about the wedding 
and her role in it all summer to anyone who will listen, but in the climactic scene, as 
her sister and her new husband drive off after their wedding, Frankie finds she can 
only say two words: 
You are the we of me, her heart was saying, but she could only say aloud: 
“Take me!” And they pleaded and begged with her, but she was already in the 
car. At the last she clung to the steering wheel until her father and somebody 
else had hauled and dragged her from the car, and even then she could only cry 
in the dust of the empty road: “Take me! Take me!” (McCullers quoted in 
Becker 113).  
 
In Through the Looking Glass: Women and Borderline Personality Disorder, 
Dana Becker considers adolescent Frankie’s fundamental question—the question of 
fashioning a life around the cry of “take me”—as the definitive “question” of 
borderline personality disorder, prompting her to wonder “whether ‘borderline’ and 
‘adolescent’ behaviors have a closer relationship than we might previously have 
imagined” (Becker 113). Merri Lisa Johnson, a diagnosed borderline but very much an 
adult (and a scholar of gender and disability studies), nevertheless fashions her own 
life much as Frankie does, in search of a subject to make her into an object (but only 
the object she wants to become). In her memoir Girl In Need of a Tourniquet: Memoir 
of a Borderline Personality, Johnson writes, “I fell in love again four years later and 
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crafted my life into a poem for [her lover]. The poem had two words. LOVE ME” 
(Johnson 13).  
Despite all this me-ness, the “me” of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
has been evoked frequently—in pop psychology, in DSM-III and -IV and -V, on 
dating sites as a warning, as neo-noir and B-movie horror genre canon, as viral 
clickbait about who best to avoid if you’d like to keep your home and your children 
and your penis—but rarely clarified. From Glenn Close’s bunny-boiling, self-
mutilating, hyperdependent seductress in Fatal Attraction to Alicia Silverstone’s 
Lolitan Eve-in-training in The Crush and debates within psychoanalysis and 
psychiatry, the attempt to pin down BPD definitionally and diagnostically has been as 
circular and inscrutable (and juicy) as its elusive subject. If, as Erving Goffman claims 
in The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, personhood itself requires a mask, 
and that mask “represents the conception we have formed of ourselves—the role we 
are striving to live up to…our truer self, the self we would like to be” (Goffman 19), 
the borderline mask represents what happens when that conception is fractured or not 
fully formed, rendering the ‘role’ distractingly artificial and the borders between 
‘genuine’ and ‘theatrical’ blurry. 
Relatedly, in cultural representations like Girl, Interrupted and Prozac Nation, 
which I will analyze through this chapter, borderline characters are commonly used to 
represent the threat of castration (a threat that is, in most representations, ultimately 
destroyed) or of removing the ‘mask’: of social propriety, of a male counterpart, or of 
the analyst. After looking at these two films, I will examine how other recent 
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performative practices like performative writing and musical theatre, drama 
therapy/performative autoethnography work (to various degrees of effectiveness) to 
understand the lived experience of BPD rather than as a perceived threat of castration. 
I will look at two recent examples of this with respect to BPD: Merri Lisa Johnson’s 
memoir Girl in Need of a Tourniquet, an example of performative writing as 
scholarship and disability autoethnography/life writing, and a 2014 production of the 
musical Borderline, produced by Dr. Robert Landy, a professor at the Drama Therapy 
program at NYU’s Steinhardt School, as an example of what can go awry when 
psychiatrically disabled individuals are not foregrounded in attempts to represent their 
narratives in performance. 
Like the threat that the borderline presents to the analyst’s possibility of using 
specialized knowledge toward the goal of diagnosis and cure, her cultural 
representation also points toward a fear of impotence, futility of positive character 
progression, and resolution. While what precisely is under threat of exposure (a 
transgression, an inadequacy, the machinations of analysis) depends on the male 
character, the institution, or the historical context, borderline characters risk the 
revelation of the inner workings of disciplinary power (whether institutional or 
interpersonal). The workings of cultural production, and indeed the performative 
nature of affective relationships and life itself, are ill-concealed in patients deemed 
‘borderline’; they are fundamentally deceptive in a way that ‘exposes’ themselves but 
also the ongoing performance of therapy or of gender relations (Bayliss 583). 
Borderlines and their cultural representation threaten, through their behavior but also 
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through their presence itself, to undermine the authority of the analyst (after all, they 
originated as ‘the unanalyzables’) or to disrupt the performance of seductive 
womanhood. Here, the dark continent of femininity and the unanalyzability of the 
borderline are conflated, mapping onto and mirroring one another to form a matrix of 
‘female trouble’ and all the cultural anxieties that inspires. 
I begin with a history of the diagnosis itself; as we’ll see from the constantly 
contested and malleable nature of the diagnosis, BPD is frustratingly difficult to pin 
down. This seems to point to the very aspects of it that also make it particularly ripe 
for depiction on film. BPD exasperates us with an unresolvable aspect and lends itself 
to a tense and dark filmic style. Pinning BPD down cinematically has proven to be just 
as problematic as containing it semantically and diagnostically, which seems to be part 
of the allure. Characters can be explicitly stated to be borderline, the film can make the 
implication, or the audience make the inference, but the value and veracity of the 
claim becomes a part of the cultural legacy of the film. Whether ‘famous’ borderlines-
in-name (as in, the film explicitly states that the female protagonist is borderline) or in 
popular discourse—message boards and movie reviews endlessly debate just how 
‘borderline’ a particular character is, and how close to reality ‘she’ is—the borderlines 
in the two commercial and popular films I’ll explore here (Girl, Interrupted and 
Prozac Nation) demonstrate the conceptual throughlines of the discursive tensions 
surrounding BPD throughout its history.  
The BPD film genre (what I will call the lengthy canon of films that feature a 
woman who is explicitly or popularly believed to be ‘borderline’) is one that reflects 
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cultural anxieties about womanhood, girlhood, sex, violence, castration and 
engulfment. The BPD film genre’s understanding of the borderline is a convoluted as 
the diagnosis. If, as Laura Mulvey suggests in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema,” “the paradox of phallocentrism in all its manifestations is that it depends on 
the image of the castrated women to give order and meaning to its world” (Mulvey 
34), the figure of the borderline lends a touch of horror to every film she appears in, as 
she threatens to disrupt the symbolic order with her disordered mind-body and the 
slippages between her performance of female dependency-in-excess, girlified 
victimhood that masks a predator, bisexuality that transcends or even dismisses the 
possibility of the male gaze, and her grotesque imitations of the male role (through 
mockery, gender-bending, insatiable sexual appetite or superior manipulation skills). 
Rather than adhering entirely to Mulvey’s idea of the binary pairing of male, sadistic, 
scopophilic spectator and female object of that viewership-violence, films in the BPD 
genre can be read more accurately through Gaylyn Studlar’s “Masochism and the 
Perverse Pleasures of the Cinema.” Studlar articulates a view of the ‘masochistic 
aesthetic’ that includes “fantasy, disavowal, fetishism, and suspense” (Studlar 205), 
stresses the pregenital period in the development of desire (fittingly, the period said to 
be disrupted in borderlines) rather than the phallic phase, and has as its central fantasy 
the “primal desire” (207) of “ ‘dual unity and the complete symbiosis between child 
and mother’” (207). This is unattainable for the masochist as well as the borderline, as 
the borderline as she is culturally conceived cannot reconcile even the parts of herself 
(child and mother) in order to become whole. Thus, within the masochistic aesthetic, 
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which I argue is the aesthetic of the BPD genre, “death becomes the fantasy solution” 
(207), which is either realized or gestured towards through self-harm or ‘death of the 
self’ through total subjection to an idealized partner. In other films, this fantasy is 
elided entirely through escape into the symbolic order, whether through submission to 
analysis where disparate parts of the self can be, if not reconciled, appropriately 
compartmentalized, or through transformation by Foucauldian ‘disciplinary power’ 
and submission to the ‘technicalization’ of “the difficulties and contradictions of 
human life” and the ‘subjectification’ of the body—for example, through 
medicalization (psychiatric drugs, hospitalization, diagnosis, psychotherapy) 
administered by an external source rather than by oneself (cutting, substance use, 
manic writing, sexual pleasure, etc.). But, if the borderline girl on film demonstrates 
the conceptual throughlines of the discursive tensions permeating BPD’s history, first, 
let’s look into that history. 
Borderline: A Brief History 
Psychoanalyst Adolph Stern has frequently been called the “father” (a loaded 
term if ever there was one) of borderline personality disorder. Stern’s seminal 
description of borderline patients in 1938 displays, and indeed even begins with, a 
sense of weariness and confusion with which any researcher of this particular disorder 
will become well-acquainted: “It is well known that a large group of patients fit 
frankly neither into the psychotic nor into the psychoneurotic group, and that this 
border line group of patients is extremely difficult to handle effectively by any 
psychotherapeutic method” (Stern 54). Their defining characteristics are the 
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following: they are difficult, too accessible to be deemed impossible and then 
discarded, too illegible to be kept and read. Stern lists the telltale signs of these 
patients “at the border” as narcissism, psychic bleeding (disproportionate reactions to 
both minor and major stresses and traumas), inordinate hypersensitivity, psychic and 
body rigidity—"the rigid personality”—negative therapeutic reactions, deeply 
embedded feelings of inferiority, masochism (both physical and emotional), “deep 
organic insecurity or anxiety” (Stern 55), the use of projection mechanisms, and 
“difficulties in reality testing” (Stern 55), meaning that they were just a tad psychotic. 
The next brave soul to undertake an in-depth look at borderline patients was 
psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch, who coined the term “‘as-if’ patients” to describe 
those whose “whole relationship to life has something about it which is lacking in 
genuineness and yet outwardly runs along ‘as if’ it were complete” (Deutsch 75). 
Characterized by “emptiness” (Deutsch 75) and a “lack of individuality” (Deutsch 75), 
along with suggestibility and “aggressive tendencies” (77) that “are almost completely 
masked by passivity, lending an air of negative goodness, of mild amiability which, 
however, is readily convertible to evil” (Deutsch 77), Deutsch’s as-ifs are able to mask 
their aggression with passivity and their near-psychosis with charm. Like porn, 
Deutsch suggests, we can’t exactly define a borderline, but we’ll know one when we 
see one, and it will be chilling. Deutsch was also the first to attribute childlike features 
to borderline patients (Deutsch 82), caused by the apparently unfortunate characteristic 
of not having been “seduced” adequately by parents’ warmth in order to create with 
them “a warm dynamic oedipus constellation” (Deutsch 80) (thus, like Deleuze’s 
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schizophrenic, existing outside the oedipal fantasy entirely). However, the primary 
legacy of Deutsch’s perspective on the borderline has been its emphasis on the 
inherently performative and malleable nature of the shape-shifting BPD patient, traits 
that would eventually become loaded with gendered meaning and transform into the 
primary earmarks of what constitutes a borderline in both psychological texts and 
cultural representations. 
In the first three decades of the 20th century, borderline patients were often 
seen as possessing a particularly inscrutable, latent, and/or mild form of schizophrenia 
(primarily due to schizophrenia’s then-association with psychosis, and thus, with 
fundamental untreatability, or an inability to be analyzed) (Davis 265). Deutsch 
mentions this, wondering whether patients read as “borderline” are in fact in 
possession of a “schizophrenic disposition or…rudimentary symptoms of 
schizophrenia” (Deutsch 90). Paul Hoch and Phillip Polatin popularized this idea with 
their discussion of “pseudoneurotic” forms of schizophrenia, with borderline 
aficionado Robert Knight subsequently agreeing that “borderline patients are…likely 
to show…the various microscopic and macroscopic signs of schizophrenic illness” 
(Knight 167) when confronted with the stress of an unstructured psychiatric interview, 
claiming that the kind of “free association” psychiatrist-patient dialogues that were 
popular at the time would prove to be “antitherapeutic” for a borderline patient 
(Knight 167).  
Borderline personality disorder’s nervous entanglement with schizophrenia and 
its frequent characterization as a sort of schizophrenia-turned-inward, or 
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schizophrenia-yet-unrealized, foreshadowed its later characterization as the 
definitively feminine disorder. For several decades before it became the it-girl of 
diagnoses for difficult women and the illegible “other” of psychological diagnoses 
(illuminating all others with its relative inscrutability), BPD was the “other” of 
schizophrenia: less developed, less potent, and less knowable. In fact, in the 1970s, 
John Gunderson would describe the main differentiations between borderline 
personality disorder and schizophrenia as “overt dependent neediness” and 
“manipulativeness” (6), solidifying BPD traits as inherently and inextricably linked to 
gendered traits. 
In the 1950s, Knight pushed for the integration of ego psychology (which 
prioritized the personality) with the Freudian stages of psychosexual development and 
their effects on the development of the psyche. Under Knight, the borderline moved 
from a psychoanalytic colloquialism meaning “neither/both psychotic and neurotic” to 
a personality organization, an underpinning that would throw other aspects of the 
personality into relief, exacerbating the more “primitive” defense mechanisms and 
weakening the ego in all respects. Compounding their reputation as manipulative 
maskers of their “true” hollow selves, Knight’s borderlines (like Deutsch’s) are highly 
performative, able to put on a “deceptive, superficially conventional, although 
neurotic, front, depending on how thoroughgoing and comprehensive the psychiatric 
investigation is with respect to the patient’s total ego functioning” (Knight 165). In the 
borderline personality organization, he writes, “normal ego functions of secondary-
process thinking, integration, realistic planning adaptation to the environment, 
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maintenance of object relationships, and defenses against primitive unconscious 
impulses are severely weakened” (Knight 165). Also within the field of ego 
psychology, Erik Erikson’s psychosocial stages of development have been influential 
in subsequent rhetoric around borderline personality disorder and the fundamental lack 
of a coherent “self.” In particular, the identity diffusion stage, commonly associated 
with adolescence and young adulthood, has frequently been understood as a 
permanent state for borderline patients. 
Borderline expert Otto Kernberg’s seminal 1975 text, Borderline Conditions 
and Pathological Narcissism, on the connection between borderline personality and 
narcissism, brought borderline personality into the realm of a “syndrome,” consisting 
of a stable collection of traits. His work brought the disorder closer to inclusion in the 
DSM and to an understanding of borderline personality as adhering to a cohesive set 
of diagnostic criteria. Rejecting much of the earlier work on borderline personality as 
occupying a liminal or undefinable state, he critiques its frequent mischaracterization 
as a “catchall” or “wastebasket” category, noting that the same pathology has 
alternately been referred to as borderline states, preschizophrenic personality structure, 
psychotic characters, ambulatory schizophrenia, and pseudoneurotic schizophrenia, as-
if personalities, schizoid personality structure, and severe ego distortions (Kernberg 
279). (It was also later referred to as “emotionally unstable personality disorder” when 
it took on more coded gendered traits [David and Kapur 588]). By contrast, 
Kernberg’s text was the first substantial move towards defining borderline as a 
“specific, stable, pathological personality organization” rather than a “transitory state” 
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(279) or a psychological no man’s land. As such, he also differed from his 
predecessors in his insistence that, with the right treatment, borderlines could indeed 
be effectively treated. 
The diagnostic elements defining Kernberg’s “borderline personality 
organization” or “syndrome” include “chronic, diffuse, free-floating anxiety” 
(Kernberg 284) and “polysymptomatic neurosis” (285), including phobias, obsessive-
compulsive tendencies, “multiple, elaborate, or bizarre conversion symptoms” (285), 
“dissociative reactions, especially hysterical ‘twilight states’” (285), hypochondriasis, 
and paranoia. Kernberg’s research also introduced the significance of “polymorphous 
perverse sexual trends” (286) in the borderline personality; something like a consistent 
interest in masochism or a consistently homosexual identity, Kernberg argued, 
wouldn’t indicate the possibility of borderline personality, but a combination of those 
would (for example, a gay masochist/submissive or bisexual sadist/dominant, someone 
who enjoyed both the sadistic and masochistic roles, or someone whose sexual identity 
and interests changed radically over time or intermittently throughout their life). 
Particularly for female patients, Kernberg also included hypersexual fantasies and 
fetishes, coupled with “frigidity” or a lack of interest in real-life sexual experiences, as 
indications of borderline personality syndrome. These observations contributed 
significantly to the association of borderlines with fluidity and multiplicity in sexual 
orientation and gender identity, as well as its association with hypersexuality and a 
knack for seduction (often pathologized more in women than in men). In this vein, 
Kernberg also furthered the notion of the borderline personality as primarily controlled 
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by the id. Finally, Kernberg’s discussions of the borderline as often “hysterical” 
helped to solidify the presumed gender of the figure of the borderline. The theme of 
multiplicity is apparent in every aspect of the borderline: “multiple” crises, “multiple” 
drugs, “multiple” sexual partners and proclivities.  
The Grinker study (Roy Grinker, Sr., B. Werble, and R.C. Drye) was the first 
piece of major clinical research that attempted, using all known sources on the subject 
within both psychoanalysis and psychology, to determine whether or not ‘the 
borderline’ was an actual stable diagnosis. Noting that previously “the psychiatric 
entity frequently referred to as borderline” (Grinker et al. 346) had previously “been 
used as a depository for clinical uncertainty” (346), Grinker and his colleagues 
determined that “the borderline disorder” was, indeed, a valid diagnosis based on 
stable criteria that remained relatively unchanged across time. However, they found 
they could not answer the question “How does a human become a borderline?” 
(Grinker et al. 352) and determined that further research on the etiology of the 
borderline was needed to come to any conclusions. 
BPD was introduced in the DSM-III in 1980, long after debates about it had 
begun. It was included under the Axis II disorders (now referred to as Cluster B), 
which are commonly regarded as “more severe” than Axis I/Cluster A disorders. 
Around this time, John Gunderson, often cited as one of the primary experts on BPD, 
conducted influential research on the disorder that would cement many later 
understandings of it and inspire a great deal of further research. Gunderson, following 
Kernberg, emphasized the concept of “splitting” so central to a psychological 
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understanding of BPD. Resulting from “a developmental fixation in object relations” 
(Gunderson 43), splitting, Gunderson argues, is a primitive defense mechanism in 
borderlines that causes them to engage in “black and white” thinking or to see external 
objects and oneself as idealized or utterly worthless, either “all good” or “all bad.” 
Gunderson also expresses doubt in the face of common complaints of abuse from BPD 
patients, arguing that “even if” their claims are true, they don’t provide a reliable 
source of information for a therapist, given the patients’ tendencies to paint all 
authority figures or love-objects as omnipotent and perfect or entirely devoid of value. 
Notably, he states that he told one patient “she was not entitled to her rage in the here 
and now—whatever its origin in the past” (Gunderson 107). 
Contesting the Definition 
Almost immediately upon its codification, the DSM-III definition of BPD 
began to be critiqued. Like the patients it described, the criteria were hotly contested, 
considered to be insufficient by some and excessive by others. In particular, feminist 
and radical therapists (among some others) argued that trauma, particularly long-term 
severe childhood trauma, was more significant in the etiology of BPD than had been 
previously believed (or, in many cases, had been outright dismissed), with BPD being 
misdiagnosed or associated with other issues such as paranoia and masochism (Bedard 
470; Savicki 283). Others critiqued the association of the “catchall” diagnosis of BPD 
with the pathologization of young girls and female adolescence itself, and especially 
those who engaged in “sexually deviant” relationships or acts such as BDSM or LGBT 
identities/communities. Lyn Wood, a member of STOP (Students and Teens Opposed 
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to Psychiatric Abuse), for example, in a protest against an NWSA conference on 
girlhood and mental health that included neither girls nor psychiatric services 
survivors/consumers (“nothing about us without us”), claimed to have been 
involuntarily hospitalized for being butch and gay, with diagnoses of BPD and the 
now-defunct “gender identity disorder” (Ruby 14).  
In response to these increasingly vocal critiques, clinical psychologist Judith 
Herman developed criteria for a “new” form of post-traumatic stress disorder called C-
PTSD (complex PTSD), which focused on the effects of long-term trauma such as that 
resulting from kidnapping, imprisonment (such as in POW camps), repeated sexual 
trauma by the same or multiple offenders, severe childhood trauma, or long-term 
domestic abuse (Herman 14). C-PTSD, though not an official diagnosis in the DSM, is 
widely used by trauma-based psychiatrists and therapists, and has been suggested 
repeatedly as a possible replacement for BPD. While Gunderson expressed the more 
common view among clinicians at that time that “it is commonplace for borderline 
patients to see themselves as having been repeatedly victimized and mistreated in a 
long series of previous relationships” (Gunderson 5), Herman and others insisted that 
the majority of BPD patients actually had been victims, which has been verified by 
extensive subsequent research. PTSD and BPD continue to have an entangled 
relationship (just the kind borderlines are said to love), with BPD playing the 
masochistic and pathologized underdog to the more legitimized and sympathy-
inducing PTSD, and both being regularly misdiagnosed as the other (Hazen et al. 270). 
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Another common critique was BPD’s fraught relationship to gender. Dana 
Becker’s influential 1997 work Through the Looking Glass was the first exploration of 
the deeply gendered nature of the borderline diagnosis, now solidified as a “known 
fact” within psychiatry; women are three or more times as likely to be diagnosed with 
BPD as men. Janet Wirth-Cauchon’s Women and Borderline Personality Disorder: 
Symptoms and Stories embarks on a similar critique, foregrounding the experiences of 
women labeled with the disorder rather than clinicians’ experiences of those patients. 
Becker attributes the overrepresentation of women in the population diagnosed with 
BPD to “the stripping away in DSM-III (1980) of the transient psychotic and cognitive 
symptoms that had formerly often been associated with borderline psychopathology in 
favor of an affective loading” (Becker 62)—what is often referred to as the “affective 
turn” within psychological diagnoses and treatment in the 1980s. Women’s 
associations with emotionality, she argues, and the likelihood that anything but 
submission towards medical practitioners will be read as particularly troublesome 
from female patients, renders them particularly vulnerable to being slapped with the 
‘difficult’ borderline label. This text also serves to solidify the connection between 
BPD and the legacy of Freudian hysteria, with Becker claiming that BPD is the 
contemporary iteration of societal anxieties about female nonconformity and 
noncompliance. Sociologist and psychiatrist Allan Horwitz agrees, arguing in 
Creating Mental Illness that gender norms not only shape therapists’ expectations of 
patients and the diagnoses with which they label them and shape narratives about 
them, but also influence patient behavior and their “performances” of psychic distress. 
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Their performances, for example, may emphasize women’s tendencies to internalize 
rather than externalize their pain, to neglect themselves in favor of maintaining their 
attachments, and to avoid antisocial behaviors in favor of self-destructive means of 
responding to distress (Horwitz 128-129). Thus, patients themselves may respond to 
and perpetuate gendered criteria by enacting what they unconsciously believe is 
‘expected’ of them as female psychiatric services consumers. 
In keeping with the research conducted by Gunderson and others, and in 
response to the critiques leveled at the DSM-III definition, the DSM-IV, published in 
1994, redefined the diagnostic criteria of BPD as “a pervasive pattern of instability of 
interpersonal relationships, self-image, affects, and marked impulsivity” as indicated 
by five or more of the following: “frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined 
abandonment;” “a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships” 
characterized by either idealization and devaluation; “identity disturbance;” “recurrent 
suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, including self-mutilation;” “affective 
instability,” “impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging,” 
“chronic feelings of emptiness;” “inappropriate, intense anger;” and “transient, stress-
related paranoid ideation” (“Diagnostic”). The 2011 DSM-V definition is more 
specific, requiring patients to exhibit impairments in self functioning (in the areas of 
identity and/or self-direction), interpersonal functioning (in the areas of empathy 
and/or intimacy), negative affectivity (including emotional liability, pervasive anxiety, 
separation insecurity, and/or depressivity), disinhibition (impulsivity and risk-taking), 
and antagonism (hostility) (“Diagnostic”). The DSM-V definition was considerably 
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reworked after extensive American Psychological Association (APA) debates, with 
some proposing to throw out the disorder entirely due to its bad-girl reputation among 
clinicians and their subsequent tendency to stereotype or ignore patients slapped with 
the label. Others argued that the DSM-III and -IV criteria were not narrow enough to 
result in a reliable diagnosis. Notably, the DSM-V description lacks any reference to 
hypersexuality, unlike its predecessors, and contains less stigmatizing and judgmental 
language. 
Martha Linehan’s development of dialectical-behavioral therapy (DBT) in the 
1990s echoed other critiques about a tendency to dismiss BPD patients’ claims of 
abuse and trauma. In her influential treatment plans for DBT and Cognitive-
Behavioral Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder, Linehan called out fellow 
clinicians for their unwillingness to budge on the “borderline question” and their 
stubborn refusal to explore new modes of approaching the disorder, opting instead to 
assume untreatability on the part of BPD patients rather than to examine the 
inadequacy of existing treatment. DBT involves radical self-acceptance that seeks to 
manage dysfunctional or nonproductive emotions while avoiding self-criticism, thus 
eventually aiming to integrate the seemingly contradictory aspects of the self. Several 
years later, in a provocative moment of “uncloseting,” Linehan “came out” as 
borderline herself, a spectacle that shocked the psychiatric community due to its 
effusive praise of Linehan and shared disdain for borderlines. 
Other research in the 1990s firmed up the association of borderline patients 
with self-harm (particularly cutting), promiscuity (long a presumed feature of the 
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disorder), impulsive and reckless behaviors, and substance abuse (Farrugia). Women 
with this diagnosis remain overrepresented in the criminal justice population, the 
inpatient populations of psychiatric hospitals, and in self-harming populations (Conn). 
Other clinicians have veered away from dwelling on current dysfunctional behaviors 
in favor of focusing on the etiology of the controversial disorder. The significance of 
sexual and domestic violence in adulthood, as well as adverse childhood events (ACE) 
in the development of BPD, is now well-documented, while the possibility of its 
genetic origins are less clear (Bower 21; Fahs 68; Herman et al. 490). Medications and 
hormonal treatments have not proven to be substantially helpful in the treatment of 
BPD (Bower 15), though some may alleviate the symptoms of frequent comorbid 
disorders, such as anorexia, depression, and addiction. DBT and psychodynamic 
therapy, particularly trauma-based, continue to be the primarily accepted means of 
treatment. 
Key “Stabilizing” Concepts 
Though the history of the phenomenology of ‘the borderline’ is complex and 
often contradictory, there are nevertheless several conceptual throughlines in its 
development which speak to its intimate relationship to shifting societal 
understandings of gender, selfhood, and trauma, which have informed cultural 
narratives and discourse about the disorder, and which will inform my readings of 
significant cultural representations of BPD. 
The first throughline is the association of borderline personality 
disorder/syndrome/organization with manipulation and the constant adoption of a 
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‘mask’ that obscures the pathology or inadequacy of what lies beneath. This alleged 
manipulation often takes the form of ‘parasuicide’ (suicidal attempts or gestures that 
are not read as genuine and which are often associated with women) and of self-harm 
(particularly cutting), believed by many to be so common to borderline personality 
disorder as to be considered inextricable from it or indicative of an automatic 
diagnosis (Gunderson). Gunderson calls them “manipulative suicide attempts” (5), 
referring to suicidal ‘gestures’ as “the most problematic expression of the 
manipulativeness of borderline patients” (5). If, as Goffman claims personhood itself 
requires a mask, and that mask “represents the conception we have formed of 
ourselves—the role we are striving to live up to…our truer self, the self we would like 
to be” (Goffman 19), the borderline mask represents what happens when that 
conception is fractured or not fully formed, rendering the ‘role’ distractingly artificial 
and the borders between ‘genuine’ and ‘theatrical’ blurry. Accordingly, Lacanian 
theorists believe that the mirror stage, or the encounter with the imaginary realm that 
induces the subject’s identification and stimulates the development of the ego, is 
disrupted or not fully achieved in borderlines (Rusansky Drob 55-56). 
The second throughline is that borderlines are often described in psychological 
discourse as performers. Specifically, they are able (it’s presumed) to perform both 
deceptive normativity which obscures their pathology and to perform ‘dramatic’ 
gestures that obscure their fundamental emptiness (in other words, as I will discuss 
further, they are defined by both excess and lack, too much and not enough, a 
fundamental tendency towards imbalance in either direction or both). Accordingly, the 
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words ‘drama’ and ‘dramatic’ appear in many descriptions of BPD patients and their 
behaviors; borderlines, it seems, have none of Goffman’s ‘dramaturgical discipline’ or 
the ‘naturalness’ of Judith Butler’s fully realized gendered subjects, whose gender 
performances appear unrehearsed due to a lifetime of conditioning—that is, their 
performances are not seamlessly integrated into everyday life. Their machinations may 
work to secure what they want and may temporarily allow others to access their vivid 
fantasy worlds, but they are obviously machinations. One guide for school counselors 
in spotting personality disorders in adolescents (a dangerous game, as many high 
school students meet most or all of the criteria in the DSM for various disorders, 
particularly disorders associated with self-absorption and/or identity confusion, such 
as NPD and BPD) warns readers about the possibility of BPD in teens who exhibit 
“dramatic student behavior such as suicidal gestures or self-mutilation” (Farrugia 
195). The choice of the term ‘gesture’ is telling here: Borderlines tell stories about 
their bodies and selves, it’s believed (through cutting their skin, manipulating a 
psychoanalyst, seducing a lover with no intention of following through or pretending 
to be either more or less ‘insane’), but those stories are incomplete, never representing 
totality or linear progression. Their narratives are arcless, circular. They make 
spectacles of themselves rather than making selves, which leads to the suspicion and 
outright dismissal of their claims (of abuse, of love); their lack of trust in others, rather 
than as evidence for past abuse, is sometimes read as pathological and as originating 
internally (Meyer-Lindberg 778). In New Maladies of the Soul, Kristeva’s adolescent 
patient ‘Anne’ replaces her unhealthy seductions of police officers and other law 
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enforcement workers with extensive imaginary ‘cop stories.’ For Kristeva, however, 
this knack for narratives can be the key to resolution for the borderline rather than a 
sign of delinquency and brokenness; she writes of the significance of the imaginary for 
borderlines (Kristeva 137-138) to help them ‘resolve’ their symptoms or obsessions 
with fantasy. 
By far borderline’s best-known and most consistent conceptual throughline is 
the BPD patient’s resistance to treatment (she is ‘born’ a mistake, fundamentally 
unanalyzable), as well as the responses they inspire from therapists and 
psychoanalysts. In fact, the ‘problem’ of the borderline that aroused so much interest 
was not the suffering of the patients, but of their therapists. Stern opens his 
introductory text on border disorders with, “Repeated failure in the past taught me that 
the knowledge we possessed was not adequate to treat these people” (Stern 54). 
Gunderson writes in Borderline Personality Disorder, “A…clinical observation that 
helped stimulate interest in defining borderline patients rose out of the intense 
countertransference reactions these patients generated in therapists—
countertransference responses characteristically marked by feelings of helplessness 
and rage” (Gunderson 2). These reactions, he claims, were not indicative of a problem 
in the therapist-patient matrix, but they “were important insofar as they…reflected 
something perversely troublesome within the nature of these patients themselves” 
(Gunderson 2). Something is uncannily askew: the borderline’s origin. 
Further evidence of this notorious reputation can be found in BPD’s 
representation in the self-help and pop psychology genres; far more texts are available 
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for the beleaguered family, friends, and partners of the borderline than for the patient 
herself. Books, courses, and message boards promise to help partners extricate 
themselves from borderline marriages. Even texts aimed at clinicians and other 
professionals, such as Janice M. Cauwels’ Imbroglio: Rising to the Challenge of 
Borderline Personality Disorder, evoke a sense of mystification, confusion, and even 
fear that echo Freud’s and other psychoanalysts’ initial tentative steps towards the 
analysis of female sexuality. In Mental Health Disorders in Adolescents: A Guide for 
Parents, Teachers, and Professionals, a chapter ostensibly meant to cover all 
personality disorders is devoted almost entirely to the threat of the ‘difficult’ and 
‘troubling’ diagnosis of BPD and its warning signs, with the others as mere 
afterthoughts (Hazen et al. 192). 
Finally, the figure of the borderline is also associated with sexual multiplicity: 
bisexuality in the Freudian sense (possessing both masculine and feminine 
characteristics and tendencies) as well as sadomasochism (neither ‘pure’ sadist nor 
pure masochist, whether emotionally or sexually).  Kernberg’s “polymorphous 
perverse sexual trends” (Kernberg 286) as indicators of BPD became a mainstay of 
cultural representations and discourse around the disorder. “Patients whose genital life 
centers on a stable sexual deviation” (286) need not apply—borderlines exude 
multiplicity in a variety of ways. Comparing BPD to hysteria, disability theorist Susan 
Cahn writes, “In our own time, the troublesome behaviors identified by the psy 
professions—a term referring to psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work, and 
psychiatric nursing—contain a mixture of conventionally masculine and feminine 
  
89 
 
traits” (Cahn 260). She argues that the borderline is troublesome partly because she 
refuses to be patly categorized in terms of gender or orientation: at once aggressor and 
receiver of that aggression, perpetrator and victim, and relishing (if her critics are to be 
believed) in all of those roles. 
The primary conceptual constant in BPD, in fact, is its untraceability and its 
perpetual representation as a conundrum that must be ‘demystified,’ unpacked, 
detangled, or, at the very least, broken down into its constituent parts and subsequently 
managed. 
Ways of Reading/Theorizing the Borderline 
Since its inception as a diagnosis, particularly during the second-wave feminist 
movement, as BPD was being ‘legitimized’ through the APA, feminist critics and 
medical professionals alike have noted the significant similarities between the 19th 
and 20th century understanding of hysteria and borderline personality disorder, with 
some going so far as to call BPD ‘the new hysteria.’ Like hysteria, the development of 
BPD as a diagnosis and the trajectory of its growth in popularity within psychological 
discourse is read by some critics as a reflection of societal changes in attitudes about 
the ‘self’ and how those attitudes are pathologized; in this view, BPD is seen as a 
feminized version of narcissism, which became a popular site of cultural and 
psychological fixation in the 20th century as psychotherapists noted a “trend towards 
self-absorption” (Battan 201). In 1993, Kristeva described BPD as a ‘contemporary 
malady’ alongside narcissism (Kristeva 1993, 8-9), a reflection of our cultural fixation 
on personality and the necessity of its readability and coherence. For feminist critics, 
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this cultural obsession with the primacy of the self aligned with shifting popular 
anxieties about the threats posed by particular feminized traits and troublesome 
aspects of womanhood to result in the notion of the borderline. Christopher Bollas, for 
example, argued in Hysteria that hysteria was a response to sexual development, 
which, for women, is ‘inherently’ traumatic; BPD, he argued, was the new iteration of 
hysteria.  
BPD’s primary relationship to the legacy of hysteria is, of course, its 
association with troubling/troubled womanhood and its reputation as a repository for 
traits that are associated with femininity and thus pathologized: as Cahn writes, 
“Borderline personality disorder has become a generic female malady resembling the 
earlier twentieth-century diagnosis of hysteria, which, according to historian Elizabeth 
Lunbeck, was used ‘less as a proxy for symptoms than as an epithet expressive 
of…[psychiatrists’] disdain for troublesome aspects of womanhood” (Cahn 
259).  Indeed, descriptions throughout the development of the disorder often rely on 
gendered language which echoes that used to describe hysteria and hysterics. For 
example, Kernberg’s depiction of borderlines as characterized by emotional lability 
and ‘overinvolvement’—including diffuse boundaries, a desire for oneness that 
resembles infantilism, and a “hysterical overinvolvement in relationships” including 
“childlike clinging” and a tendency towards an “infantile personality” (289)—reflects 
the commonly described traits shared by 19th century hysterics. And while he writes 
that “nonsophisticated observers usually consider [symptoms of BPD] in women as 
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typical feminine charm” (289), a psychoanalyst ‘knows better’: this is womanhood 
gone awry.  
Adolph Stern’s description of the embodied nature of borderline personality 
disorder echoes images of the paralysis and debilitating body spasms said to be 
experienced by hysterics: “The picture of a psychic bleeder is a familiar one. Instead 
of a resilient reaction to a painful or traumatic experience, the patient goes down in a 
heap, so to speak, and is at the point of death. There is immobility, lethargy instead of 
action, collapse instead of a rebound…Paralysis rather than flight or fight is the 
reaction” (Stern 57). The association of BPD with a lack of bodily control has enjoyed 
a lengthy legacy, culminating in BPD’s frequent association with ‘transgressive’ 
embodied patterns of behavior such as self-cutting and other forms of self-mutilation, 
anorexia, bulimia, suicidal ‘gestures,’ BDSM, and promiscuity.  Like hysterics, 
borderlines were historically also presumed to be lying or exaggerating about their 
experiences of trauma (Freud famously posited that female neurosis/hysteria were due 
in part to childhood sexual abuse, only to retract his statements later in the wake of 
widespread skepticism). Stern paints the picture, for example, of a group that performs 
its suffering and victimhood; the question as to whether or not that suffering actually 
occurred is presumed irrelevant: “In this class of patients, self-pity and self-
commiseration, the presentation of a long suffering, helpless picture of the injured one, 
are regularly met; also what I would call wound-licking” (Stern 61). 
In a broader sense, borderline personality disorder can be and has been read as 
a performance of hyperfemininity or femininity-in-grotesque, a response to gendered 
  
92 
 
expectations in excess. Like the everywoman whose ‘self’ is perpetually divided into 
actor and spectator, voyeur and object, in John Berger’s Ways of Seeing, for example, 
the borderline is frequently described as ‘watching herself’ or ‘knowing what she is 
doing.’ The borderline (as cultural archetype) takes what Berger posits as a 
requirement of feminine social existence (a split subjectivity) to its extreme, thus 
exposing its underlying artificial nature: “The social presence of women has 
developed as a result of their ingenuity in living under such tutelage within such a 
limited space. But this has come at the cost of a woman’s self being split into two. A 
woman must continually watch herself. She is almost continually accompanied by her 
image of herself” (Berger 46). Berger’s depiction of womanhood as inherently split is 
reminiscent of the conflation with the borderline as master manipulator; she is 
‘dramatic,’ always performing, seemingly consciously. Thus, the borderline is an 
example of womanhood that fails to enact a seamless performance, matching form to 
content. 
The structuring view of borderline, as posited by Allan Horwitz, “emphasizes 
the power of cultural norms and social movements to shape symptoms” (Horwitz 130) 
without contending that “the underlying disorders themselves must be cultural 
products” (130), including responses to gender norms and cultural anxieties about 
gendered behaviors. Horwitz, and the structuring view, don’t question the authenticity 
of the vulnerability or the suffering that produce culturally specific disorders such as 
bulimia, anorexia, and narcissistic and borderline personality disorders. In the same 
vein, while feminist readings of BPD from the 1990s to contemporary scholarship are 
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fruitful in illuminating the cultural underpinnings that partially explain the unique 
stigma experienced by borderlines, I am careful (especially as someone without the 
disorder) to eschew easy or romanticized readings or representations of the ‘fluidity’ 
and ‘liberation’ (Cahn 117) of BPD, or of any disorder which, while its cultural 
origins and diagnostic solidity may be questioned and critiqued, nevertheless causes 
real suffering to real individuals. Instead, like Cahn, I resist the adoption of borderline-
as-metaphor—as a metaphor for the poststructuralist eruption of the boundaries of the 
“‘unique self inherited from the Enlightenment and modernism” (Cahn); for disability, 
as purely a social construct, an unabashed celebration of liminality, or as narrative 
prosthesis (not to be represented in its embodied reality, but only to serve as a 
metaphor to be used by able-bodied/able-minded consumers); for a queering of the 
notion of sexual identity as “fixed” and “unified” (Cahn); and/or for a deliberate, 
embodied, extreme, and performative version of the suffering of ‘every woman’ under 
patriarchal rule. Cahn argues (and I agree) that this view (i.e., that BPD and other 
feminized disorders are examples of feminist ‘liberation’) obscures the material 
realities of living with psychic distress, co-opting the suffering of real women who 
exhibit the symptoms of borderline (even if the name itself deserves ongoing 
contestation). 
Victor Turner’s take on liminality has served as fruitful for disability studies 
scholars and mad studies theorists alike, and has particularly salient implications in 
discussions of the borderline as a cultural archetype. In “Liminality and Disability: 
Rites of Passage and Community in Hypermodern Society,” Jeffrey Willett and Mary 
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Jo Deegan argue that “physical disability functions in modern society as a status 
betwixt and between everyday assumptions about ‘normal’ physical strength and 
functioning” (Deegan and Willett), rendering disabled individuals permanently liminal 
(with the liminal stage representing the transitional phase in a social rite of passage). 
The concept of liminality and the symbolic associations between liminars (liminal 
persons or ‘threshold people’) and disabled individuals have frequently been evoked in 
discussions of discourse around and representations of physical disability, but they are 
also particularly fruitful in characterizing the figure of the borderline.  
The attributes of liminars, writes Turner, “are necessarily ambiguous, since this 
condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that 
normally locate states and positions in cultural space” (95); they are “neither this nor 
that, child nor adult, woman nor mother” (95). The borderline, similarly, according to 
her discursive reputation, is both child and hypersexual adult, lover and villain, and 
perpetually attempts to cross the boundaries that have been laid for her (in seducing 
her therapist, for example, or longing for oneness with an inappropriate love-object). 
Rites of passage—such as girl to woman—are disrupted in the borderline; she 
separates and longs for reunion, but remains stuck in the abyss, a permanent neophyte, 
unable to resolve her progressive stages to rejoin society. Like her etiology and her 
name, she is characterized entirely by ambiguity, inspiring discomfort in those who 
watch her. Like the borderline and like Kristeva’s abject subjects, liminality is linked 
to “death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the 
wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon” (Turner 96), encompassing all 
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manner of transgressive states and multiplicities in the borderlands, neither this nor 
that.  
Moreover, the cultural figure of the borderline is unique in that she refuses her 
status: Liminars may be “disguised as monsters” (Turner 95) and are expected to be 
humble until their status or societal role is returned to them, or until their new status is 
achieved and they can be restored to the community, but borderlines refuse 
submission, instead ‘manipulating’ full members of society, including those charged 
to lead them through the necessary rites (male partners, analysts), and threatening 
them with liminal status as well if they fall into her clutches. Moreover, the 
transgressions of borderlines are all the more scandalous because of their liminal 
status. If liminality as a ritual phase is meant to be performed as a return to structure or 
a reinforcement of it (Turner 201), the borderline does everything she can (it’s 
believed) to subvert it instead. Refusing a carnivalesque temporary reversal of socially 
appropriate roles only to be reinstated as socially appropriate woman, wife, mother, 
mistress, or daughter, the borderline instead ‘chooses’ (it seems, based on what are 
believed to be her manipulations) a life of liminality (a distinction between borderline 
liminality and the liminality experienced by physically disabled populations). 
Resisting pat categorization, she manipulates but is only ambiguously manipulable. 
She penetrates but is impenetrable. Unlike ‘normative’ neophytes in the liminal phase 
of ritual, borderlines bear the distinction of being ‘stably unstable,’ permanently 
diffuse, never to be reintegrated into society, and characterized most consistently as 
ambiguous and unknowable. Despite recent research that has solidified earlier hunches 
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about BPD being fully treatable, the figure of the borderline still occupies a liminal 
social status and represents as such in film and other cultural texts, due to her long 
history of stigmatization, representation as ‘difficult,’ and the ongoing presumption of 
borderlines’ untreatability and illegibility.  
Borderlines on Film 
Analyzing cinematic representations of BPD is not a way, as some suggest, of 
reflecting psychological realities about disorders or for medical students and 
psychology majors to form a realistic understanding of a given psychiatric disability 
and its most effective treatments (Bluestone 142), an approach which calls to mind a 
more widely disseminated version of Charcot’s medical theatre9 and his probings-in-
every-sense of poor Augustine, his ‘model hysteric’ (Kuppers 200). Instead, like 
Charcot’s hysterics, borderlines on film allow us to trace the etiology of the disorder 
rather than to necessarily gain an understanding of the disorder itself, and certainly not 
of its lived experience. 
Capturing the presumed core of BPD has been semantically and diagnostically 
difficult, and Girl, Interrupted and Prozac Nation demonstrate the parallel problem of 
pinning it down cinematically. The BPD film genre (what I will call the lengthy canon 
                                                 
9
 Jean-Martin Charcot (1825 – 1893) was a French neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology 
who methodically photographed hysterics at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, with the aim of providing 
skeptical colleagues with visual proof of hysteria's specific form.  
The photographs were anything but objective documentation. Charcot required his subjects to pose as 
their hysterical "type" for his photographs. “Bribed by the special status they enjoyed in the purgatory 
of experimentation and threatened with transfer back to the inferno of the incurables, the women 
patiently posed for the photographs and submitted to presentations of hysterical attacks before the 
crowds that gathered for Charcot's lecture’s” (Didi-Huberman). Thus, hysteria became feminized and 
performed as a specific type under Charcot’s construction.  
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of films that feature a woman who is explicitly or popularly believed to be 
‘borderline’) is one that reflects cultural anxieties about womanhood, girlhood, sex, 
violence, castration and engulfment. If, as Laura Mulvey suggests in “Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema,” “the paradox of phallocentrism in all its manifestations is that 
it depends on the image of the castrated women to give order and meaning to its 
world” (Mulvey 34), the figure of the borderline lends a touch of horror to every film 
she appears in, as she threatens to disrupt the symbolic order with her disordered 
mind-body and the slippages between her performance of female dependency-in-
excess, girlified victimhood that masks a predator, bisexuality that transcends or even 
dismisses the possibility of the male gaze, and her grotesque imitations of the male 
role (through mockery, gender-bending, insatiable sexual appetite or superior 
manipulation skills). Rather than adhering entirely to Mulvey’s idea of the binary 
pairing of male, sadistic, scopophilic spectator and female object of that viewership-
violence, films in the BPD genre can be read more accurately through Gaylyn 
Studlar’s “Masochism and the Perverse Pleasures of the Cinema.” Studlar articulates a 
view of the ‘masochistic aesthetic’ that includes “fantasy, disavowal, fetishism, and 
suspense” (Studlar 205), stresses the pregenital period in the development of desire 
(fittingly, the period said to be disrupted in borderlines) rather than the phallic phase, 
and has as its central fantasy the “primal desire” (207) of “ ‘dual unity and the 
complete symbiosis between child and mother’” (207). This is unattainable for the 
masochist as well as the borderline, as the borderline as she is culturally conceived 
cannot reconcile even the parts of herself (child and mother) in order to become 
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whole. Thus, within the masochistic aesthetic, which I argue is the aesthetic of the 
BPD genre, In other films, this fantasy is elided entirely through escape into the 
symbolic order, whether through submission to analysis where disparate parts of the 
self can be, if not reconciled, appropriately compartmentalized, or through 
transformation by Foucauldian ‘disciplinary power’ and submission to the 
‘technicalization’ of “the difficulties and contradictions of human life” and the 
‘subjectification’ of the body—for example, through medicalization (psychiatric 
drugs, hospitalization, diagnosis, psychotherapy) administered by an external source 
rather than by oneself (cutting, substance use, manic writing, sexual pleasure, etc.). In 
the following two films, as a testament, instead, to the power of the biomedical model 
of mental illness, this fantasy solution of death (whether through realized death, 
gestured symbolism, medicalized submission, or total subjection to an idealized 
partner) is only narrowly avoided. 
Self-“Help” and “Self”-Centered: Girl, Interrupted (1999); Prozac Nation (2001) 
Girl, Interrupted and Prozac Nation share a number of attributes: Both films 
attempt to represent what was popularly deemed a growing ‘epidemic’ of mental 
illness in young women throughout the 1980s and 1990s; both feature protagonists 
whose real-life counterparts were diagnosed with BPD; both were based on bestselling 
nonfiction titles of the same names (the former based on a memoir by Susanna 
Kaysen, the latter by Elizabeth Wurtzel), the ‘mental illness memoir’ being an 
especially popular one at the time; and both films’ central female characters were 
hated by much of the press and the public. One critic began his review of Prozac 
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Nation in the following way: “The self-centered brat…makes life miserable for 
everyone around her, but there’s no reason the public should have to pay for the same 
privilege” (McCarthy). This was par for the course in terms of audience and media 
reactions to Winona Ryder’s Susanna and Christina Ricci’s Liz. 
Popular hatred of the protagonists may originate partly from their reliance on 
the common and inaccurate trope of presenting BPD as fundamentally decadent—the 
diagnosis acting as a repository for petulant and spoiled young girls who want more 
than they deserve. Susanna is a middle-class graduating high school student who has 
an affair with a married professor, a friend of her mother’s, and whose family has the 
resources to provide her with a relatively lush institutional experience after a suicide 
attempt that’s presented as nonsensical and indulgent; Liz, while the daughter of an 
absentee father and an overbearing mother, is off to Harvard to study journalism, and 
her antics only risk her potential expulsion or her abandonment into a sterile office 
building with a well-meaning therapist, not incarceration. The films’ youthful white 
protagonists reflect the inaccurate cultural scripting of BPD as overwhelmingly young, 
white, and wealthy; rarely, if ever, has a film or play explored the possibility of a 
woman with BPD as a person of color, as poor or working class, or as explicitly and 
unambiguously queer or gay.  
Cahn argues that characters with BPD are primarily cast as young, feminine, 
conventionally attractive “white women of means” (Cahn 103) due to their reputation 
as beautiful-but-deadly (thus needing to adhere to racial, gendered, and age- and class-
based cultural standards about who qualifies as seductive without immediately being 
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read as ‘aggressive,’ ‘desperate,’ or ‘threatening’). This casting tendency reflects an 
inaccurate stereotype, as BPD diagnoses have been statistically shown many times to 
be equally distributed among women of different racial identities, gender identities, 
sexual orientations, and socioeconomic backgrounds (Cahn 117).  
Beyond the ‘overindulged borderline patient’ trope, the two-woman mirrored 
pairing is also key to both films but particularly to Girl, Interrupted: critics and 
psychologist commentators couldn’t decide (and still can’t, judging by the continued 
popularity of the dispute on message boards) whether Susanna or notorious crazy-girl 
canon Lisa (played by Angelina Jolie) was the ‘real’ borderline. The two-woman 
matrix is so popular in the BPD genre as to be nearly inextricable from cultural 
narratives involving characters who are explicitly or who come to be, in popular 
discourse, ‘borderline.’ The pairing takes the shape of one of two possible 
configurations: the borderline as ‘other’ and her wronged female counterpart as the 
prototype of ‘typical’ femininity, inscribing victimhood onto the female body deemed 
‘appropriate’ (as in Fatal Attraction and Welcome to Me), or, more commonly, a 
pairing in which the more dominant and aggressive/sadistic ‘bisexual’ (as in queer 
and/or both masculine and feminine) woman (Girl, Interrupted; Thirteen; Single 
White Female; Chloe) draws a more naïve, girlified femme woman into her witchy 
shared circle for a series of psychosexual games. Circling each other like predator and 
prey (with neither sure which is which), boundaries collapse and identities (individual, 
sexual, and oedipal) become mapped onto one another. This attempted union calls to 
mind a distorted version of the Lacanian mirror stage, which borderlines are presumed 
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not to be able to resolve meaningfully or cleanly. Indeed, the women together, and the 
slippages between them—with each reflecting the other’s vulnerability and fragility as 
well as their potential for monstrosity—often come to represent either a frantic 
attempted return to the mother/child bond and its illusion of oneness, or, more 
commonly, borderline in its totality, as no one woman, it seems, could be portrayed as 
containing the multitudes necessary to be fully borderline. Many times, these pairings, 
at once reifying the conventional virgin/whore dichotomy and inching it towards a 
queerer alternative, lead us to ask, ‘Who’s the borderline?’ Who caught it and who 
gave it; who’s contagious? And what will be left when one of the two is, as they 
always are, destroyed? Film posters in particular emphasize these pairings as a toxic, 
erotically charged dualism, with images often featuring showdowns or mapping each 
other’s faces onto the other, that suggest at once that the two women are one, that they 
are fractured or ‘broken mirrors’ of one another, that they are sexually attracted to 
each other, and/or that they are ‘trapped’ with one another in a sort of funhouse mirror 
of codependence.  
This two-woman pairing leads Girl, Interrupted (and, to a lesser extent, Prozac 
Nation) to a fraught relationship with queerness that must be resolved through analysis 
or triangulation. Lisa’s queerness (or at least her queer-suggestiveness) is evident from 
the start. Returning to the girls’ mental institution after one of many escapes, she has a 
Rosaline, her previous roommate Jamie, who committed suicide precisely because of 
Lisa’s disappearance, and she sets her eye on Susanna immediately as the next 
possible Juliet. Lisa’s and Susanna’s obvious mutual obsession, along with their 
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regular forays into heterosexual promiscuity, reflect the pathologization of queer 
female sexuality, as well as the association of bisexuality in particular with BPD. In 
The B Word: Bisexuality in Contemporary Film and Television, Maria San Filippo 
argues that “Susanna’s diagnostic relegation to a psychological borderland signals a 
bi-textual correlation between the film’s construction of two types of inbetweenness—
in mental status and in sexual desires” (131). Indeed, every time the film inches 
towards a queer onscreen reality, it’s quickly obscured and/or chalked up to crazy-girl 
antics. On the way to a club after escaping the institution, the two girls kiss. Nothing’s 
said about it, and they both promptly fuck the first men they meet upon entering the 
club. At another point, Susanna’s boyfriend Toby attempts to break her out; she 
considers, but ultimately decides, “I want to leave, but not with you” (“Girl”), looking 
bewildered by what she’s saying herself. Of Susanna’s choice, Filippo writes, 
“Though draft-dodging and breaking out of Claymoore are here equated as means of 
escape from an intolerable situation, Susanna will all too eagerly run away soon 
thereafter—but with Lisa. To leave with Toby—even under lawbreaking 
circumstances—would be, for Susanna, the safe choice: an escape, but one leading 
back into a life of heteronormative conformity” (128). Her reluctance to leave with 
Toby could read as a rejection of promiscuity or an acceptance of institutional 
authority, but the film quietly offers a queerer (though homonormative, and thus free 
of ‘borderline’-related stigma) alternative. After all, her therapist (the one with whom 
she ultimately connects, and who gives her a pathway to wellness) is referred to at one 
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point as a dyke; Susanna is returning, not only to Lisa, but to a girls’ institution, her 
“dyke” clinician, and the silent possibility of a future as one herself.  
In Prozac Nation, the two-woman pairings are between Liz and her best friend, 
Ruby (Michelle Williams), and between Liz and her overbearing mother (Jessica 
Lange). In particular, Ruby is the love-object of Lizzie’s borderline obsession; at one 
point, she declares, “Ruby gets it. She gets me. If she were a guy, everything would be 
perfect” (“Prozac”). Liz hooks up with Ruby’s boyfriend, giving him a blowjob, 
instead, and can’t explain why, though the connection is obvious to viewers. On the 
outs with Ruby, Lizzie attempts to resolve their separation, and their unrealizable 
tension, through triangulation, getting her own boyfriend instead. He becomes her new 
idealized object, one by whom she wants to be contaminated and to possess: “I 
understand now how people sometimes want to kill their lovers. Eat their lovers. 
Inhale the ashes of their dead lovers. It's the only way to possess another person” 
(“Prozac”). This attempt at oneness, as a replacement for Ruby, ends in an encounter 
with a more ‘obvious’ disability than Lizzie’s, this time a developmental disability. 
Upon discovering that her boyfriend is his sister’s caregiver, Lizzie becomes enraged, 
claiming he gets off on others’ misery. It’s unclear whether she’s jealous of his sister 
for her ability to garner pity and understanding for her uncontrollable condition, or 
whether she worries that he’s interested in Lizzie, too, only for her misery—to feed off 
of it. Regardless, abandoned by her replacement love-object, Lizzie gets a female 
analyst and returns (forever trapped in the two-woman unrealizable matrix) to Ruby 
and her mother—dominant in the former relationship, submissive in the latter. 
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The ‘borderline’ (as diagnosis and as concept) in both films is ultimately 
resolved through a championing of the biomedical model of mental illness and the 
necessity of the disciplinary power of the asylum. In Girl, Interrupted, Turner’s 
concepts of liminality and liminars and Erving Goffman’s idea of total institutions as 
detailed in Asylums (or what Foucault refers to in Discipline and Punish as complete 
and austere institutions) converge in the body of the borderline (either Susanna or 
Lisa, depending on who you ask), in the charged, queer-loaded space between Susanna 
and Lisa, and in the girls’ institution where Susanna is required to stay. Within the 
institution itself, there is an alternative space where much of the ultimate reckoning 
that defines Susanna’s eventual recovery takes place: In the “bowels of the hospital” 
(Cross 48) is a basement where the patients regularly gather to engage in taboo 
activities (gossiping, smoking, drinking, and reading each other’s diaries and their 
own diagnostic files). It’s the others’-other of the asylum, a performative sacred space 
where liminars can find a crude form of communitas otherwise unavailable to them in 
normative society (theirs being the asylum proper). Their madness is ‘contained’ 
within the asylum, but roams free in the basement—Lisa’s favorite place, in 
accordance with her role as the voice of the abject, subversion, and transgression. 
Accordingly, it’s only when Susanna decides to escape the hospital and to submit to 
patriarchal authority (at least in that the asylum itself represents disciplinary power, 
which includes patriarchal rule) that she rushes to exit the basement, extricating 
herself forcefully from the ‘borderline’ (both Lisa and the basement space) to become, 
for better or for worse, the kind of submissive neophyte who gets the hell out of this 
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place—a place Lisa needs “to feel alive” (Cross 48). Writes Susan Cross in Cineaste, 
“She may have a ‘borderline personality disorder’ now, but she can step over that 
border if she wants and become an ‘orderly’ adult of her own creation” (Cross 48). 
Recognizing the abject in Lisa, or Lisa-as-abject, Susanna denies it within herself, 
which is the first step in her recovery under the linear biomedical model. When the 
girls gather at night to secretly read their medical files aloud to each other, 
commiserating over their pathologizing narratives, Susanna shares the description of 
BPD. Lisa scoffs, “That’s everybody,” indicating that madness is normal: a spectrum. 
To ‘recover’ from the borderline, however, Susanna has to admit that she is different 
and does not want to be, thus requiring her submission to the treatment process and 
her conversion into a ‘docile mind.’ 
Indeed, despite Susanna’s eventual assertion that she is now a recovered 
borderline, stamped and approved, her recovery only takes place in opposition to Lisa. 
To her therapist, she wonderingly offers, “Lisa thinks it's a gift...that it lets you see the 
truth” (“Girl”), meaning, of course, madness; the reply: “Lisa's been here for eight 
years.” The looming specter of the ‘total institution’ or of permanent liminality is 
enough to scare Susanna into a profession of faith in the recovery/biomedical model. 
So when Susanna attempts to escape the sacred space of the basement to the contained 
world of the asylum itself, Lisa confronts her: “You know, there are too many buttons 
in the world. There's too many buttons, and they're just...There's way too many just 
begging to be pressed…And it makes me wonder. You know, it really makes me 
fucking wonder...why doesn't anybody ever press mine?” The borderline, it appears, 
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wants nothing more than to be manipulated herself; why, she wonders, is she the one 
who has to be electrifying? Who has to seduce? In Lisa, the abject speaks: What was 
electrifying because taboo and ‘cast off,’ Susanna now sees as repulsive and wants to 
expel from herself. Boundaries between self and other become less collapsed: Lisa has 
become part of Susanna, and she must now cast that part of herself off in order to 
escape permanent liminal status: “Because you're dead already, Lisa! No one cares if 
you die, Lisa...because you're dead already…Maybe the whole world is stupid and 
ignorant. But I'd rather be in it. I'd rather be fucking in it...than down here with you” 
(“Girl”). Thus, Susanna’s skepticism of the biomedical model dissipates along with 
her passion for Lisa. 
Lizzie, too, has a fraught relationship with therapy; initially, she claims she’s 
only there to be able to write again. Unlike Susanna, who begins to write obsessively 
only when she begins speaking to her therapist—indicating that access to language 
and the symbolic order is available to women ‘in their condition’ only through the 
process of analysis—Lizzie writes manically, then not at all, and seeks therapy to find 
a balance between the two. Later, when she begins taking medication, Lizzie never 
develops more than a deeply ambivalent relationship to Prozac or therapy. Like 
Susanna, Lizzie has a final confrontation with the possibility of her future, with 
borderline problematically being presented as a ‘choice.’ At her therapist’s office, she 
escapes to the bathroom, breaks a glass, and is poised to cut herself, only to be caught 
by her therapist and her young daughter. Confronted by a (re)productive future, as 
well as the possibility of permanent liminality and institutionalization that would 
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inevitably result if she put glass to skin, she continues with her medication instead, 
though she never expresses any further confidence in its usefulness or in the ‘truth’ it 
has to offer her. Confessing her doubts about the efficacy or ethics of the biomedical 
model in therapy, Lizzie muses, “I have this personality. It’s fucked up, but it’s me. I 
don’t know who I am anymore. And I see myself becoming this person who does the 
right thing…who says the right thing...but that's not me” (“Prozac”). Her disability, 
she argues, is a part of her, and not necessarily a shameful one. The pills, contend her 
therapist, will give her breathing space—perhaps to start writing again. And she does: 
“only now,” she says, “it wasn’t as if my life depended on it” (“Prozac”), a conclusion 
that could only be regarded as ambiguously hopeful. 
Autoethnography and the Borderline: Girl in Need of a Tourniquet 
The same year, 2013, that has been defined as marking ‘the mad turn’ within 
disability studies (referring to the increasing amount of scholarly work on psychiatric 
disability and representations of madness), Merri Lisa Johnson released her memoir, 
Girl in Need of a Tourniquet, which Johnson and Robert McRuer describe as “a 
queer/crip read—a claiming, an inhabiting—of borderline personality” (Johnson and 
McRuer 129), a memoir that “sutured together many types of discourse (medical texts, 
self-help books, fairy-tale, personal email, autobiographical memory) to evoke a 
stuttering, self-interrupting flood of ways of telling her particular story instead of 
adhering to one voice or paradigm of illness narrative” (Johnson and McRuer 129). 
Johnson’s memoir and subsequent work with McRuer marked one of the first major 
attempts to fold BPD into disability theory and queer studies; previously, scholarly 
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attention to it outside of the social sciences was limited primarily to feminist critiques 
of its etiology.  
Also in that year, in the same special issue of the Journal of Literary and 
Cultural Disability Studies in which ‘cripistemology’ (a marriage between crip theory, 
reconsidered ways of ‘knowing’ disability history outside the existing models, and 
Eve Sedgwick’s epistemology of the closet) was coined, Anna Mollow coined the 
terms ‘criphystemologies’ and  ‘undocumented disabilities,’ both of which she ties in 
with Showalter’s reading of contemporary ‘hysterias’ to refer to those disorders, from 
environmental illnesses to chronic pain to depression and, yes, BPD, that are routinely 
hystericized—that is, treated with disdain, skepticism, or dismissal by both medical 
practitioners and the public (Showalter 4). The term ‘undocumented disabilities’ is 
meant to evoke the shame of ‘not having your papers,’ of constantly being asked to 
prove your legitimacy, and to prove that you are suffering adequately and thus 
deserving of acknowledgement of your crip identity. Often, these disorders are also 
feminized or associated with women or ‘the feminine,’ given the history of 
underestimating, dismissing, or pathologizing women’s pain and of doubting their 
self-narratives. Critiquing the frequent lack of attention to hysteria and its legacy 
within disability studies scholarship, Mollow advocates for a cripping of hysteria, 
“demonstrating this concept’s profound significance for disabled people and its 
instrumental role in our oppression” (Mollow 187). Most notably, Mollow argues for 
the significance of foregrounding suffering in disability ethnographies, thus critiquing 
the resistance of ‘the medical model’ to many scholars within disability studies. This 
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stalwart refusal to admit to suffering, she says, may serve to ward off pity and disdain 
for physically disabled individuals (who are inevitably presumed to be suffering, and 
suffering badly, whether they are or not), but the same refusal actively harms those 
with undocumented disabilities, rendering them even more invisible. If reclaiming and 
expressing suffering is the only means of legitimizing undocumented disabilities, 
Mollow argues, it’s worth risking pity. Like Cahn and others, Mollow seeks to explore 
the question of who belongs in the disability category and who is ‘allowed’ to suffer 
legitimately (Glover 204). 
If BPD—the unrepresentable—and other invisible or ‘undocumented’ 
disabilities are to be represented by disabled people themselves—to be 
criphystemologized rather than rehystericized—what medium will accomplish this 
most effectively? The closely linked practices of performative writing and 
autoethnography are one possible answer; drama therapy/performative 
autoethnography are another. The aforementioned Girl in Need of a Tourniquet serves 
an example of performative writing as scholarship and disability autoethnography/life 
writing, and the musical Borderline, as an example of what can go awry when 
psychiatrically disabled individuals are not foregrounded in attempts to represent their 
narratives in performance. 
Johnson’s memoir is an instance of performative writing as articulated by 
Ronald J. Pelias in “Performative Writing as Scholarship.” According to Pelias, 
performative writing “expands the notions of what constitutes disciplinary knowledge” 
(Pelias 417); “features lived experience, telling, iconic moments that call forth the 
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complexities of human life” (418); “rests on the belief that the world is not given but 
constructed, composed of multiple realities” (418); “often evokes identification and 
empathic responses” (419); “takes as its goal to dwell within multiple perspectives, to 
celebrate an interplay of voices” (419); “turns the personal into the political and the 
political into the personal” (420); and “participates in relational and scholarly 
contexts” (420). In addition, if Mollow seeks to crip hysteria by invoking 
criphystemologies in her work, Johnson’s performative writing seeks to crip 
borderline personality (she leaves off ‘disorder’ in the title as a response to its 
pathologization and stigma). Her account of borderline personality is a prototypical 
attempt to, as Mollow suggests, foreground suffering as a necessary and even radical 
act in the process of ‘uncloseting’ an undocumented disability. 
Writes Pelias, “Although often written in the first person, [performative 
writing] presents what Trinh Minh-ha calls a ‘plural I,’ an ‘O’ that has the potential to 
stand in for many ‘I’s” (419). This is certainly true of Johnson’s work: with her style 
that repeatedly speeds up and slows down, existing outside of normative 
autobiographical structure, the personal becomes collective. As in much of disability 
life writing, the deeply individualized nature of her narrative of a life-deemed-liminal 
is precisely what opens it up to serving as a point of connection for other lives lived 
‘in the border,’ allowing others to recognize themselves amongst the plurality of I’s. 
On the significance of personal disability narrative and the continued cripping of the 
autobiography genre, G. Thomas Couser writes in “Disability, Life Narrative, and 
Representation”: “…disabled people have been hyper-represented in mainstream 
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culture; they have not been disregarded so much as they have been subjected to 
objectifying notice in the form of mediated staring” (Couser 456). The borderline, 
indeed, has been hyper-represented: She, like the Freudian hysteric, and like those 
with many other disabilities, has certainly known no lack of interest, having served as 
a siren for many lovers who have subsequently cried ignorance, a muse for filmmakers 
who have tried to pin her down like a (madame) butterfly, the hot-button subject line 
in more than a few message boards and MRA blogs about tortured love affairs and 
messy divorces, and the subject of a great deal of debates and the alleged cause of a lot 
of hand-wringing in the psychological community. The disorder and its definition 
have been excruciatingly overworked: probed, prodded, refashioned and redefined as 
much as one of the bodies of Charcot’s girls. BPD has been described as a dumping-
ground and a catchall for our fears about women’s and girls’ bodies—and even worse, 
their minds—as well as a convenient way to obscure uncomfortable truths about male 
sexuality, such as its own tendency towards masochism and the prevalence of 
childhood sexual abuse perpetrated against boys (now estimated as nearly equal to 
rates of sexual abuse against girls). Borderlines have, however, only rarely represented 
themselves on a large scale; like other people with disabilities, then, they have often 
been narratively reduced to tragedy or metaphor. 
BPD is especially ripe for analysis and exposure through performative writing, 
and lends itself inherently to its major traits as Pelias describes them. The interplay of 
voices that Pelias describes evokes the non-cohesive ‘self’/ ‘selves’ of the borderline, 
who has often been perceived as shifty, caught in a permanent state of identity 
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diffusion, of the kind of ‘trying on of masks’ normally associated with adolescence 
and young adulthood. For an autoethnographic and performative account of the 
borderline, the multiplicity and multivocality that characterize performative writing 
may arise from disparate ‘voices’ within the borderline herself, from reflections of/on 
the discourses (scholarly, scientific, psychological, cultural, social) that have created 
her by giving her a name by which to identify herself, and/or from the ‘others’ that she 
is presumed to mimic, to mirror, or to take within herself in the hope of becoming 
one.   
Johnson’s account of her disorder and the style she employs to narrativize it 
mimic the embodied experience of the disorder itself, as well as the stigma of 
harboring the borderline label. Girl in Need of a Tourniquet is characterized by 
intertextuality and multivocality, peppered throughout with interruptions, 
contradictions, asides, and allusions. In a passage near the memoir’s opening, Johnson 
describes the purpose of the book and her writing process: 
It was a book about heartbreak. IT WAS A BOOK ABOUT OBSESSION. It 
was a book about a woman who drove me crazy. THE WOMAN WAS MY 
LOVER. The woman was my mother. The woman was ME. 
No. 
It was a book about vicious introjects, implicit memories, and relentless 
reenactments of trauma and recovery. IT WAS A BOOK ABOUT GENDER, 
POWER, AND NARRATIVE, ABOUT PERSONALITY, PAIR-BONDS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS. It was a book about Zen mindfulness, 
neural pathways, and family mysteries. IT WAS A BOOK ABOUT SOUL-
WRENCHING BLUES, BRIGHT RED SCREAMS, LOVE DOGS, GRIEF 
WORK, AND HAPPINESS FILLING THE LUNGS LIKE THE HOT WHITE 
RIOT OF GARDENIAS. 
The book was not a book but a symptom. 
My words came out in the wrong dis/order. I couldn’t make it write. (Johnson 
21-22) 
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Like the protagonists of many of film’s BPD women, Johnson can’t 
write/make it right: So instead, she deliberately writes in a way that’s dis/ordered 
(echoing Cixous’ ecriture feminine), claiming the ruptured and fractured nature of her 
form of meaning-making rather than attempting to force it into a linear narrative 
structure. Particularly in passages like this one, that are meant to narrativize some 
aspect of the self or to generalize about the ‘who’ behind Johnson’s memoir, Johnson 
makes use of multiple character styles (varying from bold to italic to underlined within 
the span of a single thought process, and shifting between fully capitalized or not at 
all), font styles, and sizes, emphasizing that her personal insights are demonstrably 
nonlinear, contradicting themselves and interrupted with various forms of discourse: 
psychiatric texts and self-help books that define her diagnosis and who ‘she’ should be 
(“neural pathways,” “vicious introjects”), unabashed romanticizations of the disorder, 
and poetic metaphors and similes (“happiness filling the lungs like the hot white riot 
of gardenias”) that are often more truthful than the most straightforward and coherent 
depictions of the borderline. Simply, form mimics content, even performs content. In 
this way, Johnson’s ‘self’ becomes legible as it really is, rather than either 
masquerading as falsely coherent or remaining the mystery that BPD selves are 
presumed to be. Johnson, far from empty, is full of selves, and all of them have a voice 
here. 
Also like her cinematic predecessors, Johnson has a female 
lover/antagonist/mother figure/abuser/victim: a fellow professor, a bisexual colleague 
named Emily who cheats on her wife with Johnson in a clumsy, too-much-can’t-
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breathe affair over the course of two years. Emily doesn’t have BPD, nor is it clear 
what her motivations are, as she’s seen primarily through the lens of Johnson’s 
suffering, but Johnson’s account neither eviscerates Emily nor absolves her of being 
responsible for her own agency in their long-term, destructive affair.  
Here, the two-woman model is a reflection of a queer, material reality rather 
than a narrative prosthetic. Moreover, it is Johnson’s suffering to which we are privy, 
rather than the suffering of her partners; resisting both the BPD abuser/innocent victim 
trope and the BPD-as-fragile, Johnson is able to shed some light on the darkest corners 
of codependence and toxicity without implicating her disorder as the sole source of 
that toxicity. For her part, though Emily isn’t demonized by Johnson’s account, we do 
get a window into the cracks in her own story: She occasionally cheats on both her 
wife and Johnson with a male colleague as well, and emerges repeatedly out of the 
wreckage of the latest conflict to coax Johnson out of bed and into her own, out of 
motivations that are difficult to parse.  Ultimately, in a twist that both reifies and 
defies the usual narrative arc of ‘the BPD affair’ (siren seduction followed by one-
sided destruction), Emily does leave her wife for Johnson; it’s only then that Johnson 
can cut the cord, leave Emily herself, and begin to carve out a path for herself that 
isn’t so overwhelmingly focused on the latest inappropriate love-object. Both are 
temporarily destroyed, but neither is the enemy; the affair was a symptom of multiple 
forms of dis/order, not BPD alone. Moreover, in another memoirist, such a focus on 
personal suffering might appear solipsistic. Instead, Johnson’s self-focus in the face of 
the overwhelming ‘clinical evidence against her’ as a borderline operates less as 
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selfishness or self-aggrandizement than as a necessary form of reclamation of the 
disorder from the clutches of experts alone, thus functioning as an example of the 
purpose Couser posits for effective disability autoethnography; that is, for “disabled 
people [to] counter their historical subjection by occupying the subject position” 
(Couser 458). 
Johnson’s experience of her ultimate BPD diagnosis, moreover, resists the 
usual narrative that the labeling of BPD is wholly negative, enacting violence on its 
object: While she is affected by the stigma associated with BPD and other Axis II 
disorders, Johnson chooses to learn about herself first through the lens of BPD and its 
sordid history of depictions and controversy as an intellectual exercise rather than a 
painful one. Viewed through a crip lens, and echoing Mollow’s argument that 
claiming suffering is an integral aspect of affirming undocumented disabilities as 
valid, it is precisely Johnson’s recognition and acknowledgement of herself ‘as’ 
borderline that allows her to own her pain as valid. The label of BPD ‘gives her her 
papers,’ gives her a narrative arc, and gives her a clothesline on which to clip various 
parts of herself that previously seemed disjointed and nonsensical. Far from denying 
the abject within herself or locating it in the body of a love-object, Johnson 
incorporates it into her writing, integrating rather than attempting to purge. 
Building on and playing off of Berger’s notion of the perpetually self-
surveying woman (Johnson-as-borderline characterizing borderline-as-herself), 
Johnson personifies borderline personality itself, making her into a character with a 
great deal of aplomb. Of her diagnosis, Johnson writes: 
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Some people believe borderline personality disorder should be renamed to shift 
the focus from a spoiled identity to a constellation of symptoms. Borderline 
personality wears a red miniskirt and smokes magic cigarettes with boys who 
dream of being wild and wake with cold sweats. She is a WET WILD 
SEED…Unstable, mercurial, self-injurious, contradictory, seductive, clingy, 
the term BORDERLINE PERSONALITY has borderline personality. It is in 
crisis. It is poised to self-destruct.” (196) 
 
Be the perpetually self-surveying woman, Johnson personifies borderline personality 
itself; she emphasize ‘her’ (borderline’s) alleged sexually seductive power (“boys who 
dream of being wild and wake with cold sweats” (196) and evokes the familiar image 
of the borderline femme fatale, cigarettes, red miniskirt and all. In doing this and in 
listing many of the negative traits commonly associated with BPD (“unstable,” “self-
injurious,” and “clingy”), Johnson holds her disability at arm’s length—noting both 
the slippages and the gaps between BPD and its representations, the slipperiness of the 
term itself rather than the disorder characterized as “in crisis” and “poised to self-
destruct”—rather than to examine it critically, while owning the pain it causes her. In 
this way, her work adheres to Couser’s definition of disability autobiography as “a 
form of autoethnography, as Mary Louise Pratt has defined it: ‘instances in which 
colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with [read: 
contest] the colonizer’s own terms’” (Couser 458). Johnson engages with her assigned 
‘spoiled identity,’ picking out the parts of it she likes, owning the suffering causes by 
those she doesn’t, and critiquing the parts she doesn’t identify with or finds 
problematic. In other words, her ‘I’ is a starting point, not a stigmatized destination: 
“The ‘I’ of performative writing might best be seen as a geographical marker, a ‘here’ 
rather than a ‘self.’ In short, the self becomes a positional possibility” (Pelias 419).  
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Girl in Need of a Tourniquet can be read as a response to the aforementioned 
filmic representations of BPD as well as the clinical and cultural rhetoric that have 
historically surrounded the diagnosis. Delving into the primary critiques of the BPD 
diagnosis by feminist critics and the mad movement, Johnson lends all of them 
credence but espouses none of them wholesale (just like a borderline). She concludes 
for herself that her own BPD diagnosis can be a source of meaning and purpose, a sort 
of platform for her own creativity and healing—a starting point rather than a 
destination, but a useful one nonetheless (again, calling to mind Mollow’s discussion 
of undocumented disabilities). Unlike Kaysen at the close of her memoir, Johnson will 
never be a ‘recovered borderline,’ but she is, she says, a self-identified borderline who 
accepts both the positives and negatives of her disability. This conclusion itself 
appears contradictory, as Johnson takes time to examine and validate each of the 
criticisms so frequently leveled at the category of borderline as an effective one to 
begin with; in embracing the discursive contradictions that complicate her diagnosis, 
she again enacts a ‘borderline’ way of being and knowing that echoes Lennard Davis’ 
and David Morris’ notion of the “terrain of the biocultural” (“the intersection among 
the cultural, social, political, technological, medical, and biological” (Davis, The End 
of Normal 2), especially as it pertains to disability) and Davis’ concept of 
dismodernism (“a view of identity that remains within the orbit of postmodernism but 
eschews the fantasy of power and agency associated with the supposedly transgressive 
body” (Davis, The End of Normal 16). It is Johnson’s informed acknowledgement of, 
but not submission to, her disorder and its political and gendered underpinnings that, 
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rather than lending coherence to her ‘self,’ allows her to accept the incomplete and the 
‘not whole’ as typical and natural, a position that elides both the social and medical 
models to rest more comfortably within the biocultural perspective of disability. 
Performance, the Borderline, and Borderline 
Other recent representations of borderline personality disorder have been 
undertaken under the umbrella of drama therapy. One such project, produced by 
drama therapist, playwright and professor Robert Landry (head of the drama therapy 
department at NYU), culminated in a production of a new musical, Borderline, at 
NYU’s Steinhardt School in 2014. The musical spawned an unlikely mini-media 
frenzy of disparate opinions on the unorthodox nature of its fruition: the media 
coverage of the event and its process of creation is telling as a snapshot of the ongoing 
discomfort (within the medical community and society at large) with psychosocially 
disabled individuals’ ability to represent themselves, as well as how many cultural 
conversations around BPD still manage to miss the mark. 
Borderline made use of the mirroring, two-woman trope so common as to be 
virtually inextricable from representations of BPD. Herein lies the primary 
controversy: The ‘other woman’ in Borderline was neither a lover herself or a lover’s 
spurned wife, but the real-life therapist for over a decade of the play’s resident 
borderline, Jill Powell. Despite this difference, coverage of the production adheres to 
many of the two-woman template’s tropes, such as dividing the two female leads into 
dichotomies (virgin/whore, classy/trashy, demure/unhinged) common to 
representations of womanhood in general and oversimplified associations of BPD with 
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concepts like splitting and black-and-white thinking: “It was not easily recognizable as 
therapy, these two women screaming at each other, their faces inches apart, during a 
rehearsal in a basement space in Greenwich Village” (Kilgannon 2014). Critic Corey 
Kilgannon continues in The New York Times, “The patient, a blond woman with spiky 
hair and spiky heels: Jill Powell, 49, an actress who had fallen on hard times” 
(Kilgannon 2014). By contrast, “The other woman, more reserved in dress and 
demeanor, was Cecilia Dintino, 56, a clinical psychologist” (Kilgannon 2014). 
Separated into pat, binaristic class-, sexuality-, comportment-, and appearance-based 
categorizations, Powell and Dintino form the classic borderline matrix, with Powell as 
‘other’ and spectacle to Dintino’s representation of the biomedical model of 
psychosocial disability, along with the appropriate performance of womanhood. 
Unable to attend the performance, I became aware of Borderline through media 
coverage and had the opportunity to interview Jill Powell via Skype.   
Billed as unconventional therapy necessary to treat the likes of such an 
uncontainable and explosive patient as Powell, criticism in defense of the work cast 
Powell as messy and wayward and Dintino as the patient combination of mother, 
medicine cabinet, and bosom buddy: “Ms. Powell’s treatment has hardly been 
conventional, and can range from actions like hugging to screaming profanities. With 
roles that have included friend, big sister and lifeline, Dr. Dintino has fielded 
numerous late-night phone calls from Ms. Powell in suicidal situations” (Kilgannon 
2014). Continuing in this vein, “Dr. Landy said, ‘With certain forms of mental illness 
that do not respond to conventional treatment, we need a more radical approach, which 
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therapeutic theater can provide’” (Kilgannon 2014). Other media outlets criticized the 
approach, calling the process irresponsible and unethical on the part of the therapist 
and selfish on the part of the producer and playwright, due to the usual protocol 
discouraging outside socialization between patient and therapist. 
Powell, for her part, tells a radically different story: she felt (and, if her claims 
are true, was) exploited by the process. Publicly criticizing the ‘therapeutic’ aspect of 
the production as well as the production itself on a blog post, her complaints echo 
many of the criticisms leveled by patients, feminist scholars, and trauma therapists at 
stigmatization by the mental health community, disparaging language in the DSM, and 
sexism, ableism and misunderstanding in film representations of ‘the borderline.’ She 
begins her critique of the rehearsal process and the production itself with a critique of 
what she read as the hypersexualization of her character by Landy, who, she claims, 
“…wrote a script that leaned far too much in the direction of sexuality and gender 
fluidity. I’m guessing he thought it would bring a level of sensual heat to the show and 
he enjoyed writing about it” (Powell). Echoing the fraught, push-and-pull relationship 
between clinician and borderline patient so often evoked in earlier representations, 
Powell also claims to have been involved in a power struggle with Landy over what 
she read as an unproductive focus on her sexuality and its ‘deviance’ (as lesbian). 
She’s gay, she writes, and that is frankly irrelevant:  
My singing a lyric like one gem Dr. Landy wrote, ‘My manhood is like a tree 
in the forest,’ all the while doing a Tango with my therapist, was incorrect, 
inappropriate and flat out, had nothing to do with being Borderline…THE 
BORDERLINE SPOKE UP! Well it did not go over well and there was a bit of 
a pissing contest if you will. His writing and My story. My truth. (Powell) 
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Unlike in Johnson’s narrative, Powell’s queerness here (according to her) is plumbed 
for its titillating implications, erotic currency, and its associations with sexual 
‘deviance’ or ‘confusion.’ Her sexuality is not here a material reality, but a metaphor 
for her overall non-normativity and her tendency (as evaluated by Landy) towards 
excess and hedonism. Though the current DSM definition of BPD doesn’t include 
sexual behavior, interests, or orientation as a diagnostic criterion, the legacy of those 
associations lives on, even in clinical diagnoses and analysis, and certainly in 
performance. 
In addition, Powell writes about her intense emotional reaction to the process 
of exposing her ‘self’ in performance; due in part to her disorder, she was homeless at 
the time, and vulnerable due to a family death and the return of the shadow of an 
unstable relationship, but still expected to perform at her best at all rehearsals for no 
pay while her therapist and the professor were paid for their efforts and went home to 
comfortable settings (she alleges they never tried to locate resources for her, though 
the rehearsal process was intense, demanding, and lengthy). 
Powell also alleges that she participated in a lecture about BPD at NYU with 
Landy and Dintino where she was the primary speaker, but was not paid, while they 
were, due to her tenuous position as the object of analysis rather than the subject of 
education and their position as her therapeutic team. Thus, she was unable even to 
parlay her disability into currency as, say, a freakshow performer might (a situation in 
which the exchange is clearer: your freakery for my money), as the performance and 
its surrounding process were concealed under the veil of ‘drama therapy’ and 
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‘therapeutic theatre,’ as well as higher education. This was good, she was told, for her; 
her representation on stage was part of her rehabilitation, a service provided to her 
rather than rendered by her. Accusing Landy and Dintino of recklessness, Powell 
shares, “I ended up in the hospital and they were going to call off the play. I begged 
them no. They then realized, oh wow, our actor whose real story this is and is being 
told in real time as she lives it, is a REAL FUCKING BORDERLINE. Holy crap” 
(Powell). Powell’s story raises many ethical questions about, certainly, representations 
of BPD, but also about the right of psychosocially disabled populations to represent 
themselves narratively, and about the role and purpose of therapeutic theatre/drama 
therapy under capitalism (a question arguably raised by the necessarily capitalist 
enterprise of therapy to begin with, as the two-person ‘theatre’ of therapy requires the 
ongoing performance of psychosocial disability and of gradual, linear healing by one 
of its actors in order to justify its continued run). 
Powell complains about her mischaracterization at the hands of those posturing 
as her healers, as well as within the Times articles about her. From Kilgannon’s 
perspective, “In rehearsals Ms. Powell crackles with manic energy, playing herself. 
Her emotions have run so high that some rehearsals have stalled, or even been 
canceled, ‘so people could recover and pull themselves together,” the show’s director, 
Dave Mowers, said’ (Kilgannon). Here, ironically, the dramatic realities of psychic 
distress—a hospitalization and homelessness, for starters, according to Powell—are 
obscured by Kilgannon, the show’s creators, or both. Though their musical and its 
reception as therapeutically productive rely on Powell’s disability and its persistent 
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shadow of ‘drama’ or its possibility, the actual dramas associated with a life with BPD 
are less savory and less in line with their marketing campaign. These are the kind of 
dramas that are more difficult to sensationalize, eroticize, or stage, and they also 
deviate from the positive narrative of cutting-edge forms of healing that the creators 
(and, seemingly, the critic) were trying to present. Better to keep the realities vague 
and save the best for the staged performance, in a controlled environment, in which 
audience and other can face one another through the mediator-middleman of the 
therapist/doctor (unlike in disability autoethnographies or performances 
curated/written/produced by disabled artists themselves) rather than risk being caught 
up too unsettlingly with the borderline. 
For her part, Powell retorts that during the interview, “Both Cecilia and Robert 
were pushing their agenda of ‘Therapeutic Theatre’ so hard that I couldn’t get a word 
in. I got up because Cecilia kept cutting me off and paced and unfortunately Corey 
took that as ‘manic energy’ which actually is not me at all. That was me using my 
skills as to not cut Cecilia off as she so rudely did me, and say what I really wanted to 
say which I now have” (Powell). Powell’s account of her experience working on the 
production evokes the familiar sense of her disabled mind/body being ‘used’ (only to 
be discarded and its resulting material realities, such as financial need, a lack of 
housing security, and extreme stress, ignored) that is described by Mitchell and Snyder 
in their work on narrative prosthesis; while the play depends entirely on that same 
disability as its source of a narrative arc and passionate emotionality, Powell herself is 
silenced. The crux of the problem, indeed, with Borderline and many other 
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representations within the BPD genre, seems to be that the borderline (with all of her 
affective baggage, yearnings and ‘drama’ that make for a damn good story) is 
necessary for the ‘show’ to go on, but is excluded and obscured in both process and 
product. This is exemplified at one point, meant to be darkly humorous, in Landy’s 
musical, in which Powell and her therapist discuss the possibility of her suicide: “Ms. 
Powell promises Dr. Dintino in the show that she will not kill herself, even though she 
adds, ‘I want to die.’ ‘But if you die,’ Dr. Dintino answers, ‘we’ll have no play’” 
(Kilgannon).  
Representations of BPD, and how we read them and have read them 
historically, can serve as snapshots of how we ‘read’ sexuality, womanhood, girlhood, 
and how they should be seen. Its ongoing relevance is historically bound up in 
discursive tangles concerning trauma, gender, subjectivity, and the self. The cast-off 
girl of BPD film imagery draws us in by appealing to our desire to care; but, she sits in 
an abject space—her abjectness makes her an object in need of care while at the same 
time cautions us to turn away. She is sexualized, coddled, and reviled at once. She is 
cast-off and we wonder (alongside her) if we or someone can save her. So it is 
interesting to see more recent theatrical productions that have shown a willingness on 
the part of theatre makers to reconsider former conceptions of this much-maligned 
psychiatric disability. Delay Detach, a 2015 production at the Edinburgh Fringe 
Festival written by Joanna Alpern, for example, used the two-woman BPD genre 
‘template’ to explore the boundaries of adolescent female friendship, the impact of 
disability on long-term intimacy (including how it can create a sense of communitas or 
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shared loyalty), our collective fears about being vulnerable to disability as we age, and 
women’s shifting roles over a lifetime. Rather than cast-off girls serving as a 
repository for audience desires and fears, these recent productions seem to point 
toward expression and intimacy. Alpern’s play, along with Johnson’s memoir and 
several other recent examples of autoethnographic explorations of BPD (girded by a 
growing interest in psychiatric/psychosocial disability within the umbrella of disability 
theory), are beginning to press against the stigmatizing cultural boundaries that BPD 
has, untrue to form, never been able to cross or at least to comfortably inhabit. 
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Chapter Four 
Trauma in Emilie Autumn’s Neo-Victorian Performances 
Just as the conceptualization of memory and forgetting were at the core of 
writings on hysteria in the late nineteenth century, so recent writings continue 
to debate the ways we are to remember hysteria, those who supposedly 
suffered from it, and those who supposedly tried to understand or alleviate that 
suffering. The focus on maladies of memory forced nineteenth century 
physicians to consider what it meant to have a healthy memory and a normal 
relation to the past. What does it mean to suffer from the past, to be pained by 
memory? How is it that some people manage not to suffer from the past, to 
orient themselves properly in relation to the loss of the present? 
— Michael S. Roth, Memory, Trauma, and History: Essays on Living with the 
Past 
 
 “Emilie Autumn is an American singer-songwriter known for a couple of 
unusual things besides her music,” music journalist Joe Marvilli writes in a 2009 
edition of The Consequence of Sound. “First off, she eschews the typical rock devices 
of guitar and piano for an electric violin and a harpsichord. Secondly, she appears to 
be legitimately psychotic” (Marvilli). Marvilli quickly qualifies his earlier assessment 
of Autumn’s psychological state by softening his depiction: “Alright, maybe 
legitimately isn’t the right word. But if Autumn’s stage presence is just an act, it’s 
pretty damn effective” (Marvilli). 
Six years later, in 2015, Lilian Min spoke to pop star Melanie Martinez for 
HelloGiggles; this journalist’s discomfort, too, was readily apparent: “With boldly 
contrasting split-dyed hair, dark lipstick, and a penchant for pastel-hued clothes, the 
20-year-old Martinez feels like she’s in costume, and she partly is, though this is her 
off-duty look as well” (Min). She rationalizes Martinez’s unconventional look by 
pinning it as something of a publicity stunt. Min elaborates that Martinez’s 
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“fascination with toy sounds has her committing (for now) to an unsettlingly infantile 
aesthetic; she sucks pacifiers and plays with dolls in promotional images and videos” 
(Min). But Min quickly changes course again, warning readers not to be “fooled into 
thinking that she’s merely recycling or bastardizing girlish imagery” (Min). And 
though Martinez says explicitly that her Cry-Baby preadolescent alter ego is here to 
stay throughout her music career, at least as a secondary character in each album, Min 
paints Martinez’s self-girlification primarily as a temporary shtick or farce. 
Autumn and Martinez hail from very different backgrounds, yet often receive 
similar treatments from music journalists. In countless other interviews with both 
artists, journalists similarly rewrite both artists’ stories, even actively contradicting 
quotes that readers can see for themselves. Autumn is a classically trained violinist 
with a cult following who eventually created the steampunk/dark cabaret/glam rock 
mashup microgenre of Victoriandustrial music; Martinez is a mainstream indie pop 
star who got her start on The Voice and went on to helm every aspect of her successful 
but controversial concept album, Cry Baby, including serving as art director for all 13 
music videos. Both artists’ girlsonas are rooted in a lived experience and deeply held 
aesthetic which I will explore in my next two chapters; yet, both musicians’ girlsonas 
are often dismissed as performative affectations. 
In particular, Autumn’s professed history of psychiatric hospitalization and 
suicide attempts, as well as her performative inhabitation of stigmatized girls, both 
real and fictional, throughout history—Ophelia, Charcot’s hysterics, and Alice among 
them—is generally portrayed by journalists as just one example of her performative 
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hodgepodge of Gothic Lolita, steampunk, and neo-Victorian burlesque antics. And 
while Martinez repeatedly states that her apartment is decked out like a human-sized 
dollhouse with stuffed animals everywhere, sports necklaces made of doll parts to 
casual interviews, and is open about her anxiety (“A lot of artists feel nervous before a 
performance, but you said you feel anxious after as well. Why is that?” she was asked 
in a 2016 Vogue interview), journalists regularly preemptively justify her Lolita 
persona and her music videos’ haunting portrayals of sexual trauma and Oedipal 
psychodramas within a girlified dreamscape. Most often, they portray them as 
marketing ploys for her album or straightforward critiques of gender norms, situating 
it more comfortably for their tastes within a conventional feminist framework for 
readers. 
These trends of journalistic rationalization and erasure are intriguing in that 
they are aimed at artists whose work falls under the wide umbrella of the burgeoning 
superculture that encompasses Japanese Lolita, neo-Victorian, and steampunk 
subcultures, all of which regularly collide with, overlap with, draw from, and speak to 
each other. Moreover, both artists style themselves, not as girls, but as anachronistic, 
retrofuturistic girlified or dollified women, and both use their girlsonas to address 
trauma and mental illness. Women-as-girls (or women participating in Judith Butler’s 
girl-as-verb, “girling” themselves through repeated stylized acts [25]), particularly 
those who publicly address themes of psychological distress and psychiatric disability, 
often invoke anxiety and spark controversy among listeners, viewers, and critics. To 
unpack why psychological distress and girling are so often intertwined, it may be 
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useful to turn our attention to another set of performers who are often misread, 
disdained, or dismissed by critics.  
Adolescent Drag and Queer Temporality 
The girlsonas that are foregrounded in the performances that this dissertation 
looks at can be understood through the lenses of adolescent drag and queer 
temporality.  Citing Ann Liv Young, Kate Gilmore, and Amber Hawk Swanson as 
examples, Anna Watkins Fisher refers to the performative, campy reimagining of 
adolescence by adult female artists as “adolescent drag.” Characterized by “irony, 
awkwardness, and equivocality” (55), Fisher argues, adolescent drag is a means of 
sidestepping, subverting and exploding the limited options on offer within Western 
feminism. Fisher reads adolescent drag as a response to feminist foremothers, 
particularly fellow performance artists and activists, who shunned girldom or regarded 
it with suspicion: “In the self-conscious performance of adolescence, the once 
paternalistic and demeaning appellation ‘girl’ has increasingly become a recognizable 
queer resignification of compulsory constructions of ‘womanliness’ presented in the 
mainstream media and certain strands of feminism…adolescent drag [is] a parasitical 
operation that redirects notions of kitsch and regression to critique the limited 
identificatory positions available to a generation of young women said to be the heirs 
of Western feminism” (Fisher 50). 
 Adolescent drag, she posits, is a “tactical negotiation with [the artists’] 
cultural inheritance from 1960s and ’70s feminist art and from second-wave feminism 
more broadly” (Fisher 50). The notion of woman-performing-girlhood is particularly 
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intriguing as an exercise in adolescent drag and Munozian “disidentification,” as girls 
are simultaneously symbols of progress and the blank canvases onto which all of our 
cultural anxieties are pinned, just as they are simultaneously idealized as the 
consummate innocents and thrust into the public’s wary, watchful eye as particularly 
vulnerable to dangerous societal trends.  
While the artists analyzed by Fisher seem to be reimagining, campifying, and 
“acting out” their own fairly recent adolescences, Autumn and Martinez add multiple 
complicating layers in their own practices of adolescent (and preadolescent) drag. 
Namely, both artists inhabit multiple adolescences and childhoods, across a wider 
range of historical moments, in order to evoke key historical “times of the girl.” The 
wider temporal range of the girlhoods they perform is in accordance with participation 
in neo-Victorian, steampunk, and Lolita subcultures, all of which influence one 
another and draw inspiration from over 80 years across the Victorian and Edwardian 
periods. Moreover, the “girls” imagined in the performances that Fisher defines as 
prime examples of adolescent drag are overwhelmingly white, Western, and middle-
class. In this vein, Fisher writes, “The adolescent figure is inextricable from the white, 
Western privilege that affords the time and space to be a child, the luxury that laboring 
or forgotten children are not afforded, the ‘development’ withheld from racialized or 
colonialized subjects” (6). Meanwhile, Martinez, who is of Puerto Rican and 
Dominican descent, uses her lyrics and imagery to critique beauty standards that 
uphold white supremacy, particularly those that are brought to bear on young girls. 
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Autumn, in contrast, calls forth the ghosts of lost girls—those who have been 
abandoned to medical trauma, abuse, poverty, incarceration, or the asylum. 
Fisher’s definition of adolescent drag and my readings of it here are heavily 
indebted to theoretical work on queer temporalities, particularly Elizabeth Freeman’s 
notion of “temporal drag” as elaborated in Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer 
Histories. Temporal drag “highlights drag’s associations with ‘retrogression, delay, 
and the pull of the past on the present’” (Musser 62), writes Amber Jamilla Musser in 
her review of Freeman’s text. Further, Musser continues, “Temporal drag illuminates 
that which is often left ignored in the future-oriented time of performativity; it is the 
excess of historical signification” (62)—that is, what is left behind or cast off. 
Accordingly, the figure of the campified adolescent in adolescent drag is crafted from 
the “found objects” left over after feminism and its accordant possible trajectories 
have taken their toll, the remnants cast off after girls are presumed to have progressed 
linearly towards conscious adult agency and the adoption of neoliberal subjectivity 
and rational, productive individualism. 
Most significantly, however, temporal drag is about “the tactility of our 
relationship to the past” (Musser 62). At its core, it’s not about phantasm, theory, or 
dreamed-up alternatives, but lived realities and materiality—histories lived through 
the body, felt bodily, known bodily. Of adolescent drag as a derivative or example of 
temporal drag, Fisher explains,  
“Drag” has been a key term wielded within the broader campaign of lesbian 
and gay studies, and subsequently queer theory and increasingly performance 
studies, to unhinge identification from what some have perceived as its 
psychoanalytic orthodoxies and to understand it as a more fluid and transitive 
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performative site for social contestation in staging and improvisation...As the 
identificatory possibilities of drag have become ever more elastic within 
performance discourse over the last decade, the adolescent is mobilized as a 
site of performance exemplary of what Elizabeth Freeman has called “temporal 
drag.” (Fisher 53) 
 
In a similar conceptual vein, Elizabeth Freeman juxtaposes chrononormativity—that 
is, the normalization of the temporal regulation of bodies and minds so as to maximize 
productivity and promote linear growth and upward mobility—with queer 
temporalities, which she defines as “points of resistance to [the normative] temporal 
order that, in turn, propose other possibilities for living in relation to indeterminately 
past, present, and future others: that is, of living historically” (Freeman xxii). These 
points of resistance include interruption and what Jack Halberstam refers to as “queer 
failure”: failure to progress through the normative life stages in the appropriate order 
and according to the presumed timeline; failure to move forward rather than backward, 
with no hiccups or interruption; and failure to proceed, to “get on with it,” to put away 
childish things and to adhere to heteropatriarchal and capitalist timelines for 
“achieving” family life and productivity. Failure in this sense, Halberstam argues, can 
be a “potent form of critique, a repudiation of capitalism and profit margins, a refusal 
of the norm, an indifference to assimilation and a route to other ways of being in the 
world” (“Embrace Queer Failure”). 
Similarly, Fisher describes “the adolescent as an allegorical figure for a state of 
becoming that is profoundly queer” (54), taking on failure, interruption, fractalization, 
fluctuation, and identity diffusion as its performative keystones. Adolescent drag, 
accordingly, is characterized by improvisation, interruption, movement (here, between 
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girl and woman, between different modes of girling, and between different ways of 
being/ “doing” the girl), clutter and excess (representative of the variety of 
performative identities to select from) and a poetics of amateurism, all of which 
indicate a refusal to adopt the norms or standards of societal gatekeepers. 
Meanwhile, Clementine Morrigan, in Somatechnics, crips Lee Edelman’s 
critique of the ideology of reproductive futurism (in No Future: Queer Theory and the 
Death Drive) by introducing the concept of “trauma time” as a maddening antidote to 
both queer time and “crip time,” defined by Margaret Price as a “flexible approach to 
normative time frames” (62) by disabled people, whether by necessity or choice. 
Morrigan notes that she, as a survivor of long-term trauma, experiences time 
nonnormatively, in a way that doesn’t map onto capitalist expectations of scheduled 
productivity, but which also functions as a mode of time traveling. “Time, for me, 
does not function as a matter-of-fact linear procession. It is more like a complex, 
dynamic web of information and experience in which I can move in any direction, 
and, in which I am frequently lost” (50), she explains.  
For Morrigan, memory morphs into the present as she is immersed in 
flashbacks; a single word or phrase can leave her slogging through years of sticky 
psychological muck thought to be forgotten, while futuristic dreamscapes incorporate 
elements of her past and allow her to transcend them or transmute them into 
pleasurable artifacts. She notes that Edelman “proposes a queer anti-futurity which 
critiques a straight temporality grounded in the future of the symbolic Child. Edelman 
proclaims ‘Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively 
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terrorized’” (2004: 29)” (Morrigan 52). The notion of reproductive futurism, Morrigan 
argues, leaves the actual child behind in its scorched-earth wake, and ignores the 
unavoidable reality of child abuse, particularly that experienced by queer and disabled 
children. Citing Jose Munoz’s recognition of “the fact that the symbolic child Edelman 
writes about is implicitly a white child” (Morrigan 52) and thus presumed to be an 
innocent worth protecting for the purposes of imagined white supremacist 
heterosexual futures and Alison Kafer’s acknowledgement that “the always already 
white Child is also always already healthy and nondisabled; disabled children are not 
part of this privileged imaginary except as the abject other” (Kafer 32-33), Morrigan 
argues for the reintroduction of the real, traumatized child into retrofuturistic 
imaginings of the symbolic Child, writing, “Along with my discomfort with 
Edelman’s lack of acknowledgment of actual children, and of child abuse as a 
producer of queer temporalities, is a general awareness of the lack of engagement with 
disability and madness in the work of Edelman, as well as other theorists of queer 
temporalities.” (58) Though it’s often dismissed as a private psychological problem or 
an inscrutable force, trauma queers time, she says, and should be validated as another 
node of intersectionality alongside crip and queer time, particularly because, as 
Morrigan argues, trauma time “opens up time as a space that can be moved through in 
any direction, affirming the pain of violent pasts, and dreaming of just futures” (58). 
In accordance with the materialist underpinnings of temporal drag, Morrigan 
claims that trauma is primarily remembered, reimagined, reconfigured, and 
forgotten—whether accidentally or deliberately and productively—through the body. 
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“Trauma can be remembered and forgotten simultaneously, through body memories 
and also through structural dissociation” (53), she elaborates, and the memories might 
not tell the linear stories we want them to: “In the case of body memories, pain, an 
intense reaction to a particular type of touch, and other embodied experiences, can 
take the place of narrative memories” (53). This nonlinearity causes her to experience 
“the past as present, amnesia, the present as future as past, and ongoing disorientation 
in time” Morrigan 53), and she calls for us to read “the queer time travel of trauma as 
a means of queer, mad, world-making” (54), insisting that “the queer temporalities of 
[her] traumatized mind are not a problem, a tragedy, or an unfortunate condition 
requiring a cure. Instead, they are a different way of being in the world, a creative, 
flexible, and nonlinear way of relating to time” (58).  
I am not as concerned with the unfortunateness or fortunateness of the 
temporalities that populate and drive a traumatized mind, here; nor am I particularly 
interested in the question of evaluating Autumn’s and Martinez’s representations of 
mental illness, trauma time, and girldom as “good” or “bad,” “helpful” or “unhelpful,” 
“moral” or “immoral.” Rather, I am interested in representations of trauma as lived 
realities that fundamentally change a subject’s relationship to time; the way that 
visually driven subcultures like neo-Victorianism and Lolita culture can serve as 
mirrors for or representations of those lived realities; the way in which those 
representations are frequently (mis)interpreted; and the significance of trauma time for 
the culturally malleable (or “plastic,” according to Heather Warren-Crow) figure of 
the girl. 
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Central to my readings of these three artists and their relationships to time and 
trauma are the interrelated steampunk, neo-Victorian, and Lolita subcultures, all of 
which reimagine nineteenth-century fashions, norms, and preoccupations, engaging in 
an active dialogue with the past and cobbling together alternative histories to imagine 
an alternative present. And while all three have complex relationships with 
materialism and consumer culture—particularly in terms of the associated surface 
aesthetics and the need to mark oneself as belonging, while remaining individualized 
and “set apart”—they are also sites of burgeoning performative practices, such as the 
adoption of subcultural languages and counterpublics organized around taboo 
longings. These subcultures are rapidly converging under the wider umbrella of a 
“superculture,” and all three regularly speak to, inform, and overlap with one another. 
Steampunk and neo-Victorian Lolitas, Lolita-inspired steampunks, and every possible 
combination therein are distinctly different, while drawing from similar wells of 
obsession and ambivalent nostalgia. 
Neo-Victorianism and Steampunk 
Autmn’s chosen girlsona is rooted in Neo-Victorianism, an aesthetic 
movement and genre that spans literature, pop culture, and a variety of closely related 
microcultures, which has its roots in mid-20th century reimaginings of 19th century 
fashion by young people. In the 1950s and 1960s, British and American teenagers 
began incorporating items from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into 
their everyday wardrobes. Elizabeth Ho defines neo-Victorianism thusly, emphasizing 
its patchwork revisionist relationship to temporality and the past: “Neo-Victorianism 
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is a deliberate misreading, reconstruction or staged return of the nineteenth century in 
and for the present across genres and media” (5). Mark Llewellyn and Ann 
Heilmann’s influential definition of the genre/subculture in Neo-Victorianism: The 
Victorians in the Twenty-First Century also foregrounds the significance of the active 
presence of the contemporary voice in neo-Victorian cultural representations, as well 
as the persistence of the haunting spectre of the past: “Neo-Victorianism...must in 
some respect be self-consciously engaged with the act of (re)interpretation, 
(re)discovery and (re)vision concerning the Victorians” (4). This active engagement 
with fashion historiography—such as corsets or chemises worn over clothing, leather 
paired with parasols, or high-collared dresses with short hemlines—and with 
everyday-objects-made-fetish (straight razors, fingerless gloves, hairpins, and lace 
cuffs, for example), as well as crafts and hobbies/activities (i.e., exchanging calling 
cards) that combine Victorian-era ornamentality with postmodern hybridity and 
individualism, maps contemporary anxieties, needs, and preoccupations onto 19th-
century material culture. This juxtaposition allows practitioners to enter into an 
intimate conversation with the imagined past and perhaps even to begin to redress its 
wrongs, as well as our own.  
“Theorists like Frederic Jameson might read neo-Victorian subcultural styles 
as part of postmodernity’s endless repetition of past images and styles” (Feldman-
Barrett 80), Christine Feldman-Barrett explains, but, drawing from Caroline Cason 
Barratt’s “Time Machines: Steampunk in Contemporary Art,” she suggests that neo-
Victorianism’s aims are a bit loftier than repetition alone: “However, one might 
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instead view this phenomenon as one that ‘compresses time to meld both old and new 
in a pastiche, an endeavour that seeks to redeem the past’ (Barratt 175)” (80). In this 
vein, she argues that part of the purpose of donning neo-Victorian clothing is to 
dismantle and “correct” the errors of the past (violence and discrimination, for 
example), thereby juxtaposing oneself and the relatively liberated present with the 
more repressed past. At the same time, this devotion to reinventing Victoriana 
represents a kind of taboo longing, a nostalgia for a ‘past that never was’ and an 
admission of dissatisfaction with the present. In the examples I explore in this chapter 
and the next, moreover, that relationship (between contemporary neo-Victorian artists 
and the pasts they reimagine) is more complex, illustrating not only the contrast 
between the past and present, but also the unsettling throughlines between then and 
now for particular marginalized groups, for whom certain forms of discrimination 
have remained stubbornly persistent. 
Steampunk, a related movement with roots in 1980s science fiction, reimagines 
today’s technologies as if they were invented in the Victorian period, resulting in an 
alternative history set by turns in the mythic “Wild West” of the U.S. and 19th century 
Britain. Novelists H.G. Wells and Jules Verne have been important inspirations for 
steampunk fiction, fashion, and gadgetry, which imagines “what the Victorian era 
would have looked like if it had access to technology” (Combs), or, in some instances, 
projects an image of a future littered with Victorian technologies. Mixing DIY culture 
with the lure of technology, steampunk is a readily recognizable retrofuturistic 
aesthetic crammed with clock innards, analogue computers, airships, and steam 
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cannons. Bands like Abney Park and The Men That Will Not Be Blamed for Nothing, 
complete with fictional backstories, conjure images of contemporary goths 
transporting themselves to the 1890s or Dickensian street urchins who show up to 
wreak havoc among today’s societal fringes. Jonathan Greyshade describes steampunk 
as an attempt to revive the aesthetic and some of the underlying values of the 
Victorian period with an eye towards progressivism: “[Steampunk] is the marriage of 
Victorian-era focus on manners, beauty and form with technology, given a fantastical 
twist of functionality and craftsmanship, with a firm grounding in community and 
environmental consciousness. It seeks to reconcile a modern industrial sensibility with 
optimism, beauty, imagination, sustainability, and even whimsy and humor, things 
often notably lacking from post-modern design” (Greyshade).  
Simultaneously, underpinning steampunk values is the legacy of punk 
(particularly cyberpunk) and DIY culture, as well as anarchist leanings. Many 
steampunk enthusiasts craft their own wardrobes and accessories, placing a high 
premium on creativity and technical know-how. Much of steampunk’s eccentric 
appeal is related to the notion of exposure and of unpacking the past to see how it 
works, which is literalized in its accompanying fashion and accessories. Corsets, as in 
other neo-Victorian and neo-Victorian-adjacent subcultures, are worn over the 
clothing, and pantaloons often become pants themselves. Cogs, pulleys, and gears are 
visible and open for display, just as Victoriana’s innards are on display for 
reinterpretation and parsing. Conjuring obvious comparisons to notions of queer/ed 
temporalities, Feldman-Barrett writes, “There is an overt questioning of progress and 
  
140 
 
technology within the steampunk aesthetic. Linear time itself is being questioned, 
especially in relation to industrial time” (81). Steampunk, then, as a prime example of 
temporal drag, calls attention to the constructedness of time and gender norms, 
inviting participants to find pleasure in dismantling and reconstructing the 
assumptions of the past through bricolage, science fantasy, and revisionist histories. 
Lolita Culture and the Identify of the Girl 
If steampunk asks what could have gone differently in the areas of technology 
and innovation, it stands to reason that Lolita culture, particularly Gothic Lolita, 
steampunk Lolita, and neo-Victorian Lolita, asks what could have gone differently in 
the development of the cultural idea of the girl. Lolita culture, too, expresses a 
nostalgia for a past that never was—a girl that developed away from the encroaching 
responsibilities of adulthood and domesticity, and who was free to keep her pleasures 
close without having to trade them in for their more demanding, other-focused 
counterparts (i.e., dolls for babies and the plush, hyperreal, indulgent confections of 
Lolita fashion for clothing pointedly designed to attract a romantic partner). The Lolita 
subculture draws heavily from the central character in shojo manga and her accordant 
sensibilities (a shojo philosophy) and the related figure of the Lolita that emerged in 
1970s Harajaku street fashion in Japan, which rose to prominence within the context 
of the kawaii ultra-cute craze and has become the central axis around which a 
counterpublic has subsequently formed, eventually becoming a “transnational 
object”—co-opted, appropriated, and commodified for the global market. The 
subculture reached its peak popularity in the mid-2000s amidst the global rise of 
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“visual Kei” bands and the widest circulation of Lolita guidebooks like FRUiTS and 
the Gothic Lolita Bible, but the subculture persists.  In So Pretty/Very Rotten: Comics 
and Essays on Lolita Fashion and Cute Culture, Jane Mai and An Nguyen define 
Lolita culture straightforwardly as “a street fashion originating from Japan in the 
1970s typically associated with the Harajuku neighbourhood in Tokyo” (13). The 
bouncy, exaggerated “cupcake” silhouette and the ruffles, bows, and cute icons 
favored by Lolitas are influenced by the Victorian and (less often) Edwardian periods 
and ubiquitous cultural and literary figures like Alice in Wonderland, as well as 
Victorian bisque dolls, Japanese anime, and the excess and romanticism of the late 
Baroque Rococo period.  
Lolitas are often young women in their late teens and 20s: “Japanese Lolitas 
are usually young women (not girls), who dress in cute, childlike, and modest 
fashions” (Winge 47), explains Theresa Winge in “Undressing and Dressing Loli: A 
Search for the Identity of the Japanese Lolita.”  “Lolitas, also known as ‘Lolis,’” she 
elaborates, “are young women and men who dress as anachronistic visual 
representations of Victorian-era dolls, covered from head to toe in lace, ruffles, and 
bows” (47). Lolita culture has a literary parallel in shõjo manga or Japanese ‘girls’ 
literature’ (shojo bungaku), which was popularized in the 1980s by authors like 
Takemoto Novala. The sprawling fandom has spawned “a subculture most visible as a 
fashion choice but which has also been instantiated in a variety of ways as a literature; 
as a genre of manga, anime, and pop music; as a theatrical and community-forming 
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social practice; and as an aesthetic choice imagined as able to infiltrate every level of 
one’s life” (Bergstrom 21).  
Indeed, while Lolita culture is often reduced in media coverage to fashion, its 
most ardent followers often eschew the idea that Lolita involves costuming or cosplay, 
arguing instead that it functions as an identity. They adopt that identity in part by 
gathering in groups (virtually or in person) to practice performative rituals, such as 
teatime, dollmaking, and crafting. For some, this becomes a lifestyle to varying 
degrees of integration with their self-perception; for others, it functions similarly to 
queer closeting, in which someone might not be out at work but slips into preferred 
patterns of speech and behavior when off-duty. Performances of a Lolita “character” 
or version of the self, however, require practice and artifice: Poses, mannerisms, soft-
spokenness, and elegant turns of phrase are all key to the projection of a Lolitaized 
self. Writes Feldman-Barrett, “Intriguingly, Lolitas’ neo-Victorian dress is 
complemented by their use of ‘schoolgirl speech,’ which is a form of Japanese 
developed during the Meji Restoration: a period that also spanned the mid-nineteenth 
century” (77). Isaac Gagne notes that this subcultural language contributes to Lolita 
culture’s status as a distinct counterpublic, rather than an aesthetic alone: “Gothic & 
Lolita (hereafter, Gothic/Lolita) is a fashion-oriented subculture of young females who 
wear elaborate, antiquated dresses and aspire toward looking, acting, and speaking like 
‘princesses.’ Participants and producers of this subculture have also revived and 
recreated joseigo, or ‘women's language’...creating thereby a linguistically distinct 
community through a metalinguistic and counterpublic discourse in magazines and 
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internet forums” (131). One of the questions raised within the performances I’m 
considering here, then, is what it means to perform idealized “princessified” girlhood 
after an actual girlhood that was anything but. 
Lolita culture has since been co-opted and exported for global consumption, 
and many adherents bemoan its reduction in many cases to surface aesthetics alone. “It 
is through this global appropriation and reinterpretation,” writes Winge, “that the 
Lolita achieves her role as a transnational object, as well as her role as an object of 
resistance, agency, and nostalgia” (61). While many Lolitas, particularly due to the 
stigmatization they’ve faced as a group, appear to want the subculture to spread—
starting groups all across the world and global virtual Lolita communities, setting up 
shop as purveyors of the rarely-cheap coveted Lolita merchandise and garb, and 
offering thousands of intricate online tutorials in videos and forums on how to achieve 
the style—many others are wary of the sexualized interpretation and judgmental 
reception the look often receives. Lolita culture is stigmatized in part simply due to its 
status as a primarily youth-dominated counterculture, but has also been repeatedly 
accused of glorifying pedophilia and infantilizing women, not least because of its 
presumed ties to Nabokov’s notorious nymphet. Mai and Nguyen, in response to the 
common question “Is Lolita fashion related to the 1958 novel Lolita by Vladimir 
Nabokov or the film directed by Stanley Kubrick in 1962?”, claim (as do most Lolitas 
when asked) that the simple answer is, “No, not at all” (11). However, they 
subsequently confess that the relationship between the original Lolita and her 
subcultural counterpart is more complex than many Lolitas like to admit, although 
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they staunchly deny any connection to Lolita’s objectification, (hyper)sexualization, or 
status as an actual (if fictional) minor. Instead, they claim that Lolita culture affords 
those who participate in it an opportunity for self-expression that is not afforded to the 
literary Lolita: “It is important to remember that the novel is told from the perspective 
of Humbert Humbert. Dolores does not have a voice—the reader does not know her 
thoughts or feelings…In contrast, for women ‘Lolita’ fashion exists as a domain 
removed from the sphere of cis-male influence. Lolita has agency, feelings, and 
power” (15). 
Theorization about neo-Victorian subcultures has frequently taken on the task 
of discerning to what degree participants, particularly those in Lolita cultures or who 
reimagine the Victorian perspective through the lens of girlhood, are glorifying or 
reifying antiquated gender norms and unrealistic beauty standards and to what degree 
they can be read as empowered, empowering, or resistant. Feldman-Barrett argues that 
each subculture’s political aims are different, each subverting a different dominant 
narrative: “Goths challenge the stark stratification of social class, Lolitas empower the 
childlike, and steampunks question the mythology and chronology of ‘progress’” (73). 
Because these subcultures and their visual and rhetorical markers overlap and 
influence one another so intricately, Feldman-Barrett’s take is primarily helpful in 
indicating some of the political interventions that these modes of performance and 
narrative can make. Lolitan subcultures are primarily read through the lens of queer 
theory as a (literally) crafty and carnivalesque means of releasing the stress of societal 
rigidity and eliding or delaying adulthood. Nguyen and Mai describes Lolita culture as 
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“A means of coping with living in a rigid and stress-filled society” (15), with Lilian 
Min adding that the layered, intricate modesty of Lolita fashions offers young women 
an opportunity to slip out the side door of both gender binaries and the plodding 
progression towards adulthood: “a version of femmehood that doesn't hinge on sexual 
maturity, or traditional notions of (straight male-centric) sexuality” (Min). 
Lolitas, too, are often posited as deliberately liminal figures who position 
themselves as outside the demands of capitalism and ‘progress’ as defined by 
modernity, and can thus be understood as examples of the ‘queer failure’ so prized by 
Halberstam. Mai and Nguyen write, for example, “Lolita could be examined through 
scholar Brian McVeigh’s theory of kawaii as ‘resistance consumption’ in which 
‘adoring or associating oneself with cuteness positions one, if only temporarily, 
outside the demands of the highly ordered regimes of labour’” (167). In the same vein, 
Feldman-Barrett writes of neo-Victorian subcultures as a whole that the political aim 
is a macro version of this utopian transformation: i.e., “the subversion of norms of 
Victorian social hierarchy and...evading the dominant notions of ‘progress’ that 
accompanied industrialization” (6)—to return to a time, then, when the ‘story’ of 
industrialization still had a chance to go differently. 
The Erasure of Disability and Mental Illness 
Notably, theorization about Lolita, neo-Victorian, and shojo counterpublics 
and performative practices, as well as about adolescent and temporal drag, largely 
overlooks disability and mental illness (echoing Morrigan’s critique of much of queer 
theory’s treatment of temporality), focusing primarily on queer readings of the Lolita 
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figure or the neo-Victorian girl as purposely eliding chrononormativity by delaying or 
sidestepping adulthood and prolonging the pleasures of childhood. Neo-Victorianism’s 
hyperfocus on madness, the asylum, and themes of suicide and medical trauma renders 
queer readings that don’t tend to psychiatric disability invaluable, but incomplete. 
Neo-Victorianism’s inextricable ties to mental illness and psychological distress, 
particularly that of women under the thumb of patriarchal authority, are inarguable, 
and they are readily evident in what’s widely considered the first-ever neo-Victorian 
text, Jean Rhys’ 1966 postcolonial novel Wide Sargasso Sea. In Rhys’ novel, after a 
traumatic childhood, Creole heiress Antoinette Cosway watches her cognitively 
disabled brother die in a house fire in Jamaica before enduring a violent and 
emotionally abusive arranged marriage to a man who rejects her in part due to her 
Creole background—a series of traumas that leads her to develop a debilitating mental 
illness, to which he responds by confining her in the attic.  
Rhys’ novel is a postcolonial retelling of Jane Eyre, partly from the 
perspective of the “monster” in the attic, from her own girlhood forward, rather than 
from the point of view of Jane, to whom the suicidal wife in the attic represents only 
an obstacle to her own conventional marital happiness. The novel, told from multiple 
perspectives, established many of the themes and motifs that would develop within 
neo-Victorian literature and subcultural practices over the subsequent decades, 
including multivocality, the centering of previously marginalized or abject figures, and 
analysis of mental illness within the context of the advent of the field of psychology 
and the era of institutionalization.  
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Still, many of these representations rely on madness-as-metaphor: neo-
Victorian girls (who are generally insinuated to not be “mad” at all, but only to be 
attempting to elide their oppressive domestic duties) recast as feminist heroes who 
escape patriarchal repression by escaping the asylum. Meanwhile, the steampunk trope 
of the begoggled “mad inventor,” inspired by Jules Verne’s imperialist, nationalist 
boys who forge westward using self-built steam-powered vehicles between the pages 
of Edisonades (science fiction dime novels), connects madness to genius (a flattering 
linkage generally only afforded to impish boys rather than wayward girls), thus 
relegating it to the realm of lovable and laudable eccentricity. Lolita styles traffic in 
highly stigmatized and pathologized images of girlhood—with Gothic Lolitas 
conjuring up images of anachronistic “troubled teens” and the proliferation of cute 
objects that accompany Classic and Sweet Lolitas often described as “manic” or as 
symptomatic of a certain empty-headed vulnerability. Shojo manga, fittingly, often 
delves into dark psychological themes, with narratives propelled forward by the 
emotional triumphs and distresses of the character rather than linearly and according 
to plot (as is the cases in shonen manga, or boys’ comics). 
Indeed, neo-Victorian representations have a fraught relationship to trauma, 
both personal (such as incest) and collective (such as war, genocide, and eugenics), 
with scholars divided on the question of whether their primary aims are to 
voyeuristically exploit or to productively address and correct past traumas. In “What 
Did the Victorians Do for Us?”, a review of Marie-Luise Kohlke & Christian 
Gutleben’s Neo-Victorian Tropes of Trauma: The Politics of Bearing After-Witness to 
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Nineteenth-Century Suffering, Justin Sausman offers an incisive overview of theorists’ 
positions on neo-Victorianism’s relationship to the trauma it represents: 
Neo-Victorian fiction...would seem to exemplify Freud’s logic of 
Nachträglichkeit, in which, as Roger Luckhurst explains, ‘an event can only be 
understood as traumatic after the fact, through the symptoms and flashbacks 
and delayed attempts at understanding that these signs of disturbance produce’ 
(Luckhurst 2008: 5). However, whereas the traumatised subject is condemned 
to a repetition of the same set of pathological symptoms until released through 
narrativising the repressed event, neo-Victorian fiction can be read as a self-
conscious investigation of these symptoms, appearing as both victim and 
analyst of its own traumatic traces...This casts the entire neo-Victorian 
enterprise as a species of trauma literature. (119-121) 
 
Thus, neo-Victorianist cultural producers have to navigate the question of whether 
representations of a traumatic past exploit and further marginalize the oppressed 
groups they attempt to center and to what extent they traffic in sensationalism. Marie-
Luise Kohlke refers to the papering-over of an allegedly repressive and sexually 
abusive past with contemporary sexual norms, thereby retroactively sexualizing the 
nineteenth century, as “sexsation” (Kohlke 1), while other neo-Victorian scholars 
consider the so-called “medical sensationalism” of depictions of the period’s medical 
system as corrupt and misogynistic: “Christy Rieger,” writes Helen Davies, “has 
coined a useful phrase—‘medical sensationalism’—to discuss the neo-Victorian 
fascination with ‘scandal, illicit sexuality, the abject body, and medical misconduct’ 
(Rieger, 2014, pp. 153-64)” (Davies 18), and the figure of the deviant, perverse, or 
exploitative medical professional. To what extent do these representations diffuse and 
obscure the lived realities of marginalized groups rather than injecting meaning into 
their retelling? Moreover, do they function as a productive means of ‘after-
witnessing,’ or do they absolve us of considering the lasting effects of these traumas, 
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and their contemporary manifestations? Further, all of this prompts the question that 
Justin Sausman asks in “What Did the Victorians Do for Us? Review of Marie-Luise 
Kohlke & Christian Gutleben (eds.), Neo-Victorian Tropes of Trauma: The Politics of 
Bearing After-Witness to Nineteenth-Century Suffering,” namely, “what prompts this 
delayed working through of the Victorian past in the present moment, that is, the 
‘trigger’ event in trauma theory that releases previously repressed memories” 
(Sausman 121)? 
One of the potential answers to this question, for Autumn, Martinez, and other 
neo-Victorian artists who explore themes of psychiatric disability, is that psychology 
began firming up as a cogent field during the Victorian era. This makes it an 
appropriate subcultural space to inhabit and a meaningful historical period to “return” 
to through fashion, literature, and performative practices, in order to revisit the 
temporal moment when their identities congealed. Wilhelm Wundt founded the first 
experimental laboratory dedicated to psychology in 1879, and the American 
Psychological Association, which would later come to define mental illness as a 
cultural category—subsequently leading to both significant abuses for many and, 
eventually, healing for some—was established in 1892. This timing was especially 
significant for young women, who were at risk of institutionalization in the Victorian 
era for rebelling against marriage or domesticity, as well as for a range of mental 
illnesses included postnatal depression and anxiety, and other disabilities such as 
epilepsy, work-related stress, and “moral insanity” (infidelity or promiscuity). It’s no 
wonder, then, that the specter of the asylum (and the violence that often took place 
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there), with all its attendant implications for the role of those with cognitive and/or 
psychiatric disabilities in history as well as contemporary society, figures prominently 
in neo-Victorian subcultural media. People who identify as psychiatrically disabled in 
the present-day, then (such as Autumn and Martinez), can be read as carrying out a 
kind of traumatic repetition via neo-Victorian reenactment. 
Navigating Trauma through Lolita Performance 
Many performers, in fact, appear to use girlification/Lolitaization as a means of 
traumatic repetition and attempts at mastery over their personal histories and shared 
girlhood histories, as well as in finding pleasure in abject and taboo aspects of 
youthful femininity; perhaps the use of these amalgamated practices for the purposes 
of navigating and managing a traumatized bodymind (echoing Margaret Price’s 
contention in “The Bodymind Problem and the Possibilities of Pain” that the notion of 
the “bodymind” is key to a feminist materialist approach to disability studies, and to 
begin to address able-mindedness as rigorously as able-bodiedness) is one of the 
reasons for its evocation of cultural anxieties, however unconscious.  
Relatedly, both Autumn’s and Martinez’s girlified performative references to 
traumatic histories and the subsequent effects on their and their alter egos’ psyches are 
often read as a metaphor for the historical mistreatment of girls and young women in 
the Victorian period and today. In other words, their narratives about psychiatric 
disability and the aftermath of trauma are relegated to the realm of the figurative, for 
the purpose of straightforward feminist interpretation. This is a common trope within 
literature and literary criticism, as disability narratives are often elided in favor of how 
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they can be plumbed for potential metaphorical meanings for abled readers. According 
to Mitchell and Snyder in Narrative Prosthesis, almost every culture around the world 
views “disability as a problem in need of a solution, and this belief establishes one of 
the major modes of historical address directed toward people with disabilities. The 
necessity for developing various kinds of cultural accommodations to handle the 
‘problem’ of corporeal difference situates people with disabilities in a profoundly 
ambivalent relationship to the cultures and stories they inhabit” (222). They assert that 
literary narrative leans upon disability as a stock feature of characterization and a 
metaphorical device; “solving” the “problem” of disability within a narrative propels 
the story forward and allows the narrative to deal with the perceived crisis.  (Mitchell 
and Snyder). I contend that when the subjects in question are women in adolescent 
drag, or women-as-girls, this phenomenon is exacerbated by the ingrained cultural 
tendency to pathologize women, and to doubly pathologize young women and women 
who engage in practices associated with girls or girlification, as they are perceived as 
delaying or sidestepping their appropriate progression towards an adult female 
subjectivity (a woman who “forgets” or “puts behind” the girl and transmutes all 
associated practices into the nurturing of others, such as the exchange of the doll for 
the human baby, rather than pleasure).  
Anna Mollow’s term “criphystemology” forms the basis for my primary 
theoretical intervention into readings of Autumn’s and Martinez’s Lolita-adjacent, 
neo-Victorian performances. A riff on “cripistemology,” the term coined by Robert 
McRuer and Merri Lisa Johnson to refer to what Aly Patasavas describes “as a mode 
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of thought that ‘combines the process of ‘cripping,’ which ‘spins mainstream 
representations or practices to reveal able-bodied assumptions,’ [Sandahl] with a 
philosophical commitment to ‘standpoint epistemology,’ which acknowledges that the 
subject positions from which we produce knowledge matter” (Mills 349), 
criphystemology “crips hysteria” (Mollow 185) and, in my opinion, also hystericizes 
disability, by “knowing disability as suffering” (Mollow 186), refusing to ignore or 
rhetorically erase pain, and “nam[ing] and validat[ing] the social and embodied 
experiences of individuals with undocumented disabilities, whom our culture often 
interpellates as hysterical subjects” (Mollow 186).  
The erasure to which she refers occurs within disability studies (particularly 
when the social model10 is applied to its furthest possible extent), but also within 
society at large, as undocumented disabilities (i.e., mental illness, chronic pain, and 
conditions that are not readily visible and obvious) are largely feminized and thus 
pathologized, dismissed, or doubted as verifiable and valid. I posit, too, that some of 
this invalidation is due to the widespread erasure of trauma from disability narratives 
and its relegation to feminist studies alone, as a “women’s issue.” This erasure is 
evident in critical and theoretical readings of Autumn and Martinez that primarily 
posit them as either pursuing Lolitan and neo-Victorian aesthetics for the purposes of 
spectacle and shock value, or as using anachronism and psychological metaphors 
(suicide, mania, and melancholy, for example) in order to critique patriarchal systems.  
                                                 
10
 The social model of disability distinguishes between disability (a social construction) and impairment 
(a bodily state) and recognizes social discrimination as the most significant problem experienced by 
persons with disabilities and as the cause of many of the problems that are regarded as intrinsic to the 
impairment. 
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The recurrent symbol of the asylum and its cultural legacy, as well as both 
Martinez’s and Autumn’s depictions of trauma and psychiatric disability, thus 
constitute the primary focus of my readings of both artists’ performances. In 
particular, I will examine their music and accompanying visuals (in the form of live 
performances, graphic memoirs, and music videos) through a criphystemological lens, 
with an eye towards “trauma time,” in order to, as Ann Cvetkovich contends 
(Cvetkovich 4), recover and recognize accounts of trauma for the disabled and queer 
archives. The cultural notion of the girl as simultaneous symbol of progress and crisis 
makes the becoming-girl or girlified woman an ideal prism through which to reflect, 
slant, and collapse notions of queer, crip, and trauma time. 
Though Autumn’s and Martinez’s relationships to girlification (and 
dollification, a tangential form of girlification involving the practice of dressing up as 
a human doll) are quite different, several shared themes and motifs in their music 
videos, transmedia performances, and public personas solidify them as examples of a 
girl-grotesque aesthetic that traffics in girlified excess and the uncanny, as well as 
representations of trauma time. As Mary Russo terms it, the female grotesque is tied to 
the uncanny, the carnivalesque, and “making a spectacle of oneself” (Russo 1), which 
is quite literally what Martinez and Autumn do with the disjointed, disordered aspects 
of their bodyminds for politics, profit, and pleasure. These similarities also provide a 
foundation for reading both artists through a criphystemological lens that regards 
trauma and its aftermath as material realities worthy of representation in and of 
themselves. Tactics employed by both artists to this end include anachronistic and 
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retrofuturistic pastiche, bricolage, and images of the abject. Autumn, moreover, 
deploys a spectacle of “freakery,” as defined by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and 
medical sensationalism as defined by Christy Reiger, in her live performances, thus 
bringing hysteria and its contemporary iterations into disability discourse. Martinez, in 
particular, draws heavily from maximalist and pop surrealist movements (in visual art, 
design, and literature), both of which have key traits—such as multiplicity, 
contradiction, redundancy, and ambivalent nostalgia—that map neatly onto the figure 
of the postmodernist neo-Victorian girl and intervene in romanticized notions of 
Victorian era “bedroom culture,” slicing into the myths of the private/public divide 
with a dull knife and subjecting the domestic sphere to spectacularization.  
 A classically trained violinist, Emilie Autumn Fritzges attended Indiana 
University as a music student at 15 before being kicked out, in part due to her 
outrageous outfits and behavior. She released two classical albums and played violin 
for Courtney Love’s live band before turning in her traditional instrument for an 
electric violin and her already neo-Victorian-adjacent persona for a fully realized alter 
ego, often appearing as a steampunk princess, a painted bisque doll with signature 
painted tears, and a Gothic Lolita in her photo spreads (she has rarely been seen 
publicly in contemporary clothing). Her next four albums—Laced/Unlaced, which 
marked her transition from classical to dark cabaret music; Enchant, which served up 
darker reimaginings of fairy tales and girl-focused myths; Opheliac, a concept album 
on the Ophelian archetype—and Fight Like a Girl, a musical accompaniment to her 
bestselling autobiographical neo-Victorian graphic novel, The Asylum for Wayward 
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Victorian Girls—solidified “Victoriandustrial” music, the microgenre she has come to 
represent alongside other melancholic cult favorites like Hannah Fury of 
Mellowtraumatic Recordings, compared by one critic to a “parasol-wielding OutKast,” 
who has built an online fandom of hundreds of thousands while never performing in 
public. Pairing synthesizers, drum machines, and electric violin with the harpischord, 
“Victoriandustrial” music has steampunk roots and has been described as a patchwork 
of “new age chamber music, trip hop baroque, and experimental space pop” (Spano). 
Autumn’s live performances are similarly eclectic, incorporating a campy, full-
fledged, corseted burlesque troupe (the Bloody Crumpets) with glittered glam-rock 
stylings and high-energy circusry, such as fire tricks and acrobatics.  
Autumn has been open about her diagnosis of bipolar disorder and her 
extended stays in psychiatric hospitals in the mid-2000s after multiple suicide attempts 
and bouts of self-harm. She has also alluded to a history of childhood molestation, 
which is frequently referenced in her songs. This troubled history is a key aspect of 
Emelie Autumn’s public persona, which manifests in a variety of girl-centered media 
and formats: neo-Victorian and steampunk fashion with some Lolita crossover, diary-
writing, handwritten notes and doodles, burlesque, cabaret noir, songwriting, and 
Instagram poetry. She self-consciously styles herself as a girl, conjuring the image of a 
dollified Dickensian street urchin, which Eckart Voigts notes in “Victoriana’s Secret: 
Emilie Autumn’s Burlesque Performance of Subcultural Neo-Victorianism” as a point 
of possible contention and pushback to her identity as a feminist artist: 
The very fact that Autumn persistently adopts the term “girl,” reviled by 1970s 
feminism and revived by the 1990s riot grrrls, for self-fashioning purposes, not 
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least in the title of her novel An Asylum for Wayward Victorian Girls, would 
rouse the suspicion of contemporary feminist critics (see Neely 2012: 113). 
(22) 
 
She has developed a cult following and an avid fandom, primarily of teens and young 
women, who call themselves the Muffins or the Plague Rats. For her stage persona, 
Autumn has assumed the name “Emilie Autumn Liddell,” invoking the prepubescent 
female object of Lewis Carroll’s attentions, who inspired Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland (1865). Her on- and offstage antics have invited criticism; though her 
multiple hospitalizations and suicide attempts have been verified, the rest of her 
backstory is vague, and some of her more outrageous claims—such as that her family 
died in a fire—have been proven false. Some fans, drawn to Autumn due to their 
connection to her personal history of mental illness and trauma, have seen this claim 
as a betrayal, while others have always believed her public persona to be a 
contradictory patchwork of truth and reality, Victorian and contemporary, particularly 
given the musical steampunk tradition from which she draws of obligatory fictional 
backstories. Autumn’s girlsona, true to steampunk tradition, invokes character 
creation, in this case a tragic orphan.  
Catherine Siemann notes in the Journal of Neo-Victorian Studies that 
reimaginings of Lewis Carroll’s Alice, due in part to later rumors that circulated about 
his supposed pedophilic tendencies, have significantly darkened, turning Wonderland 
into the site of psychological horror and Alice into a troubled young woman. In video 
games like the wildly successful American McGee’s Alice and its sequel, Alice: 
Madness Returns, which posit Wonderland as a delusional realm of escape and 
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hallucination for a traumatized teenage knife-wielding Alice, the titular heroine is 
reimagined as a young woman (albeit one still styled in a Lolita-esque Alice getup), in 
a testament to our growing sense of girls’ “loss of innocence,” widespread panic about 
hypersexualization, and media narratives that agonize over girls in crisis. In tandem 
with the rise of the girl-in-crisis, Alice has become a psych ward patient or a hunted 
potential sex slave, taunted by her personal demons and tempted by the sinister 
undertow of hallucination and exploitation.  
I would add that this widespread “darkening” of fictional girls from the past in 
neo-Victorian representations responds in part to the spread of psychology and its 
accompanying revelations about teen girls, who have been the subject of much 
psychological attention and make up a disproportionate number of the mental health 
consumer population. Autumn’s songs adhere to this trend, giving voice to darkened, 
underbelly-up versions of fictional girls from fairy tales, 19th century literature, 
Shakespeare, children’s nursery rhymes, girls’ clapping games, and legends. Autumn’s 
reworkings of girl icons like Ophelia from the perspective of her own well-known 
personal trauma can be read as examples of what Elizabeth Freeman describes as 
“erotohistoriography,” or a re-membering of history through the body.  
Freeman describes erotohistoriography, or “tactile historicism,” as “distinct 
from the desire for a fully present past, a restoration of bygone times. 
Erotohistoriography does not write the lost object into the present so much as 
encounter it already in the present” (95). This means of approaching history, she 
elaborates, “uses the body as a tool to effect, figure, or perform that encounter” and 
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“sees the body as a method, and historical consciousness as something intimately 
involved with corporeal sensations” (96). Erotohistoriography, or, as would be more 
appropriate here, embodied historiography, is a particularly useful way to understand 
Autumn’s invocation of childhood memories and integration of literary allusions into 
her lyrics and performances: She uses multivocality and a poetics of dissociation, via 
the inhabitation of historical archetypes, to feel their histories of pain in her own body 
and to convey them as parts of her own story through a neo-Victorian lens.  
Addressing the concept of erotohistoriograhy in the context of sadomasochism, 
Freeman claims that embodied practices that involve doling out or receiving pain 
“encode and transmit the bodily knowledge of personal and collective trauma” (163). 
Similarly, Autumn’s lyrical inhabitations of dead, harmed, or ‘lost’ girls—Lolita in 
“Gothic Lolita,” Ophelia in Opheliac, the docile “Rose” in “Rose, Rose, Rose Red,” 
and the Lady of Shalott in “Shalott”—use archetypes of traumatized and “mad” girls 
to whom Autumn feels a transhistorical connection to convey her personal traumas as 
well as to cement herself in the cultural tradition of girls who have been traumatized, 
institutionalized, or otherwise wronged due to or in anticipation of their psychiatric 
disabilities. 
Autumn’s hyperfocus on traumas, both collective and individual, in her work 
has led to accusations of romanticization of mental illness and of “traumatophilia”: 
“Kohlke and Gutleben draw on Luckhurst’s definition of traumatophilia as ‘taking a 
kind of perverse delight in the repetition or abject assumption of a collapsed trauma 
subjectivity’” (Voigts 21), Voigts writes. Her rebuttal to this accusation is that she is 
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critiquing the longstanding romanticization of mental illness in young women, and its 
misrepresentation and relegation to sensationalism, within literature and medicine 
alike. She chose Ophelia as the central character in her first concept album, Opheliac, 
for example, because of the way (in Autumn’s view) that Ophelia’s psychic pain has 
been co-opted and mined for its cultural capital: “Ophelia was the archetypal “mad 
girl”, the poster girl for glamorized insanity, the patron saint of girls on Zoloft” 
(Ohanesian), she told one interviewer, noting the long tradition of Ophelia-mid-suicide 
iconography: “In the 1800s, there were so many paintings of Ophelia drowning and it 
was this obsession with death, female suicide. I mean, Ophelia is the original Suicide 
Girl” (Ohanesian).  By speaking from the abject position of characters like Lolita and 
Ophelia, then, and by styling herself in their image, Autumn affectively links herself 
to their legacies—a girlhood that is raw, interrupted, mad, dismissed, and exploited. 
She recovers their narratives for the purposes of “after-witness,” an aspect of the neo-
Victorian representation of traumas that claims distance is necessary in order to avoid 
subsumption or overidentification with a given historical figure or fictional character. 
The role of fiction in this instance,” Sausman argues, “is to give voice to precisely that 
which has been excluded from the historical record, to perform a necessary act of 
identification or appropriation in which historical others are retrospectively spoken for 
because they were unable to speak themselves” (Sausman 120), thus “providing a 
space in which, in the absence of direct testimony, witnesses can be made to speak 
within a fictional world” (Sausman 120). Of after-witness specifically, Marie-Luise 
Kohlke and Christian Gutleben write that “neo-Victorian fiction enacts the role of 
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‘after-witness’ that ‘testifies to and stands in for inadequate, missing, or impossible 
acts of primary witness-bearing to historical trauma’” (7). 
In “Gothic Lolita,” for example, Autumn addresses her personal Humbert 
Humbert(s) directly, returning the voice to the already-harmed Lolita herself, thus 
participating in a kind of revisionist fictional history that puts the girl back in the text. 
“Gothic Lolita,” then, is not just her external misunderstood-teen fashion, but her post-
trauma afterlife—one she wants us all to witness: “How old are you?/I'm older than 
you'll ever be/I've been dead a thousand years/And lived only two or three” (“Gothic 
Lolita”), she croons, presumably to her abuser, over tinkering toy sounds. Setting up 
an analogy between child molestation and death (here, of the soul; of the innocence 
she is expected to display; and of her linear progression towards adulthood), she lets 
the perpetrators know that they have killed her by interrupting her procession towards 
maturity and rational consciousness: “I don't mind telling you/My life was ended by 
your hand/The kind of murder where nobody dies” (“Gothic Lolita”), she sings. 
Lolita culture and neo-Victorianism collide, as they often do, in “Gothic 
Lolita,” in which Autumn speaks from the abject position of death or death-by-
dissociation, the nowhere place of the numb and void. By speaking from the point of 
view of a “dead” girl, even if metaphorically, Autumn is participating in a trend that 
Fiona Nelson claims to be ubiquitous in contemporary young adult literature: that of 
the narrator-as-already-dead-girl. Death and near-death, as it did for mad Ophelia with 
her snippets of song prior to her suicidal immersion, and as it does for in Alice 
Sebold’s The Lovely Bones and Jay Asher’s controversial Thirteen Reasons Why, 
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affords girls with the liberty to speak and act freely—something they never knew in 
life. Though Nelson warns readers against labeling this trend as one of 
“empowerment” or progress, it can certainly be read as an attempt (if misguided) to 
queer time and to elide the usual constraints on youthful feminine voice, agency, and 
sexuality. To this end, Nelson writes, “Girlhood itself is not free, but people who 
return to girlhood can revisit it without the constraints on their sexuality” (50). 
Moreover, she continues, “Being dead, or dying, becomes a viable subject position for 
girls who have no safe opportunities in life to realize their own sexuality” (Nelson 51).  
Within the context of trauma time, too, Autumn’s positionality as song-speaker 
is nothing but realistic; trauma, in fact, does often interrupt the normative flow of time 
and contribute to a dulled consciousness and a profound sense of loss, a lessening of 
the presence that manifests as dissociation and that many trauma survivors have 
compared to living as a ghost or zombie. In this vein, Morrigan explains: 
A major component of trauma is a re-experiencing of the past with the visceral 
intensity of the present. Flashbacks can include any combination of the senses, 
including intense visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile recreations of a 
traumatic experience. Flashbacks are different from regular memories because 
the body experiences them as if they are happening in the present, producing a 
stress response intended for emergencies. The emergency happened in the past, 
but the response is happening in the present. In “Trauma and Temporality” 
Robert Stolorow writes “[e]xperiences of trauma become freeze-framed into an 
eternal present in which one remains forever trapped, or to which one is 
condemned to be perpetually returned... (2016: 160).” (Morrigan 50) 
 
Moreover, just as Humbert Humbert names Lolita (as Mai and Nguyen suggest in their 
analysis of Lolita culture), Autumn names her abuser here, stating that if she is to be 
defined by him (as she claims she has been against her will): “Thank you, kind 
sirs/You've made me what I am today/A bundle of broken nerves/A mouthful of 
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words/I'm still afraid to say” (“Gothic Lolita”)), he is by necessity also defined by her: 
“If I am Lolita/Then you are a criminal/And you should be killed/By an army of little 
girls” (“Gothic Lolita”). And though she sings of “ruffles and laces/and candy sweet 
faces” (“Gothic Lolita”) as the death knolls that “directed [her abuser’s] furtive hand” 
(“Gothic Lolita”) and catalyzed her molestation and subsequent figurative death, she 
continues to identify herself as a “Gothic Lolita” throughout the song, suggesting that 
she has not yet and will not give up on her Lolita identity or, alternatively (or in 
addition), that she cannot—her growth having been stalled by her trauma—and thus 
has been trapped in her Lolitan self and has had her identity turned sinister, like 
Alice’s, not by her own actions but by the harmful gaze of another. 
Autumn incorporates into her live performances the theatrical trappings of the 
Victorian era freak show, which is another common neo-Victorian/steampunk trope 
(particularly within niche performances, such as steampunk freak show-themed 
burlesque acts, circuses, interactive carnivals, and vaudeville): “The asylum 
has...become a standard feature of neo-Victorianism, as evidenced by its regular use in 
the steampunk movement” (Voigts 20), Voigts notes. Autumn uses this theatrical 
setting to performatively illustrate the aftermath of trauma and to stage an encounter 
between the Foucauldian medical gaze and the girls it analyzes, as well as between the 
Victorian clinical setting and its contemporary counterpart. In particular, in live 
performances of her song “Girls! Girls! Girls!” from Fight Like a Girl, Autumn binds 
the hysteric to the figure of the 19th-century “freak” through the process of what D 
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Rosemarie Garland-Thomson refers to as “enfreakment” (in short, the creation or 
making of a freak).  
“Freak,” within the parameters of the definitions set forth by Garland-
Thomson, doesn’t simply refer to someone who is disabled, marginalized, or 
extraordinary, but specifically a liminal societal figure whose difference-on-display 
invites both ridicule and a salacious, voyeuristic gaze. In particular, the freak serves as 
a barometer of the cultural margins and allows “typical” or “normal” citizens to 
participate in the pleasurable marginalia by proxy, while reifying societal norms by 
contrasting themselves and their “ordered” bodies to the the carnivalesque antics of 
the grotesque and disordered. These performances, Garland-Thompson notes, often 
collapsed various categories of difference, rendering the “freakish” bodies on display 
at once titillating and reviling, tempting and producing of horror: “The freak is an 
object of simultaneous horror and fascination because, in addition to whatever 
infirmities or abilities he or she exhibits, the freak is an ambiguous being whose 
existence imperils categories and oppositions dominant in social life” (57).  
Enfreakment, Disability, and Hysteria 
Noting the parodic, high-society stage names often taken on by performers in 
freak shows as carnivalesque reversals of their marginal societal status, Garland-
Thompson writes that “Enfreakment emerges from cultural rituals that stylize, silence, 
differentiate, and distance the persons whose bodies the freak-hunters or showmen 
colonize and commercialize. Paradoxically, however, at the same time that 
enfreakment elaborately foregrounds specific bodily eccentricities, it also collapses all 
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those differences into a “‘freakery,’ a single amorphous category of corporeal 
otherness” (10). The performers in Autumn’s live shows are indeed multiply “set 
apart” from the norms of propriety, constraint, and modesty. The troupe of clearly 
adult women, meant here to appear as inmates let out of the asylum to turn a profit for 
their exploitative clinicians, is styled garishly as maddened, girlified stereotypes of 
burlesque performers. Their makeup is mussed and amateurishly applied, while their 
outfits are revealing hodgepodges of Victorian Annie-and-the-orphans getups and old-
school showgirl camp. One Bloody Crumpet wears a single ripped schoolgirl stocking, 
for example; another’s mascara is running, presumably from crying. Their 
freakishness manifests in several ways, threatening to divert them from the normative 
futures of womanhood and mental passivity. Their development towards their assigned 
‘places’ within the limited assortment of available modes of being within Victorian 
womanhood has been stalled: by trauma that keeps them hovering between past and 
future, presumably by their own mental illnesses or pathologized behaviors, and by the 
asylum itself, from which they have been plucked and forced to perform for a 
voyeuristic audience. 
Throughout the performance, they cater to stereotypes about girls, 
psychiatrically disabled populations, and sex workers alike, but repeatedly carry them 
out to near-obscene excess. A stylized girl-on-girl bit with Autumn in male drag, for 
example, results in a series of extended, full-on makeout sessions seemingly designed 
to make the audience uncomfortable; what starts off as a campy, stereotyped depiction 
of ‘crazy’ institutionalized women turns dark when they mime suicide by hanging 
  
165 
 
during a choreographed dance. Rather than teasing in order to titillate and keep the 
audience dangling, this brand of dark cabaret renders the audience culpable, forcing 
them to account for their own salacious and voyeuristic desires: After all, they are all 
there to witness the extended, musical aftermath of Autumn’s widely popularized 
history of trauma and suffering. And in true carnivalesque fashion, Autumn uses the 
performance as an opportunity to reverse roles: Dressed in a campy barker getup, 
complete with the requisite cane, she’s the ringmaster and showrunner here rather than 
a patient. (Still, her jaunty cap evokes her usual Dickensian street urchin image, 
hinting at her “true” underlying identity). Along with the Bloody Crumpets, Autumn 
employs “abusive language” and vulgar humor and the power of laughter—two of the 
keystones of the grotesque, as defined by Bakhtin—in order to fold mental illness into 
a bawdy pastiche of freak show aesthetics. 
The enfreakment of so-called hysterics and their contemporary iterations via 
the staging of their pain—pain that is both due to their psychological distress and due 
to the medical gaze and its accompanying abuses—is an example of what Anna 
Mollow calls for in her work on undocumented disabilities and hysteria’s significance 
to disability studies. In particular, people (disproportionately girls and young women) 
who experience disabilities and illnesses for which institutionalization would have 
been likely in the Victorian period and which are not always readily recognized and 
quantitatively measurable by Western standards, such as epilepsy, endometriosis, 
narcolepsy, addiction, cognitive disabilities, chronic fatigue, mental illnesses, and 
environmental illnesses, often struggle to have their pain legitimized and taken 
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seriously—interpersonally, politically (i.e., within legal definitions of disability and 
disability assistance), and academically (within the broader field of disability studies). 
Physiological problems, as in the case of Dora, are frequently read as psychological, 
while trauma and its most common resultant comorbid conditions (both mental and 
physical), too, are often downplayed or ignored as inextricable aspects of disability, 
particularly due to the popularity of the social model of disability that in some cases 
attempts to disengage rhetoric of pain and suffering from cultural representations of 
disability. The ambivalent figure of the freak, who traffics in the grotesque and 
carnivalesque, at once demanding attention and, sometimes, jealousy, for their 
uniqueness, is thus an apt neo-Victorian cultural text for the modern-day ‘hysteric’ to 
inhabit. The figure of the freak, Garland-Thompson argues, is not as powerless and 
vulnerable as is often posited, while the power dynamics of the freak show are not as 
wholly exploitative and one-sided as they are often depicted.  
Accordingly, Autumn’s performances evoke freak show imagery alongside 
visuals and rhetoric reminiscent of Jean-Martin Charcot’s medical theatres where he 
showcased hysterics. The freak show/medical theatre juxtaposition is also common 
within neo-Victorian performance and literature, primarily in order to link the rise of 
the freak as a significant foil to “rational” society to the medical and pseudoscientific 
discourses circulating during the period; Autumn’s mapping of this template onto the 
legacy of hysteria is an apt one, as it references the percolation of the field of 
psychology as notions of the disordered mind as clinically diagnosable began to 
congeal. Mapping this discourse onto the bodyminds of girls, too, is a pointed move, 
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as they were frequently the subjects of said discourses. The neo-Victorian/Charcot 
template is an especially fruitful one on which to map contemporary experiences of 
medical trauma, psychiatric disability, and their intersections with youthful femininity 
and sexuality, given hysteria’s prominent role in the development of both the 
burgeoning field of psychology and societal views of women at the time.  
“By constituting the freak as an icon of generalized embodied deviance, the 
exhibitions also simultaneously reinscribed gender, race, sexual aberrance, ethnicity, 
and disability as inextricable yet particular exclusionary systems legitimated by bodily 
variation—all represented by the single multivalent figure of the freak (10),” writes 
Garland-Thompson of the freak as a representative of an intersectional constellation of 
“othered” identities, ready for display and public dissection. Autumn sets up the 
collapsing of these various categories of difference (girl-not-woman, disabled-not-
abled, traumatized-not-typical, sexualized-not-modest) in the early lines of “Girls! 
Girls! Girls!”, presenting ‘her’ hysterics as meant to be looked at and used, mined 
voraciously for their medical and sexual usefulness alike: “Come see our girls, crazy 
girls/If you’re willing to be thrilled, this is a hell of a ride/Those girls, crazy 
girls/They’re hot/they’re nuts/they’re suicidal” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”). She uses the 
term “girls” presumably to refer to their age as well as in the sense of “less-than,” and 
in the flippant way that sex workers such as strippers, showgirls, and escorts are often 
packaged for public consumption in signage and advertising verbiage. Using terms 
like “nuts,” “crazy,” and “suicidal” interchangeably with “hot,” she packages their 
alleged psychiatric disabilities as inherently salacious and as justification for the 
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audience’s salacious gaze. These girls, then, are not only worth looking at: they were 
made to be looked at. 
“Accept our hospitality, indulge in abnormality” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”). 
Autumn next invites onlookers, presenting the girls’ freakery as entertainment and the 
audience as salivating voyeurs. Her repeated requests for more money, too, point to 
the commodification of the disabled bodymind for public consumption. Autumn 
continues by describing the array of trained hysterics as “a portrait of insanity, 
approach with your humanity”; thus, from the start, Autumn juxtaposes the ‘mad’ 
girls, the freaks, with the “typical” or “normal” audience members. This contradiction, 
Garland-Thompson argues, is key to the process of enfreakment: “The extraordinary 
bodies on display served as a reference point against which to construct and validate 
the ‘uniform abstract citizenry democracy institutes’” (10), she explains. Autumn’s 
performers are thus othered because of their minds (as mentally ill) and bodies alike 
(as women-turned-girls, and as hypersexualized). Moreover, aping common Victorian 
freak show rhetoric, Autumn repeatedly seeks to “authenticate” the performers’ 
disabilities (“This is the real thing, my friends, guaranteed, 100 percent, authentic, 
mentally ill!” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”) and to justify the audience’s voyeurism for them, 
rationalizing their collective “othering” via assertions of their own superiority and the 
freaks’ obvious difference: “So point and laugh, it isn't bad/They oughtn't mind 
because they're mad!” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”) she reassures them, before telling the 
audience that the patients are “really more like animals than people” (“Girls! Girls! 
Girls!”).  
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Later, Autumn warns the audience: “Some of them are really quite attractive as 
you'll see/Some are truly hideous, I'm sure that you'll agree/While others still look 
rather quite a lot like you and me/But you mustn't let them fool you!” (“Girls! Girls! 
Girls!”). These references to the girls’ simultaneous beauty and ugliness are 
reminiscent of Thomson’s assertions that freaks were both enticing and relegated to 
the realm of the grotesque, inviting both jealousy and horror as they stood in 
demonstrable opposition to the status quo. In terms of ‘mad girls’ in particular, given 
their history of being disbelieved and portrayed as deceptive and “not really” suffering 
(stereotypes that were likely exacerbated by some subjects’ actual histories of trauma 
that rendered them less trusting and more disoriented in time and relationships), these 
lines indicate that it’s precisely that inscrutability and “invisibility” that renders them 
so threatening, particularly at a time in which categorization and taxonomy were king. 
Autumn’s critiques of the Victorian asylum as controlling and the nineteenth-
century clinician as invasive and authoritarian are read by some neo-Victorian scholars 
solely as references to common neo-Victorian tropes, but they are also barely-veiled 
critiques of contemporary psychology and her own time in psychiatric hospitals, 
which she has openly claimed was abusive and traumatizing. At one point, Autumn-
as-ringmaster begs the audience for help in further medicating her charges: “For a 
tuppence, just a tuppence, a handful of pills to feed the inmates/We’ve got pills for 
depression, obsession, aggression, possession, indiscretion/There’s a bloody pill for 
everything nowadays!” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”). She has referenced what she considers 
to be a trend of overmedication, and her own experiences in being forcibly medicated, 
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in a variety of interviews. “This seems just a bit inhumane” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”), 
one well-intentioned “observer” ventures. Autumn reassures her: “It’s just a simple 
little shock, it doesn’t cause her any pain” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”), she tells the patron, 
in an obvious reference to electroshock therapy.  
Electroshock (now “electroconvulsive”) therapy, which carries potent risks of 
significant memory loss and brain damage, was disproportionately used on women 
during the Victorian period, in part, some claim, because their minds and memories 
were not considered as precious, and because it could be used as a means of inducing 
docility and compliance. The therapy has made a resurgence in inpatient contexts in 
recent years and, it’s recently been discovered, is still used disproportionately on 
women—particularly forcibly. Thus, as many neo-Victorian scholars suggest is the 
ultimate aim of the genre, Autumn is demonstrating not only the contrasts between the 
past and the present but, for marginalized groups in particular, the striking overlaps 
and continued patterns. Moreover, “Girls! Girls! Girls!”, like Autumn’s other 
performances, takes several meta and ironic turns, as she appears to reference her own 
personal history and/or the fact that she and the other performers are, in fact, 
performing. After lyrically referencing the inferior size of girls’ brains, calling to mind 
nineteenth-century pseudoscience that claimed to be able to diagnose potential 
medical and mental conditions based on skull size and shape, Autumn’s character 
proclaims that “the only bits that aren’t inferior are bosom and posterior/And these are 
only useful in a seedy music hall” (“Girls! Girls! Girls!”), while gesturing at her own 
music hall. 
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This reference to the commodification of visible difference and the 
sexualization of mental illness in order to make it saleable (from which disabled 
performers usually profited much less than their nondisabled employers), is ironic in 
that Autumn herself is charging others to witness her suffering and the performative 
aftermath of her own trauma. She herself has been accused of sexualizing or 
romanticizing mental illness or of selling her traumatic past, similarly to the ways that 
freak show performers and sex workers are castigated for “selling their bodies.” 
Through lyrical and performative winks and nods, she tells the audience that she’s 
aware of what she’s hawking—and if not her, she implies, it would be someone else 
selling her story. 
The initial verses and chorus are followed by a series of staged medical 
questions in the vein of vaudeville patter, with the girls doubling as inquisitive 
audience members. These serve as rundowns of medical history and ways for Autumn 
to “talk back” to the Victorian medical gaze by illustrating its ludicrousness through 
vulgarity and humor. One voyeur, for example, asks Autumn-as-ringmaster: “If 
insanity's primarily a femininish malady/And no one's doubting that for it's a scientific 
fact/Then according to the medics, are they faultier genetics?/Are they born with this 
disease, or is it something they contract?” (“Girls!” Girls! Girls!”) By turning 
dominant Victorian medical narratives into comedic rhyming singsong, she exposes 
them as ridiculous, while juxtaposing those patently ludicrous beliefs with the cage 
behind the girls, representative of the imprisonment and abuses to which those beliefs 
sometimes led. 
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In “Girls! Girls! Girls!,” in a performative move reminiscent of Kafer’s call for 
more attention to able-mindedness and Price’s focus on the bodymind rather than the 
body alone, Autumn is bringing the bodymind into the freak show setting, reviving the 
hysteric in order to display the legacy of suffering that institutionalization, in both its 
historical and contemporary forms, has often wrought—particularly for girls and other 
marginalized subjects. Echoing Price’s definition of the “bodymind” as a crucial 
feminist intervention into disability studies, Autumn adopts the freak show aesthetic in 
order to bring past and present girls’ minds and experiences of psychological distress 
to the fore. Charcot’s role in the cultural and medical history of hysteria, too, was 
more complex than is often indicated, as Petra Kuppers elaborates in “Bodies, 
Hysteria, Pain: Staging the Invisible.” “An elaborate machinery,” Kuppers writes, 
“was at work [in Charcot’s exhibitions] to bring the neurological, internal working of 
the hysteric condition into visibility, and to mark it on the body it ‘possessed’” 
(Kuppers 158). This kind of legitimization is precisely what Mollow references when 
she argues for the need to recognize “undocumented” disabilities as valid and worthy 
of concern and treatment. He certainly exploited young women (and occasionally, 
men) by putting them on display, hypnotizing them for primarily medical audiences 
and posing them in order to create an iconography of hysteria that was circulated in 
medical texts and among a range of experts. Elaine Showalter has noted that our 
subsequent cultural understanding of hysteria, of mentally ill women in general, and of 
depression and anxiety as a whole—as well as theatrical and media representations of 
Ophelia and other psychologically distressed female characters—have been heavily 
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influenced by those initial posed photographs in institutions, indicating that our 
medical texts, visual archives, and media representations of certain disabilities, 
particularly those deemed feminized/illegitimate, influence each other in turn. Kuppers 
explains, for example, that it was the staging and theatricalization of hysterics’ pain 
that led to more attention for the disorder and elevated it to the status of a “real” 
condition worthy of clinical consideration: “By proving that these people were not 
consciously in control, Charcot established the legitimacy of psychological conditions 
and their effects on the physical body—a fight that echoes with contemporary 
struggles to validate Myalgic Encephalonyelitis (otherwise known as chronic fatigue 
syndrome) and many pain-related impariments as genuine medical conditions that 
warrant the extension of social welfare or insurance benefits” (158).  
This legitimacy-via-medical-theatre came with a price, though: Hysteria could 
only be “proven” by the expert hands of a male clinician, and was only brought into 
the realm of a pitiable condition (itself not an unproblematic perspective towards 
mental illness) with the help of the patriarchal medical gaze. Autumn’s process of 
enfreakment, bringing hysteria and mental illness into the folds of freakery and 
disability, can be read as an attempt to legitimize this suffering and thus to contribute 
to the existing iconography of hysteria. Autumn stages this ambivalent encounter 
within the context of the Victorian-era freak show, with all its familiar trappings 
(carnival barkers with snappy catchphrases and the ubiquitous cane, crude posters, and 
cages for the ‘hysterics’) in order to attempt to take the lead herself, from the 
perspective of hysterical girl rather than medical authority. Rather than being 
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displayed, she is displaying histories in order for them to be prodded and unpacked: 
that is, the collective history of which she is a descendant as well as her personal, 
well-known history of mental illness and the trauma that catalyzed it. 
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Chapter Five 
Welcome to Melanie Martinez’s Pop Surrealist D-O-L-L-H-O-U-S-E 
In September 2017, in response to a flurry of controversial reactions to her 
debut album, then-20-year-old indie pop star Melanie Martinez posted a blurry 
Polaroid selfie on Instagram. In it, she wore a shiny pink babydoll dress that 
contrasted with her exposed full tattoo sleeves and septum ring, her hair arranged in 
her customary split-dyed long pigtails. Against the wall behind her were an array of 
shelves crammed with vintage porcelain dolls and creepy bug-eyed toys, including 
disheveled stuffed animals and an ominous blue-eyed pig. Accompanying the photo 
was the following manifesto of sorts: 
If you don't like pop surrealism you probably won't like me. If you can't 
understand that visual art has a deeper meaning and you only look at it for face 
value you probably won't get my work. If you can't understand that crybaby is 
a character, that the first record is representative of her childhood, and if you 
sexualize female pop artists on the daily you'll say I “sexualize babies.” If you 
can't understand why someone would bring up mental health, growing pains 
from childhood to adolescence, family issues, and other uncomfortable topics 
we never hear about in pop music, you will probably just throw my music and 
art away as something that "glamorizes mental health issues" even though most 
of the people that resonate with my work deal with these things on a day to day 
and someone needs to be there for them. So here I am. If you have issues with 
my music and art and judge it so harshly to the point of making up your own 
reason as to what my intentions were when making it, you should just stop 
watching it. Because quite frankly, you. Just. Don't. Get. It. (“Melanie 
Martinez Instagram Post”) 
 
Indeed, Martinez’s work, while wildly popular, has left many critics and viewers 
baffled. One of her first music videos, for her single “Cry Baby,” begins with an 
unholy birth (“Cry Baby”). Visions of a pregnant mother in white, with requisite curly 
blonde hair and large pearl necklace, are interrupted by brief glimpses of medical 
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horror: the buzzing of flies, bloody medical instruments on a tray, and a clinical 
setting somewhere between today’s sterile cold hospital rooms and Victorian-era 
instruments that look particularly ominous and primitive to the contemporary eye. The 
doctor is a silent man in a rabbit mask, as if yesterday’s emo kids handpicked him 
from the set of Donnie Darko11; the hospital walls are outfitted with a cat clock and 
other kitschy-retro gestures towards a 1960s aesthetic. The mother screams in agony 
as a pinata full of candy bursts out of her vagina. There is no father. 
“It’s a girl,” a nurse with no whites in her eyes whispers, as a little boy 
(presumably the baby’s brother) in a bright orange late 19th-century getup lights up 
his mom’s smokes with a pink lighter. The mother’s face contorts in horror: “Oh no, 
she’s a crybaby,” she laments in slow motion over the baby’s sobs. The nurse removes 
the baby from her mother’s judgmental sight, and her brother scrawls her birthright, 
“crybaby,” onto a makeshift birth certificate. 
From this surreal scene bursts Cry Baby—Martinez, now a young woman in 
full-blown temporal adolescent drag—who is born fully-fledged and already angsty, 
sitting up in her crib fully tatted and pierced, boasting candy-colored curls and braids 
along with a series of alternating quintessential Lolitaesque getups with neo-Victorian 
accents and a full face of meticulous Lolita/dolly makeup. Emilie Autumn’s girlsona is 
rooted in the Neo-Victorian, leather, and metallic, and Martinez contrasts this with a 
girlsona stuck in a hellscape of Ozzie and Harriet, sugar, and plastic. Yellow ducks 
                                                 
11
 Donnie Darko is a 2001 film that has since found a cult following; the title character is a confused, 
suicidal, disillusioned, teenaged, outsider who has visions of a prophetic giant anthropomorphized 
bunny. 
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smile against the blue sheens of ruffled dresses, and Peter Pan collars and bows 
contrast with pop art prints amid oversized pink aprons and pinafores. Her nightmarish 
dreamscape launches out of nowhere in a timeless girl’s bedroom, cluttered with the 
remnants of every major period of girlhood: Dolls, a wooden dollhouse, and teddy 
bears, reflecting the burgeoning focus on the girl at the end of the 19th century, are 
scattered next to the mass-produced brightly colored plastic toys ushered in during the 
mid-20th century, another key moment in the development of the figure of the 
culturally consumptive girl. 
Martinez, as Cry Baby, is baby, doll, girl, teen, and woman at once, with the 
accoutrements of a child, the wooden high chair of an infant, and the expressive, 
aware, melancholic face of an adolescent or young woman. Still, her demeanor is 
affected rather than realistic, reflecting Theresa Winge’s description of a Lolita’s 
performance of her subcultural identity: “A Lolita’s dress modestly conceals her 
mature body beneath ornately elaborate garments adorned with lace, ribbons, ruffles, 
and bows; she poses and conducts herself in order to create a surreal and fantastic 
childlike appearance; and she communicates kawaii characteristics—hypercute and 
hyperfeminine—with her dress, poses, and mannerisms” (50). This hypercute act, 
accompanied by the kind of pouty lips and doe-eyed blinking demonstrated in 
hundreds of Lolita lifestyle how-to videos, is contrasted both with Martinez’s mother, 
who presents as a veritable caricature of abusive behaviors (drinking straight out of a 
wine bottle, for example), and with Martinez’s own colorful language and eyebrow-
raising antics, which foreshadow her later unraveling. Jane Mai and An Nguyen. in 
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their contribution to So Pretty/Very Rotten: Comics and Essays on Lolita Fashion and 
Cute Culture, list common motifs found in Lolita fashion: 
A partial list: Alice in Wonderland, fairy tales (Cinderella, Snow White, Little 
Mermaid), cakes, candy, doughnuts, macarons, ice cream, cathedrals, famous 
paintings, ribbons, roses, violets, daisies, gingham checks, high-quality lace, 
pintucks, crosses, crowns, tartan, stripes, velveteen, peter-pan collars, heroines 
from Ghibli films, straw hats, maximum poofiness, A-line skirts, cherries, 
strawberries, rabbits, cats, poodles, angels, coffins, hearts, Mary Janes, 
Vivienne Westwood rocking horse ballerina shoes, skirts swaying with every 
step, armor. 
 
Martinez draws from this list and beyond, mixing in images typically associated with 
horror and the grotesque, but rendered in a cute, pastel, and innocent aesthetic. She 
sports tattoos of ice cream, cake, and gumballs; her music videos feature cookies laced 
with poison; doughnuts that bleed when bitten; and dismembered bodies preserved in 
formaldehyde and lace. Asked during an interview if she played with a lot of these 
toys growing up, or if her music was a way of living a life she never had, Martinez 
replied: 
I had a lot of Barbies growing up, and a lot of porcelain dolls, but I was scared 
of them. I was so scared of them, I would try to turn their head away and 
would make my mom take them out of my room. I couldn't look at them. I feel 
like, me now, I'm trying to cope with that fear I had as a child. Now, I just love 
them and make necklaces out of them. (NYLON). 
 
Her music and imagery blurs lines between horror film, Saturday morning cartoons, 
and young adult novels like The Babysitters’ Club book series.  
“You seem to replace/Your brain with your heart,” she sings in a far lower-
than-expected voice at the start of the song, pulling out a real brain and heart from the 
bowels of her twisted little girl’s paradise of a bedroom. Singing hauntingly about her 
tendency to wear her heart on her sleeve, Cry Baby confesses lyrically, “Someone’s 
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turning the handle/To the faucet in your eyes/They’re pouring out where everyone can 
see/Your heart’s too big for your body/That’s why you won’t fit inside.” Meanwhile, 
Martinez spells out “FUCK” with alphabet blocks and angrily refuses the baby food 
offered by her drunken, hovering mother. She continues, “They call me Cry Baby, Cry 
Baby/But I don’t fucking care/Cry Baby, Cry Baby/I laugh through my tears/Cry 
Baby, Cry Baby/’Cause I don’t fucking care/Tears fall to the ground/I just let them 
drop,” as animatronic toys team up to pull her hair and torment her. Finally, she gives 
in to “the faucet in her eyes” and sobs alone until she’s drowned in her own fantasy of 
a bedroom, her blocks floating in a pool of her own tears. 
“Cry Baby” is the first song off of Martinez’s debut concept album of the same 
name; it’s also the name of the titular character Martinez plays throughout, which she 
describes in various interviews as a “fairy tale” version of her “darker side.” The 
album was released to mixed reviews, and though the album became an instant hit—
debuting at #6 on Billboard charts, selling 40,000 copies in its first week, and shortly 
thereafter going certified Platinum—it also generated a great deal of controversy. 
Some critics accused Martinez of promoting ephebophilia or pedophilia with her 
girlified look. Reactions from self-avowed Lolitas were also mixed, with some 
praising Martinez as proof that the subculture was gaining mainstream attention and 
others uncomfortable with Martinez’s mixing of Lolitan fashion with outside-the-box 
signifiers of a more ‘adult’ identity, like tattoos and piercings. Other critics often 
thought the girlhood metaphors were too heavy-handed and the imagery too in-your-
face or cast Martinez as the inept little sister of Lana Del Rey, Alanis Morrissette, 
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Fiona Apple, or Lorde—similarly beset by misery, but not yet sophisticated enough in 
her sad-girl presentation. Jason Lipshutz wrote in Billboard, for example, “Martinez is 
clearly cribbing from the dimly lit pop stylings of Lorde and Lana Del Rey, but while 
her wispy delivery strikes the same femme fatale poses, she lacks the subtlety of her 
influences” (Lipshutz). 
Media perplexity, too, swirled around Martinez’s own distance from her 
persona, with some critics appearing unsettled by Martinez’s participation in the 
Gothic Lolita subculture in all aspects of her public life, as well as by her admissions 
of struggling with anxiety and psychological distress. One Vogue writer notes she’s 
wearing a “necklace made of doll parts” (Rosenzweig) at the interview, for example, 
before quickly writing off her getup as a promotional tactic or marketing ploy. Lilian 
Min wrote in HelloGiggles, “The blurry divide between her and her uncanny art alter 
ego (Cry Baby, whose journey defines the titular album) isn’t an accident: Like so 
many great pop artists before her, Martinez leans on a more exaggerated public 
persona to help define her space in the pop world.” 
Still, all signs pointed to the fact that this persona was much more heavily 
integrated into Martinez’s identity than was comfortable for many viewers. When 
asked by a Valfre reporter about her need-to-have items when on tour, Martinez 
responded, “Stuffed animals to cuddle in my hotel room, my band, candy and snacks; 
especially chocolate chip cookies” (“Girl Crush: Melanie Martinez”). Asked to 
describe her style in six words, she responded: “Fluffy, Childlike, Whimsical, Pastel, 
Japanese Lolita” (“Girl Crush: Melanie Martinez”), indicating that if her adolescent 
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drag was indeed a performance, it was certainly an immersive one. Here Martinez, 
acting as the girl-grotesque, stands off against her cast-off girl persona. She is a girl 
who refuses linear progression through the Freudian stages and rejects her own 
ascension into the symbolic law of the Father, through deliberate delays (i.e. mixing 
babydoll dresses and tattoos), and through an overzealous embrace of the trappings of 
girlhood (through “adolescent drag,” the ruffles of a dollified Lolita adorned with 
dismembered doll parts). Yet, she is seemingly cast-off from both the Lolita 
subculture and the pop mainstream. Although commercially successful, Martinez’s 
concept album is too familiar to be art and too grotesque to be mainstream. She is cast 
off no matter which way she turns.  
Indeed, every song on Cry Baby is steeped in twisted takes on girlhood 
artifacts and childlike mainstays, from nursery rhymes and fairy tale archetypes to 
tinkering toy sounds and girl-centered hobbies (i.e., playing with dolls and attending 
carnivals). Each of these nostalgic throwbacks is turned around to expose its more 
sinister underbelly and to explore a more ominous, adult take on the theme. The 
Wonderlandian journey through girlhood memories proceeds in order, with the songs 
telling a chronological story about an ageless girl, an Alice in Lolita garb and stuck in 
a whitewashed, traumatizing suburban dystopia. “Cry Baby” and “Dollhouse” provide 
an overview of Cry Baby’s life: Raised in a picture-perfect nuclear family, her reality 
is far more painful than its ornate trappings would suggest. Cry Baby’s mother is an 
abusive alcoholic who drinks to forget her husband’s infidelity, while her brother is an 
addict. In “Sippy Cup,” her mother kills her husband in a drunken rage and drugs Cry 
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Baby to keep her quiet. “Carousel,” like Autumn’s “Girls! Girls! Girls!,” draws from 
neo-Victorian freak show imagery, along with midcentury state fair visuals, to 
compare a toxic or abusive relationship to a carousel ride that Cry Baby can’t escape 
from. In “Alphabet Boy,” Martinez chastises the same boy for attempting to lord his 
degree and mastery of language over her; in “Soap” and “Training Wheels,” Cry Baby 
finds a more suitable love interest amid analogies to childhood mouthsoaping 
punishments and, of course, bicycle training wheels. “Pity Party” samples Lesley 
Gore’s 1963 hit “It’s My Party” as a musical backdrop for Cry Baby’s solo birthday 
party, to which no one shows up, including the boy she thought would be loyal. 
Abandoned by her parents and lover, a vulnerable Cry Baby undertakes an ill-fated 
game of tag and takes a misguided trip to an ice cream truck to comfort herself. “Tag, 
You’re It” and an ode to “Milk and Cookies” follow Cry Baby through a kidnapping 
and an attempted molestation, as well as her ultimate poisoning of and escape from her 
abuser. “Pacify Her” marks Cry Baby’s internal shift; destroyed by her abandonment 
and abuse, she steals a potential lover’s partner out of spite. “Mrs. Potato Head” 
explores Cry Baby’s relationship to her body image when faced with media 
representations of harmful beauty standards aimed at girls. And in “Mad Hatter,” in 
which Cry Baby channels Lewis Carroll, she finds kindred spirits in psychedelic 
visions of anthropomorphized toys and decides to stay firmly in the realm of 
Wonderland, ostensibly retaining her Lolitan identity and refusing to progress linearly 
to womanhood. Moreover, she declares that she’s “crazy” and now embraces it rather 
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than trying to elide it, in reference to the trauma she’s faced and its inevitable 
aftermath. 
Every song on Cry Baby is accompanied by a music video, each directed by 
Martinez herself. Each video is set in the same timeless suburban 
dreamscape/hellscape hybrid, populated by black-eyed cashiers and nurses, blue-faced 
boys, costumed doctors, kidnappers in wolf masks, humanoid oversized toys, and not 
much other life besides Cry Baby herself. The album was sold along with an 
illustrated storybook to complete the cohesive narrative. Rhyming couplets further the 
darkening of girlhood stereotypes and cultural artifacts and paint a picture of trauma 
and its aftermath: The “Dollhouse” poem, “And in her picture perfect home/Mommy’s 
drunk while daddy moans/Her brother always comes home stoned/She watches in her 
room alone,” is accompanied by an image of a stilted dollhouse, complete with Daddy 
and his mistress in one room, a passed-out Mommy in the other (bottle in hand), and 
Cry Baby with her requisite single tear. Moreover, the story hints at underlying pain 
and a trajectory of trauma and its consequences that even the music itself doesn’t fully 
delve into: “She escaped and was never the same,” declares the poem that 
accompanies the “Milk and Cookies” image, as an explanation for Cry Baby’s newly 
self-destructive behavior. 
Martinez’s turn in Cry Baby is a prototypical example of the ways that 
temporal/adolescent drag and participation in neo-Victorian and Lolita subcultures can 
serve to interrupt and trouble dominant patriarchal narratives, as well as the usual 
narrative trajectories within mainstream feminism. For example, Winge writes that 
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“the [Lolita] subculture provides its members with a safe space to escape everyday 
life, but this may constitute either a positive form of resistance and agency, or a 
nostalgic and anachronistic evasion (or perhaps both)” (63). Martinez’s aesthetic 
evokes precisely this political ambivalence. Her visuals and lyrics are intentionally 
provoking and disturbing—evoking cultural anxieties and the mix of revulsion and 
enticement that are often characteristic of the grotesque—in the tradition of 
maximalist and pop surrealist art movements. She uses this aesthetic language and her 
own in-character temporal drag to turn Angela McRobbie’s notion of “bedroom 
culture” inside out, breaking down and parsing out the Freudian Oedipal family from 
the much-overlooked perspective of the girl. Additionally, Martinez’s work draws 
from the visual well of the uncanny (through, in part, dolls and dollification) as they 
relate to the grotesque, in ways that complicate and queer dominant media 
representations of traumatized and/or mentally ill girls. That Martinez works with 
parts, pieces, and pastiche to construct her complex and fractured, yet surprisingly 
cohesive, identity plays upon our fear of the cast-off girl and what she might bring 
back to us when we see her again. 
Maximalism and Girlhood 
Maximalism, a movement within design, visual art, and literature, is the 
aesthetic “language” of Martinez’s performances (and of many girl-centered, girl-
driven subcultures). Often described as a reaction against the tyranny of minimalism, 
with its clean lines and ample white space, interior designer Sasha Bikoff says that the 
maximalist philosophy is “more is more” (Bikoff). A guide to “knowing you’re a 
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maximalist” in interior design digital mecca Apartment Therapy claims that two of the 
ways you can tell you want no part of the minimalist utopian craze are that you have a 
“collection of collections” and “your favorite color is everything” (Mitchell). 
Characterized by redundancy (in Martinez’s case, bows upon bows, patterns upon 
patterns, pastels upon pastels), excess, and the intermingling and uneasy juxtaposition 
of light and dark (girl and wolf, children’s rhymes and trauma) and “high” and “low” 
cultures, the choice of a maximalist aesthetic for Martinez’s concept album cements its 
postmodern roots and its ambivalent approach to both the cultural figure of the girl 
and the trajectories of trauma and mental illness. 
Maximalism is a particularly salient performative lens through which to 
explore the underbelly of girlhood through adolescent drag and the inscrutability of 
signs upon signs, accompanied by no clear attendant signifier. Writes Anna Watkins 
Fisher, “Adolescent drag draws upon the adolescent figure as a chain of significations, 
a network of reflections that bounce off of each other... She is always multiple, always 
overloaded, both allegorical and caricatural” (73). In media representations, girlhood 
is often defined by what it is not: not-mother, not-boy, not-woman. Moreover, it is 
often relegated to the realm of the insignificant or trivial; the color, whimsy, and 
playfulness of a maximalist aesthetic calls that triviality into question by draping it on 
the bodies and problems of an adult woman. Finally, the maximalist aesthetic speaks 
to a simultaneous questioning and reifying of the reductive definitions that peg girls as 
“too much” or “not enough.” These polarities condemn or condone, pathologize or 
normalize, ignore or glamorize, girls. As Valerie Walkerdine notes, the “girl” is 
  
186 
 
always accused of being “too something and not something enough” (“Girlhood” 15). 
“The “girl” is talked about as either excess or lack, good or bad, nice or mean, chaste 
or slutty, aggressive or passive, fat or thin, healthy or unhealthy, powerful or 
submissive, a real go-getter or completely out of control” (15), she argues. Locating 
girlhood outside of a binary, then (by, for example, leaning into the excess proffered 
by an aesthetic like maximalism), provides a chance at freedom, even if that freedom 
is only an illusion gained by inscrutability and the reductiveness of a gaze that sees 
only surface.  
The literary critic James Wood gave a rather telling name in 2000 to a certain 
breed of postmodern literature that later became known as “maximalist”: “hysterical 
realism,” thus connecting books like David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, Don 
DeLillo’s Underworld, and Salman Rushdie’s The Ground Beneath Her Feet 
inextricably to the spectre of the traumatized girl (theoretically, at least) and to the 
perpetual whirring motion of young femininity and its alleged neuroticism. Writing for 
The New Republic about Zadie Smith’s massive postcolonial novel White Teeth, a 
nearly 500-page tome that covers over a century of history, Wood calls it a 
prototypical example of maximalist literature (which, by the way, he certainly does 
not mean as a compliment): “This is not magical realism,” he clarifies. “It is hysterical 
realism” (Wood). Within hysterical realism, Wood claims, plots are secondary; 
narratives are driven more by internal emotion and affect than by external events; 
descriptions and sidetracks are king; characters are always proliferating, spawning 
more and more as they make connections and feel ever more intensely; and talk is 
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cheap, intense, and most of all, frequent: “The big contemporary novel,” a “perpetual 
motion-machine,” “seems to want to abolish stillness, as if ashamed of silence” 
(Wood), explains Wood. But this is the stuff of carnivorous vitality, not life, he claims.  
Expressing dubiousness that anyone could feel anything as intensely as 
Smith’s multiple narrators feel, well, everything, Wood skewers the ambivalence, 
multivocality, nonlinearity, and inscrutability of this breed of too-big-for-their-britches 
books. Moreover, to give a sense of the genre, he repeatedly pairs pathologizing 
language with the kind of disparaging epithets often aimed at young women in order 
to trivialize or criticize their behavior. Echoing common complaints about young 
women’s superficiality, vanity, and ultimate hollowness, he writes, “An excess of 
storytelling has become the contemporary way of shrouding, in majesty, a lack” 
(Wood). Later, he claims that books that fall under the umbrella of hysterical realism 
“have a showy liveliness, a theatricality, that almost succeeds in hiding the fact that 
they are without life: liveliness hangs off them like jewelry” (Wood). Like the girl of 
popular cultural imagination, who is at once vapid, concerned only with trivialities, 
and in mortal peril, both “too much” and not enough, adorning herself to excess in 
order to conceal her lack, maximalism is, in Wood’s estimation, all appearance and no 
substance, trafficking in everything and nothing at once: a gilded cage with no bird 
inside. 
Wood’s description bears a striking similarity to critics’ takes on shojo manga, 
which proceed not as shonen manga do—i.e., plodding ever forward in a clean 
narrative arc—but which are instead driven by layered patterns that signify complex 
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webs of emotions. The reader is more like an emotional cartographer than a passenger 
of the plot, following along as the girl-heroine is gripped by flights of fancy that flit 
across the page and gets sidetracked into visceral fantasies, both dark and whimsical. 
“These characters emerge upon an ever-changing abstract background, sometimes 
called ‘wallpaper,’” Frenchy Lunning explains, “that surrounds and suspends them in 
a cloying miasma of roses of symbolic love, flower petals for happiness, and puffs of 
delicate feelings. These wallpapers act as an emotional chorus, overcoding the 
narrative with an effusion of emotion and signification” (11). Wood’s depiction of the 
sprawling postmodern novel at its most hysterically realist is startlingly reminiscent of 
Lunning’s descriptions of the emotional rabbit holes into which shojo heroines often 
plunge themselves: “An endless web,” writes Wood, “is all they need for meaning. 
Each of these novels is excessively centripetal. The different stories all intertwine, and 
double and triple on themselves. Characters are forever seeing connections and links 
and plots, and paranoid parallels. (There is something essentially paranoid about the 
belief that everything is connected to everything else)” (Wood). 
Martinez’s music video imagery in Cry Baby draws from this artistic and 
philosophical legacy, one that links the very notion of girlhood to emotional and 
aesthetic excess. The bubbly lushness of her suburban paradise and her girltopia of a 
bedroom, paired with the sinister goings-on that take place inside it and her own 
hyperembellished getups, complicate and girlify notions of the grotesque. Each key 
aspect of maximalism is employed to toy with stereotypical depictions of the girl, 
whether by exposing the traumas often left unsaid or swept away for the purposes of 
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the cultural construction of girlish innocence; finding unexpected pleasure in carrying 
“girly” beauty standards and hobbies to their illogical ends; or juxtaposing the girl-in-
crisis with her girl-power counterpart in a single Lolitan-Alice character. The 
characteristics of maximalism map well onto the figure of the mentally ill girl, as both 
mental illness and girlhood are associated with diversions, trivialities, and 
being/wanting/expressing “too much,” all of which are reflected in a maximalist 
aesthetic that embraces visual interruptions, clashing, layering, and redundancy.  
 Adolescent drag, as discussed in the previous chapter, in general can be read 
as a maximalist performative practice, given to mashups and forever mixing the vulgar 
with the serious; children’s games, fairytales, and nostalgic objects with the 
obscenities and pornography of adults; and mass-produced plastics with masterpieces. 
Fisher explains, “In these artworks, the mature/immature developmental binary gets 
mapped onto the highbrow/lowbrow taste divide, as amateur aesthetics emerge as the 
condition of possibility for a queering of the adolescent figure that transverses and 
troubles such normative binaries” (52). One of the ways in which this elision of binary 
traps is accomplished in adolescent drag like Martinez’s is through bricolage, or the 
productive collision of found objects, a commonly cited trait of maximalist art and 
design. Martinez’s bricolage reminds us that cast-off items can be rework and 
incorporated into a new and dangerous whole. The girl we ourselves may have cast off 
can be reincorporated and reborn in ways that threaten to expose our own culpability, 
related to Kristevan abjection, which festers at the site of the cast-off mother and 
bubbles into fruition in the muck of the presymbolic realm, where mother and child 
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were one, the semiotic chora where the boundary between subject and object is blurred 
and language is not yet articulable. Our fear of the cast-off girl comes from our 
knowledge that we are both titillated and ashamed of our own act of casting her off. 
Martinez confronts us with the border between desire and revulsion in her unblinking 
revelation of the adult under the adolescent drag. She embraces, rather than traveling 
through, the grotesque.  
Bricolage is also characterized by a DIY approach to artmaking, improvisation, 
and the postmodern technique of polystylism. In visual art and architecture, bricolage 
often refers to the mixing of various styles from different periods. Martinez employs 
bricolage in her art design and costuming throughout Cry Baby, creating a collage of 
sorts that invokes nostalgia for various key moments in the historiocultural life of the 
girl. “Pity Party,” for example, casts Martinez as a teenybopper at the cultural moment 
in which teenagerdom emerged as a phenomenon and the notion of adolescence began 
to coalesce. “Mad Hatter” alludes heavily to (of course) Alice and the prototypical 
neo-Victorian girl, while “Mrs. Potato Head” draws from the well of girl-crisis 
imagery that has dominated the media landscape since the 1980s. The choice to layer 
fetish objects from these key eras in the cultural development of the girl on top of one 
another is in line with the aesthetic of maximalism and is also consistent with 
Martinez’s evocation of a “traumatized timeline,” a historiography that—like the 
traumatized mind—proceeds by skips and starts, lingering first in this memory, then in 
another, never settling on a singular, distinct chronology.  
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Martinez’s work is also heavily indebted to pop surrealism, which itself can be 
understood as a maximalist approach to visual art. Pop surrealism exploded out of an 
unholy union between pop art and the Lowbrow movement. Lowbrow was born in Los 
Angeles in the 1970s and influenced by zine culture, underground comix, tattoo art, 
and the punk scene. Following the rise of Juxtapoz Magazine, as well as another 
seminal publication called Hi-Fructose, a number of individuals within the Lowbrow 
art movement began breaking away from the raw, gritty representation of cartoons and 
counterculture. “Despite their master painter techniques,” Angie Kordic writes in 
Widewalls, “these creatives did not reach the realms of the ‘snobbish’ Highbrow – nor 
was this their intention – but they nevertheless managed to blur the line between low 
and high art, giving way to a new subclass of pieces that could be defined as Pop 
Surrealism” (Kordic). 
Cry Baby’s pop surrealist connection is notable due to the movement’s 
recurring images of both girls and mental illness. Pop surrealist art is distinctly 
populated by pathologized and abject youthful femininities. Doe-eyed ageless girls 
with massive heads on cartoonish miniature bodies are the antiheroines of pop 
surrealism. The “girls” are often hybridized and/or in various stages of temporal drag, 
enticing the viewer with sad sweetheart eyes and candy-colored spilled-out skirts 
before “spoiling” the viewer’s voyeuristic gaze with disturbing details that unfold and 
sprawl across the psyche, infecting the sickeningly sweet image more and more the 
longer one looks. The girls, or girlified women, of pop surrealism are not passive 
objects, but rather knowing sirens, whose overwhelmingly large eyes cry out for your 
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attention before it’s averted, interrupted, and diverted for more sinister purposes. 
Debra J. Byrne writes of pop surrealism’s evocation of the carnivalesque, “While 
drawing from the aesthetics of street art and graffiti, pop surrealism is more sinister. 
Carnivalesque art...is not so lighthearted because it ultimately refuses escapism. Its 
aim is to confront. The would-be reveler is transformed into a captive spectator who is 
shown his or her mortality and that all is not quite right with the world. Laughter is 
invoked, but not for distraction—rather to trigger anxiety” (Byrne). 
This anxiety is often triggered by visual cues that suggest non-normative 
bodies or that gesture towards abnormal psyches, often via Jungian archetypes12 or 
disconcerting signifiers that often populate nightmarish dreamscapes and the 
unconscious. In pop surrealist Ray Caesar’s work, for example, babies smoke pipes 
and sport fish tails, and girls’ arms end in sinewy, snakelike branches rather than 
graspable hands. In his painting “Ecstasy,” a Victorian girl, a vision of pink with 
piled-high dark hair, is fed a jar of blood or strawberry jam (we can’t tell which) by an 
otherworldly force, seemingly out of thin air. The layering over of childlike themes 
with unnerving implications is a pop surrealist mainstay, and Martinez uses the trick 
herself in the music video for “Alphabet Boy,” appearing at first to lick a butcher knife 
coated in blood with abandon before the viewer has a reasonable amount of time to 
register that it’s jelly. Pop surrealist art frequently draws from the remnants of old 
                                                 
12
 Archetypes are what Carl Jung called “primordial images” and the “fundamental units of the human 
mind.” Jung wrote in The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, “Archetypes are the living system of 
reactions and aptitudes that determine the individual’s life in invisible ways.” 
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masterpieces and sacred imagery and mixes them with cartoon and comics aesthetics, 
the unnerving details of horror, and the rawness of street art.  
Most notably, Mark Ryden’s “The Gay 90s” series skewers and honors the 
“earnest kitsch” of the late 19th century; Martinez’s music videos can be read as 
performative manifestations of the series. In Ryden’s “The Magic Circus,” a red-
haired Cry Baby lookalike invites the viewer with a confronting, melancholy stare to 
what appears to be her personal nightmare: a kaleidoscope of off-kilter kitsch that 
evokes both nostalgia and historical trauma in imagery reminiscent of freak shows, 
19th century pseudoscience, and children’s traveling circuses at once. Twin girls 
reminiscent of the famous miniature ghosts in The Shining play among an oversized 
long-necked cotton-candy-pink bunny, whose Disneyfied puppet hand empties blood 
into a toy monkey’s goblet. Aborted fetuses, shrunken-headed demons, and body parts 
both human and animal, which are reminiscent of Victorian-era scientific drawings, 
lurk among lollipops, dolls, a Jesus toy holding unsettlingly expressive balloons, and a 
dancing octopus. As in all of Martinez’s videos, the line between human and animal, 
human and object, and ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ is blurred, leaving the door to the 
skitter-skatter corners of the psyche deliberately ajar. The girl-heroine of the painting, 
meanwhile, serves as something of a ringmaster, with a brightly colored puzzle as her 
clipboard and a peppermint stick as her baton. Stuffed into a box labeled “Meat 
Show,” she appears resigned to her role as central archetype. 
Martinez-as-Cry-Baby exhibits the same reluctant attitude towards her role as 
narrator/leader of an unlikely band of kitschy-creepy symbols and signifiers. Forced 
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into her role as postmodernism’s and pop surrealism’s unwitting poster child, she 
wields her power by framing it ironically and gesturing towards it with ambivalent 
tolerance, at once world-weary and resigned to her powerlessness in terms of what 
she’s asked to represent. In fact, Martinez’s world of characters and her own persona 
appear to be lifted directly from a Ryden or Caesar painting, in a performative take on 
pop surrealism that breathes human life into their painted sad-eyed girls. In Caesar’s 
“Tea with Me and He,” a Little Miss Muffet lookalike in a white wide-brimmed hat 
and pristine cupcake dress serves tea to a wolf with a man’s body, nearly identical to 
Martinez’s kidnapper and, potentially, sexual predator in “Tag, You’re It.” Moreover, 
his girls, like Martinez, often look directly at the viewer smirkingly—in defiance no 
matter what harm is coming to them (bee swarms, birds pecking their backs raw, or 
otherwise). If they are going to be consumed, they won’t be easily washed down in a 
single gulp. By mapping her own youthful feminine persona and her own girl-read 
body onto their girl archetypes, however, Martinez risks being read (and has been 
read) as glorifying ephebophilia or as hypersexualizing herself, similar to the 
criticisms that have plagued Lolita subcultures for decades.  
Often taking on neo-Victorian themes as well as creepifying 1960s pop art, the 
girls of pop surrealism pose in dresses layered with raw meat, are lost at carnivals 
amid animal-human hybrids, and gaze melancholically alongside pop art reimaginings 
of Abraham Lincoln, Mary, and Jesus. Asked about his choice to foreground the girl in 
his work, Caesar claims that the girls are alternative versions of himself, citing a 
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traumatic and abusive childhood from which he escaped by secretly dressing up as a 
girl. Of the girls in his paintings, he tells one interviewer, 
They are a reflection of me and the way I see and define myself.  They are 
completely movable digital dolls wrapped in my skin and with physical aspects 
of myself as an expression of my memory through my life...They inhabit 
spaces that are rich with the nostalgia, texture and odor of my own past. 
(Gordon) 
 
Likewise, Amanda Erlanson explains Mark Ryden’s own identification with the girls 
in his paintings in Juxtapoz Magazine:  
Languid girls who exude both a doll-like innocence and a knowing sensuality 
appear in nearly every painting...Within Mark’s conceptual landscape, these 
porcelain waifs represent the anima, the Jungian archetype that mediates the 
feminine aspects of the unconscious in the male’s emotional development. 
Indeed, Marion believes that each of the girls Mark paints is in one sense a 
self-portrait...Asked about his close identification with the feminine, Mark 
said, “I believe that beyond the arena of art, the world would be a much better 
place if centered around a feminine perspective.” (Erlanson) 
 
The girls in his paintings also, Caesar says, allow him to indulge a lifetime of 
dissociation, flashbacks, and the development of traumatized otherselves through 
visual sidetracks into nostalgia and feminine alter egos. Martinez’s transformation into 
Lolitaized versions of the creepy, meat-draped girls that figure prominently in pop 
surrealist paintings, and her use of those performative forays into girl-adjacent 
alternative selves to explore the darker sides of her psyche and to revisit traumas, tells 
these stories from the perspective of the embodied, traumatized girl herself behind the 
archetype.  
Moreover, while, for male pop surrealist artists like Ryden and Caesar, the girl 
can serve an imaginary point of freedom, a line of flight through which to take refuge 
and to experience as a romanticized safe haven (if a playful and boundless one) from 
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the grueling demands of performing normative adult masculinity, the women and girls 
expected to simultaneously uphold and resist the trappings of socially normative 
girlhood have to navigate a more complex cultural pathway. Moreover, their choice to 
use the girl as the appropriate prism through which to reflect upon their own shadow-
selves, mental illnesses, and dissociative identities suggests a cultural linkage between 
the figure of the girl and notions of emotional and psychological instability. 
Martinez’s choice to embody these consummate figures of the unstable, the 
grotesquely cute and cutely grotesque, is thus an intriguing one: The psychiatrically 
disabled or otherwise non-normative girl or woman-as-girl is here, again, doubly 
othered, as even the visual presentation relief valves available to not-girls do not 
provide girls themselves with the same opportunities to elide binaries. Even Lolita 
scholar Moto Mastura warns that women who engage in Lolita subcultures or other 
forms of adolescent drag should ensure that there is a layer of division, via camp or 
other visual markers of disidentification, between a woman (especially a young 
woman) and her Lolita “self,” so as to avoid the appearance of adhering to patriarchal 
standards, or girls-becoming-Girls. 
The “D-O-L-L-H-O-U-S-E” 
Like Lewis Carroll’s Alice, Marina Warner writes, today’s Lolitas seek 
“alternatives to the adult society of arbitrary laws, tyrannical rulers, and double talk” 
(xvii). While Alice’s alternative space in which to explore the pleasures and truths 
girlhood can offer her is Wonderland, Cry Baby has only her home and the domestic 
sphere, to which she is firmly relegated. All of her outings prior to the final song—to 
  
197 
 
an ice cream truck, the local market, a bike ride, and a carousel—are centered around 
men, whether in the form of lovers who break her heart or of her kidnapper. Several 
music videos take place in her hyperreal pop art explosion of a home. In “Soap,” Cry 
Baby bathes in a clawfoot bathtub. In “Sippy Cup,” she watches her mother commit 
murder in the kitchen. In “Pity Party,” she celebrates her birthday alone in an 
elaborately decorated living room. Most of them, however, are in her dollhouse-
themed bedroom. The Cry Baby bedroom setting, which is unnerving in its 
timelessness across eras both in cultural history and in the life of a girl (with the room 
functioning simultaneously as a little girl’s haven, a nursery, and a teen enclave), 
echoes McRobbie’s assertion that girl culture is bedroom culture, both by choice and 
by design. Youth cultures that require adolescents in particular to convene in public, 
she argues, have primarily been geared towards the interests and leadership of boys, 
while girls’ participation is overlooked or denigrated, with female punks (for example) 
painted as fangirls, hangers-on, or groupies. In other words, they are presented, 
particularly in media coverage of youth subcultures, as consumers of culture and 
recipients of male attention in those subcultures, rather than cultural producers 
themselves. 
Cry Baby complicates and plays on this notion in several ways, most notably 
by her turning inside-out of the “bedroom culture” trope. While the bedroom was 
historically often presented as the safest place for a girl, due to her vulnerability to 
both the designs of men and her own fanciful whims if allowed into the public sphere, 
Cry Baby’s bedroom is just as unsafe as the outside, its boundaries permeable and 
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consistently transgressed or violated. Her family, first and foremost, is unsafe, with a 
monstrous mother and a barely-mentioned, neglectful father; the doors and locks, 
curtains and frames within her conventional suburban home are means of secret-
keeping and the concealment of taboos and abuse (and, later, of her own escape) rather 
than self-preservation. She escapes her bedroom to the kitchen only to be drugged by 
her mother and returned promptly to her room, the site of alienation and aloneness 
rather than a chosen retreat. Moreover, her boundaries are consistently invaded, no 
barrier strong enough to protect her: Spoons of baby food are forced into her mouth; 
even toys come alive to haunt her (before she joins their sinister forces, of course). 
The flickering 1950s-era television brings in harmful media representations of beauty 
and white supremacy, encroaching upon the protective barriers around her psyche. 
When Cry Baby is kidnapped, moreover, she’s brought to yet another bedroom almost 
identical to her own at home, indicating that the bedroom is far from an idealized oasis 
for the girl.  
Sonya Sawyer Fritz argues in “A Room of Her Very Own: Privacy and Leisure 
in the Victorian Girl’s Bedroom” that this (in part) neo-Victorian reconception of the 
girl’s bedroom as permeable and open for public viewing, rather than as private haven 
of leisure and rest, is not wholly historically inaccurate. Fritz makes note of a 1935 
autobiography, I Have Been Young, in which Helena Swanwick offers an unappealing 
description of her home life as a middle-class girl in Victorian England: “To ‘be there’ 
was supposed to be adequate occupation; I was a sort of eternal girl-in-waiting, always 
ready to be called upon... for the social amenities which I found exceedingly dull” 
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(57–58). And although privacy is perceived as paramount in many readings of 
Victorian life and values, the story was often different, Fritz claims, for girls: 
Swanwick provides a telling image of a public persona that Victorian girls 
were often required to maintain in order to fulfill their domestic obligations in 
the home; as the notion of a ‘girl-in-waiting, always ready’ suggests, pressures 
placed upon Victorian girls...often inscribed duty over personal interests and 
publicity over privacy in girls’ experience of domestic space. (39) 
 
Thus, the middle-class girl’s ostensible privacy (and modesty, and relegation to the 
domestic sphere) was, in many cases, a performance for the benefit of others, a 
decorative addition to the domestic tableau, and the provision of a silent but 
productive backdrop to visitors’ and family members’ lives. 
Martinez’s illustration of this idea—that others’ public lives in many cases 
rely/relied on the concealment of girls’ lived, deliberately othered realities—can be 
read as a critique of the repressive-projective-obsessive Freudian Oedipal family and 
as a feminist Marxist analysis of the workings of reproductive labor. The work of 
reproducing such a family, and particularly the work of secret-keeping and serving as 
a silent repository for familial troubles and trauma, often falls on the shoulders of the 
silenced and shunted aside girl. This phenomenon is particularly conjured in the music 
video for the album’s second song, “Dollhouse,” in which Martinez appears as a literal 
doll, complete with painted freckles, trapped eternally in a heavy-handed metaphor of 
a 19th-century dollhouse. As the only “living doll” or doll-made-flesh in her otherwise 
entirely plastic family, the gilded-caged Martinez can only warn her real-life 
counterpart, played by an actual girl, of her apparent fate if she, like Martinez, 
continues to play the role ascribed to her. It’s heavily implied that Martinez is an older 
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version of the girl, now traumatized and thus sealed into her fate after the Oedipal 
family has robbed her of a potential self. As the family daughter (and thus, it seems, 
the scapegoat), she is asked to participate in a representational theatre of the Freudian 
unconscious in which she wants no part. As doll, rather than daughter, however, Cry 
Baby is able to escape out the “side door” of the Oedipal family and to reject the 
tyranny of triangulation, even if only because she is already wounded. 
The video opens with an establishing shot of a little girl, Martinez’s presumed 
flesh-and-blood alter ego, playing with a doll version of her. Martinez, as Cry Baby, as 
doll, is decked out in full neo-Victorian Lolita mode with a baby pink pinafore and a 
contemporary twist (pink and purple curls, garishly painted lips, and caked-on eye 
makeup). Over haunting, tinkering toy sounds and the distorted gasp of a twisted Jack-
in-the-box, Cry Baby-as-doll haunts the girl who owns the dollhouse by mimicking 
the demands of their respective family roles: “Hey girl, open the walls, play with your 
dolls/We’ll be a perfect family.” Her promise is undercut with a consistently sardonic 
gaze—Cry Baby has been here too long and is far past jaded—and the self-
consciously robotic movements of a doll who is all too aware of her predetermined 
role. She quickly reveals the truth behind the plastic exterior, however, and 
consistently laments her silencing within the nuclear family configuration, which 
leaves her unheard and lost: “No one ever listens, this wallpaper glistens/Don’t let 
them see what goes down in their kitchen,” she sarcastically instructs her younger, 
human self, indicating that their role in the Freudian/patriarchal family is to serve as 
productive emptiness, the lack against which all other selves are measured.  
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Playing further on the notion of the unconscious as representational theatre, 
stuffed with symbols that all point back to desperate attempts to recover what has been 
lost (through castration, the mother wound, or otherwise), Cry Baby next directs the 
family to a series of Oedipal tableaux in which she always looks out of place next to 
their pasty plastic caricature of perfection; notably, she’s also the only nonwhite 
member of her family. As the family poses for photographs, she reiterates the fact that 
each family member is meant to play out a particular psychic drama in a prescribed 
chronological order: “Places, places, get in your places/Put on your dress and throw on 
your doll faces.” Repeatedly painting a contrast between the performance each 
member of the family is expected to perform to robotic perfection and the underlying, 
neurotic reality (no one makes it through the Oedipal complex unscathed, after all), 
she tells the girl, “Everyone thinks that we’re perfect/Please don’t let them look 
through the curtains,” and, in another tongue-in-cheek implosion of middle-class 
respectability politics and the Freudian family-gone-nuclear alike, she explains 
further: “When you walk away, it’s when we really play/You don’t hear me when I 
say/Mom, please wake up/Dad’s with a slut/And your son is smoking cannabis.” 
Subsequently, she exclaims (referring to her mother), “Uh oh, she’s coming to the 
attic! Plastic/Go back to being plastic,” thereby connecting her own transformation 
into a doll—her own constructed mask layered atop the Freudian mask of repression— 
to an emotionally protective layer against familial trauma, as well as her own sideways 
form of freedom. 
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As the second song in the album, just after “Cry Baby,” which establishes the 
character of Cry Baby as a girlified version of Martinez in temporal drag, “Doll 
House” has expositional work to do (establishing, for example, Cry Baby’s mother’s 
alcoholism and her father’s wandering eye with lyrics like “When you turn your back, 
she pulls out a flask/And forgets his infidelity”), but it also moves beyond the 
aforementioned representations of the Freudian feminine-as-lack and feminist Marxist 
readings of invisible labor into a more complex vision of what girls can represent 
theoretically.  
The Figuring of the Girl 
Deleuze, unlike many of his critical predecessors, used the girl as an 
ideological prism through which to reflect and process his ideas, particularly his 
critique of psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus. In “The Woman in Process: Deleuze, 
Kristeva and Feminism,” girl studies theorist Catherine Driscoll compares the 
approaches of Kristeva and Deleuze with respect to subject formation in late 
modernity and its relationship to psychoanalysis, thus “considering how they place the 
girl as a pivotally difficult figure for the process of constituting the subject” (65). For 
both Kristeva and Deleuze, Driscoll notes, the girl occupies a particularly ambivalent, 
“lost” space within the Oedipal configuration; in fact, “the daughter does not belong to 
this triangle” (73) at all. Further, Driscoll argues “that in their accounts of body, desire 
and subjectivity both Deleuze and Kristeva produce ‘the girl’ as an impossible figure 
of anticipation and escape within the Oedipal framework” (64).  
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This figuring of the girl as at once theoretically inscrutable under 
psychoanalysis and thus as offering a potential productive site of creativity, freedom, 
release, and play is reminiscent of Luce Irigaray’s assertion that “the daughter can 
become neither the father nor the mother, given that the mother is not a subject” (73-
74), since femininity, including fully mature femininity, is constituted primarily as a 
lack or a symbol of castration. Excluded from the realm of the symbolic and paternal 
law, and disconnected from the mother, the girl is the ‘other’s other’ and has nowhere 
to move within the available linear pathways of the Oedipal maturation process. The 
son, deprived of his initial love-object (his mother) by his father’s incitement of 
castration fear, ultimately identifies with his father, while his desire for his mother is 
repressed and channeled into more appropriate libidinal drives. The girl’s role is less 
clear, as she, too, apparently wants to possess the mother, then her father, and is 
ultimately doomed to re-identify with her mother primarily through their mutual lack 
(penis envy). Deleuze claims that within the psychoanalytic model, the “girl’s 
becoming is stolen first” in order that she may become a proper object of desire for the 
boy, representing the possibility of reclaiming or recovering what he feels he has lost. 
Because she must, from the start, serve as a compensatory “victim” (of the loss of 
self), “example” (of what could happen to him—castration—if he does not comply 
with the patriarchal order), and “trap” (as an appropriate object of desire onto which 
the boy can project his lack and longing in order to resolve that loss), she has both 
nowhere and everywhere to go. “Becoming-woman,” then, Driscoll concludes—
drawing on Deleuze’s assertions that ‘the girl...is an abstract line, or a line of flight,’ 
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that ‘girls do not belong to an age, group, sex, order or kingdom, but rather ‘slip in 
everywhere,’ and that ‘it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl’”—“is a 
way of understanding transformative possibilities- the ways in which identity might 
escape from the codes which constitute the subject” (75). Indeed, while Freud 
presented the unconscious as a “representational theatre” with clear symbols and 
signifiers, Deleuze posits desire as a productive force, a desiring-machine connected to 
other desiring-machines that produces a flow of desire from itself (a series of flows 
which, one imagines, would be best represented by a maximalist aesthetic). Cry 
Baby’s fantasy world of girled signifiers with no clear meanings certainly fits the bill; 
she is at once Lolita, girl, doll, and dollhouse, and anything but daughter, sister, or 
woman-to-be.  
The notion of Cry Baby as a Deleuzian girl is furthered by her multiple 
slippages in identity, the permeable boundaries that shimmer around her shoulders and 
shoot her into the interstitial spaces between herself and Martinez, herself and a doll, 
herself and her little-girl counterpart, and the dollhouse and the family. Cry Baby, as 
doll, is surrounded by signifiers that point to the spectre of the Good Daughter, from 
giant bows to ice cream, teddy bears to training wheels. In her ghostly hands, they lose 
their socially normative meanings. Moreover, she, desiring everything at once from a 
place of potential rather than lack, asks the girl she’s counseling (and thereby us) to 
productively “forget” their implications. In this alternate universe where desire builds 
on itself, teddy bear becomes lover, girl becomes doll becomes the nonmonstrous 
mother she never had a hope of becoming, and her endless adornments, rather than 
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keeping her docile and presentable, allow her to escape the notice of the invasive 
Freudian eye, to shrink herself into the dollhouse and thus delay her descent into her 
feminine-as-lack of a destiny. As the song proceeds, she whispers conspiratorially into 
the ear of the Oedipal girl, who is struggling to proceed through the appropriate 
Oedipal stages, and pulls her into her world as a warning: don’t go there; don’t do it. 
You will only lose if you try to move upward, but from where I stand, there’s nowhere 
to go but sideways. The know-it-all siren snake to her younger self’s Eve, Cry Baby 
feeds her the red pill and tells her it’s better to stay conscious and wanting, gathering, 
collecting, desired and desiring, than repressed. From this position, as forever-girl, she 
still experiences melancholy, but at least she knows everything, having achieved a 
kind of resigned omniscience, as she repeats consistently in the chorus: “D-O-L-L-H-
O-U-S-E/I see things that nobody else sees/D-O-L-L-H-O-U-S-E/I see things that 
nobody else sees.”  
“Mrs. Potato Head” and the Grotesque 
“The doll,” writes Mari Kotani in “Doll Beauties and Cosplay,” “is just 
another metaphor for death,” making it an apt vehicle for reflections on the uncanny 
and the grotesque. Lolita fashion is heavily influenced by the ornate tradition of 
Victorian bisque dolls; Momo Matsura, discussing the relationship between Lolitas 
and dolls, writes of this connection: 
Looking at porcelain or bisque dolls…ties Lolitas’ fascination with death for a 
mental and physical state that will allow them to freeze time and create a sense 
of stillness and suspension...This death-like nostalgic state can be connected to 
the idea of being, remembering, and protecting the ‘eternal.’ It is not 
something that exists in a linear, forward-moving timeline, stretching forever 
into the future, but is something that lies outside an orientation towards the 
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future. It involves remembering and protecting certain aspects of the past and 
suspending them in time. (21) 
 
Meanwhile, G. Stanley Hall, Victorian-era psychologist and the founder of the 
child-study movement, saw dolls as the keys to forward progression from girlhood to 
womanhood. In “Interrogating the Meanings of Dolls: New Directions in Doll 
Studies,” doll studies scholar Miriam Forman-Brunell writes that “G. Stanley 
Hall...argued that doll play taught girls key lessons in femininity and maternity” 
(Forman-Brunell 11). In 1896, Hall, a professor of psychology and president of Clark 
University, co-authored with A.C. Ellis “A Study of Dolls,” which posited that dolls 
represented a key socially appropriate means for girls to “practice” their future roles as 
women, wives, and mothers. Hall and Ellis argued that dolls allowed girls to practice 
appropriate, normative feminine futures and “ladylike propriety, beauty, and 
domesticity” (64). This view was largely accepted by feminist scholars for years, but 
was complicated by counter-cultural activists like the riot grrrls of the ‘80s and ‘90s, 
who sometimes dressed as “broken dolls” or campily dollified themselves for their 
music videos and performances in ways that often baffled critics, who associated dolls 
with passivity and propriety (allegedly the antithesis of the riot grrrl ideology). In 
“The ‘Dollification’ of Riot Grrrls: Self-Fashioning Alternative Identities,” Meghan 
Chandler and Diana Anselmo-Sequeira, for example, note that in the 1990 music 
video for “He’s My Thing” by riot grrrl mainstay Babes in Toyland, the performers 
“celebrated...grotesquely reconstructed doll figures by mimicking their scabs, 
scratches, and sutures. As a result of this perceptual twist, girls ceased to long for dolls 
that mirrored a beautified notion of self. Instead, dolls became the externalized 
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reflection of girls’ hidden selves, personal obsessions, and coming-of-age nightmares” 
(64-65). Thus, Chandler and Anselmo-Sequeira elaborate, “Riot Grrrls found a voice 
in the otherwise historically silent figure of the doll, and became ‘dollified’ 
spokespersons for new feminist ideals” (65).  
It was around this time that girl studies scholars and other thinkers and activists 
began to reconsider the culturally productive possibilities of the doll or of dollifying 
oneself as an act of resistance or pleasure. Indeed, “it was not until the 1980s,” claims 
Brunell, “that...a new generation of scholars (baby boomers raised on postwar 
children’s culture) [began] to question the patriarchal imperative of dolls and the 
presumed passivity of girl players. The new interpretive frameworks, historical 
contexts, and methods of analysis revealed that dolls were not uniform, static artifacts 
of a single dominant culture” (4). 
Dolls appear in every Cry Baby video, as does the process of dollification or 
becoming-doll. Parents become Stepford Wife dolls with a robotic sheen; dolls litter 
the bedroom floors and spring to life, turning either comrade or menace; Cry Baby 
herself, of course, dresses in exaggerated doll camp for “D-O-L-L-H-O-U-S-E” and, 
to a certain degree, in her everyday wardrobe. Most notably, in the album’s second-to-
last song, “Mrs. Potato Head,” the symbol of the doll is at its most versatile: at once a 
childhood source of pleasure, a means of mimicking normative femininity, and a 
vehicle for achieving the ultimate in objectification. Martinez’s persona itself can be 
seen as the result of some degree of dollification, as she adopts a Lolitan alter ego as a 
bodily canvas, a revolving kaleidoscopic fleshly time-travel machine onto which she 
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maps various chronological ages, historical periods, and cultural iterations of the ideal 
girl. Cry Baby’s attitude towards dolls and dollification, then, is not a wholesale 
negative one. Resisting the too-easy reduction of any dollification process or dollish 
look to a representation of the patriarchy’s demands on the girl, Cry Baby seems 
instead to take the stance that a mutable, flexible doll—one with the chance for 
agency, creativity, and productive nostalgia, like Cry Baby herself—can even be a tool 
of subversion, while a form of dollhood selected for you by an outside influence 
functions as a trap.  
It’s the latter process of dollification that comes to play in “Mrs. Potato Head,” 
which uses the familiar mix-and-match movable-parts and constructable-face of the 
notorious plastic children’s toy as an extended metaphor for women who undergo 
plastic surgery and other extreme procedures to meet the demands of men. The video 
for “Mrs. Potato Head” opens in the living room, the only video in the album to take 
place there. Cry Baby is fixated on the perennial consumer-culture centerpiece, the 
television, while brushing her doll’s blonde hair. A 1950s-styled ad flickers on the TV, 
transmitting cultural messages to a preteen-styled Cry Baby via a commercial for 
blonde wigs. “All beautiful, all blonde,” a smarmy spokesperson promises 
impressionable viewers. Propped up precariously on the heads of women of every 
race, the blonde wigs are indicative of the white supremacy that permeates virtually all 
conventional Western beauty standards, even if unspoken. Cry Baby knows, or at least 
is learning now, it’s heavily implied, that her “ideal” form would be both white and 
womanly. Instead, she is Latina (unlike the rest of her family) as well as seemingly 
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permanently “girl,” far more Lolita than femme fatale. Seduced by the advertisement’s 
promises of superiority and beauty, Cry Baby shuts herself into the bathroom and 
coats herself with makeup, donning a blonde wig in direct imitation of the steps to 
attaining beauty that have been visually outlined for her. Weeping, she realizes she’s 
failed; nothing but something more drastic could transform her into the image she sees 
reflected back to her. In a now-familiar reversal of common childhood roles, she asks 
for advice from her toys, rather than directing their behavior, as she implores, “Oh, 
Mrs. Potato Head, tell me/Is it true that pain is beauty? / Does a new face come with a 
warranty?” Sucked into the television’s immersive promises of womanhood-as-future, 
she imagines herself as the show’s star, and we watch as a grown-up siliconified Cry 
Baby undergoes an extreme series of plastic surgery procedures to please her male 
counterpart. The surgeries are ultimately botched, and her partner leaves her for 
another identical model.  
The symbolism of the mask and its connection to the grotesque, as Mikhail 
Bakhtin elaborates in Rabelais and His World, is particularly useful here, as the 
“mask” functions as the necessary layering-over of social norms that allows the girl to 
proceed to womanhood in true Butlerian fashion (learned, repeated, and punished 
when transgressed). “The mask,” he writes, “is related to transition, metamorphoses, 
the violation of natural boundaries, to mockery and familiar nicknames” (40). In 
“Dead Meat: Horror, Disability, and Eating Rituals,” Julia Gruson-Wood notes that 
the monster-villain in horror texts (films, theatre, literature) is often wearing a mask in 
order to denote or emphasize their aid in the transition of his victims from health to 
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illness, whether physical, psychological, or societal (Gruson-Wood). But as a girl, Cry 
Baby visually and lyrically suggests, she is expected to already wear a mask; her very 
skin is a gendered performance, her body a decoration for the domestic interior. This 
inherent “maskedness” renders the adult female body pliable, having been subjected to 
one required cultural mask after another as she grew.  
This suggestion is grotesquely realized in the video’s central scene, in which 
we’re asked to watch a gruesome cosmetic surgery conducted by the rabbit-headed 
doctor, in which he peels off grown-up-Cry-Baby’s Barbified “skin” and inserts breast 
implants on a distinctly doll-like body (albeit with human-like insides). In this vein, 
Martinez’s scalding lyrics reflect the connections between dollification and DIY art, 
and between objectification and death, as she sings: “It’s such a waste/When little girls 
grow into their mother’s face/But little girls are learning how to cut and paste/And 
pucker up their lips until they suffocate”; in the chorus, she gets more explicit about 
the necessary rigidity and “plasticness” of womanhood (as opposed to the flexibility 
and plasticity of girlhood): “Kids forever, kids forever/Baby soft skin turns into 
leather/Don’t be dramatic, it’s only some plastic/No one will love you if you’re 
unattractive.” 
As Anna Watkins Fisher details in her work on adolescent drag and David J. 
Getsy elaborates on in “Queer Exercises: Amber Hawk Swanson’s Performances of 
Self-Realization,” Amber Hawk Swanson’s performance art traffics in precisely these 
kinds of visuals and themes; in her infamous The Amber Doll Project, she 
commissioned an exact replica of herself in silicone RealDoll (a humanoid flesh-
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colored sex doll), created to her precise bodily proportions and sculpted to match her 
every curve. In her various projects on livestreaming platforms, Amber deconstructs 
the Amber Doll and other sex dolls, recreating them in true bricolage fashion into 
other creatures (a white whale, for example) in order to raise questions about agency, 
women’s bodies as public property, the ways we figuratively “dollify” women on an 
everyday basis by reducing them to their parts, and the thin line between the human 
and the doll, separated only by the uncanny valley and our internal projections. In 
others, she allows strangers to use and, often, abuse the Amber Doll as much as they 
like, even abandoning her to said abuse, both to evoke an unsettling empathy from 
viewers for an inanimate object and to illustrate how little we often have for the 
female body (and, frankly, how much we apparently would like to do to it when left to 
our own, mob-mentality devices). Martinez’s deconstruction of a projected version of 
Cry Baby’s body accomplishes many of the same performative goals, both by 
alarming viewers by confronting us with our own penchant for exploitation and 
voyeurism and by forcing us beyond that alarm to experience perhaps an even more 
uncanny empathy for a nonhuman being.  
At the video’s close, Cry Baby, seeing her future’s foreshadowing, removes 
the wig and presumably embraces a degree of self-acceptance, returning to her body, 
herself, and the now. And while Cry Baby’s hypergirlish Lolita look raises some 
eyebrows as to its potential relationship to fetish, it’s thrown into relief here against 
the meant-to-be-modified body of the contemporary woman, and is presented as Cry 
Baby’s “real” self—that is, before outside influence is able to claim it. Cry Baby’s 
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symbolic “return,” here, to girlhood thematically precipitates the movement into the 
following song, which sends her deeper into that rabbit hole of radical self-acceptance.  
“Mad Hatter” and the Girl in Wonderland 
If the doll is, indeed, a metaphor for death, Martinez’s message in “Mad 
Hatter,” is rather on the nose, as Cry Baby escapes a future of dollhood by fully 
indulging the fractalizing effects of trauma and dissociation. “Mad Hatter,” the last 
video on the Cry Baby concept album and the chronological end to Cry Baby’s story, 
opens with a shot of a slightly-older Martinez, her hair arranged in blue bows 
reminiscent of Alice’s iconic dress, smoking a bowl on her bed. Confronted in her 
bedroom by the nurse and the cashier from earlier videos—the only adults in the series 
besides her own parents, and most notable for their knowing smiles and irisless black 
eyes—she quickly succumbs to temptation, drinking from the “Drink Me”-labeled 
shrinking potion that allowed the first Alice to go anywhere she liked. 
Next, a robotic doll-girl (perhaps what Cry Baby would have become, had she 
proceeded through the linear maturatory phases expected of her) launches Cry Baby 
into a full-fledged psychedelic Wonderland, a brain-oozing remix of her cluttered 
childhood bedroom. The explosion of “bedroom culture” comes to its full fruition 
here, as the bedroom becomes the world, and the world littered with the candy-colored 
remains of Cry Baby’s destroyed girlhood.  
From the start, however, this is no “ordinary” Alice as we’ve ever seen her. 
Blowing heart rings from her bong, she zigzags into an imitation of the Cheshire Cat. 
Later in the video, her hair piled atop her head in dramatic Renaissance fashion, she is 
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more Queen of Hearts than Alice. Accompanied by a gang of giant Rushton “rubber 
face” toys who defend her at all costs, this Alice is the spinning axis around which 
Wonderland whirls, but not its singular identifiable heroine. Rather than merely 
portraying a darker, older Alice, Martinez disrupts our tendency as viewers to map the 
Alice narrative onto her; instead, like the Deleuzian girl who willfully takes on the 
shape of anything that strikes her fancy, she transforms into every shape and signifier, 
spilling sideways into every manner of Wonderland character.  
She is at once the rabbit and its hole, Alice and the Mad Hatter, the Queen of 
Hearts and the Cheshire Cat, the consumed and consumer, meat (as in Ryden’s 
paintings, with the girl stuck in the meat display) and carnivore. The girl, she seems to 
imply—the traumatized Alice—is not merely herself, but expansive enough to 
embody all of Wonderland, and difficult to pin down or package, label, and 
commodify for an easy sale. Her dizzying array of alternative identities is suggestive 
of the dissociation common after childhood trauma like what Cry Baby has 
experienced, and evokes in vivid detail that Clementine Morrigan describes as “trauma 
time” or a traumatized, fractured relationship to temporality.  
Launched into a Wonderland that doesn’t know whether it wants to be utopian 
or dystopian and that purports itself as a living graveyard of a lost girlhood (populated 
by psychedelic visions, giant doll-puppets, melting faces, donuts that sprout legs and 
bleed jelly and pop surrealist absurdities), Cry Baby confronts “adults” in various 
nonhuman forms while lyrically riffing on and sinisterizing Alice references with lines 
like, “Skinny dipping in a rabbit hole for fun,” “We paint white roses red/Each shade 
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from a different person’s head,” and “Getting drunk with a blue caterpillar.” She peels 
the rubber off her own face when confronted by two robotic alter egos of her parents, 
in effect rebelling against their judgment of her by embracing and throwing back the 
accusations leveled against her (neuroticism, hypersensitivity, and overemotionality, 
for example), the objects of her girlhood now weaponized as tools of defense (perhaps 
in a nod to regression or defense mechanisms). She parrots back collective 
expectations of her as “crazy,” “psycho,” “mad,” and “nuts,” lyrically mocking and 
ironizing terms often leveled at mentally ill girls in particular for her own usage. 
“Over the bend, entirely bonkers/You like me best when I’m off my rocker,” she slyly 
accuses the listener, mocking media stereotypes of mental illness and reversing the 
aim of the derogatory terms used to describe her, thereby implicating the collective 
public in “making her this way.” She declares herself as finally belonging where she 
never did before, if only outside the bounds of nuclear family or any form of symbolic 
logic to begin with, singing, “The normals, they make me afraid/The crazies, they 
make me feel sane.” 
After she frightens off her parents, an “adult” version of Cry Baby encounters 
the “White Rabbit”—that is, the doctor who delivered her as a baby—now as a 
psychiatrist (thus representing the sole “point of logic” within the chaos of 
Wonderland, a throwback to the patriarchal origins of hysteria, and Alice/Cry Baby’s 
initial introduction into the world), peddling mood-altering drugs and sporting a blank, 
sinister stare. Buoyed by the support of her toy-gang and the trappings of her girlhood-
gone-bad, she lyrically references the legacy of hysteria, citing a medical system that 
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often dismisses women’s claims: “Where is my prescription?/Doctor, doctor please 
listen,” she pleads snarkily before continuing, “My brain is scattered/You can be 
Alice, I’ll be the Mad Hatter,” again subversively reversing their expected roles and 
dissipating the myths of the possibility of a coherent sense of narrative or identity 
within the chaotic realm of “trauma time.” Next, as the chorus explodes into a series of 
rebellious declarations of her status as “crazy”— “I’m nuts, baby, I’m mad/The 
craziest friend that you’ve ever had/You think I’m psycho, you think I’m gone/Tell the 
psychiatrist something is wrong”— her Rushton dolls similarly explode through the 
floor and surround her protectively. She jumps on a chair to confront the rabbit-doctor, 
defeating him once and for all and declaring victory over her brain’s chaos as her 
plush minions back her up. Later, she transforms into a colorful dish of ice cream, but 
her ragtag troupe of lost toys stabs the four robot-adults leaning in with spoons to 
death before Cry Baby can be consumed. 
Thus, rather than “growing into” the woman she is expected to become, Cry 
Baby has “grown” her girlhood companions, the accoutrements of her past, up to her 
current size to serve her changing needs. And if this is her fate, Cry Baby seems to 
suggest—trauma time, that is—then she might as well make the most of it, surrounded 
by her girlhood sources of comfort. Moreover, Cry Baby’s rebellious stance 
concerning her history of trauma mirrors what Brian Bergstrom refers to as the divine 
“criminality” of the Lolita/shojo character in girl-centered manga: 
The elaborate costuming, ostentatious use of outdated verb forms, and 
cloyingly hyperfeminine mannerisms of the Lolita subculture function as a 
way to reimagine the very aspects of girlishness that render them a “crime” 
against sociality and productivity. The implication is that these are strategies 
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whereby the disciplinary machine of normative embodiment is preempted 
through covering the body in exaggerated signs of its inability ever to be 
anything but what girlhood has made of it. (30) 
 
The iconography of girlhood and tattoos,Bergstrom suggests, are appropriate 
bedfellows, if only because their relationship to time and trauma is similarly chaotic. 
Rather than throwing away girlhood wholesale or becoming the mother she feared as a 
child, Cry Baby instead clings to what gave her pleasure, giving them due space in the 
complex sprawl of her fractured psyche. 
In “Mad Hatter,” as elsewhere in the Cry Baby universe, Martinez plays on the 
visual and allusory canon (here, Alice) historically associated with the girl, drawing 
deeply from its well of cultural and literary signifiers while deviating from and mixing 
them to produce affective disturbance, disruption, and disorientation in the viewer.  In 
“‘But I’m grown up now’: Alice in the Twenty-First Century,” Catherine Siemann 
notes that, in the reinvented Alice of contemporary video games, graphic novels, and 
films, the Victorian/neo-Victorian heroine navigates a significantly more sinister 
landscape, in part due to posthumous allegations of pedophilia against Carroll, but also 
likely due to the cultural narrative that casts today’s girls as “growing up too fast” and 
as perpetually subject to hypersexualization that prematurely ages them. Siemann 
writes, “The re-envisioning of Alice dates back to Carroll’s day, as Carolyn Sigler’s 
Alternative Alices shows us, but in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
controlled menace of the original is transformed into outright violence, insanity, and 
sexual threat. In order to negotiate this darkening terrain, Alice is portrayed as a young 
woman in her teens or early twenties” (175). And if, as Catherine Driscoll argues in 
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Girls: Feminine Adolescence in Popular Culture and Cultural Theory, “like Antigone 
Alice has also continually appeared in theoretical texts—from literary formalism to 
poststructuralist philosophy—implicitly elaborating the significance of the girl to late 
modernity” (44)—then Martinez’s turn in “Mad Hatter” represents Alice’s debut as a 
postmodern girl. 
The Girl Begins to Shout 
Attempts to represent mental illness by girls are often read as cries for help, 
glamorization, or commodification. Martinez was particularly accused of “glorifying” 
or pedestalizing mental illness, as she noted in her response to critics on her personal 
Instagram. Though those accusations shouldn’t be taken lightly, the carnivalesque 
embrace of “insanity” in neo-Victorian reimaginings of girlhood, particularly in light 
of the pop surrealist canon and iconography from which she draws, is more complex 
than a mere wholesale reversal of mental health stigma. Rather, as Kathryn Bond 
Stockton suggests of Lolita’s displays of agency, desire, and rebellion in her analysis 
of the survivor-victim-heroine’s “queer childhood” in Nabokov’s novel, and as 
Watkins Fisher describes in the “adolescent drag” of artists like Amber Hawk 
Swanson, Martinez’s attitude towards trauma, identity, and mental illness in the final 
moments of Cry Baby collapses the definitions of victim and victimizer and denies 
easy reductions of her persona to hypersexualization and objectification. Rather than 
championing the aftermath of trauma or reveling in the traumatized psychological 
landscape, Cry Baby manages her traumatized reality by populating the world she’s 
been thrust into with objects of girlhood pleasure and comfort. Rather than 
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disappearing into the psychological ether, they return with a vengeance for comfort or 
revenge whenever Cry Baby is again beset by distress. 
At the song’s close, she is awakened by the Nurse and Cashier from prior 
songs—those who served as her only, and unlikely, allies in moments of crisis, when 
conventional sources of comfort (mothers, fathers, love interests, food, parties) failed 
her. Like them, Cry Baby now has irisless jet-black eyes, suggesting that she has been 
“inducted” into a strange sorority she never pledged—one inhabited only by women 
whose sisterhood is tethered to their mutual pain and distress, but who have chosen (or 
been chosen for) the whirlpool of “trauma time” rather than their expected linear 
progression towards motherhood. 
By vacillating between child and adult, between woman-turned-girl and girl-
turned-woman, Martinez builds a compelling example, via pop surrealist iconography, 
of the “adolescent drag” Fisher describes and what Morrigan calls “trauma time,” in 
their performative, pop cultural iterations. Often, work like hers (popular, sexualized) 
is read shallowly—as an easy pandering to hypersexualization of girls, or an unfiltered 
glorification of mental illness, for example. These readings and critiques are not 
entirely invalid and deserve consideration, but they do miss out on a crucial materialist 
reading of Cry Baby as mentally ill, and as an example of the real traumatized girl 
behind media sensationalism and pearl-clutching.  
In some ways, in pop surrealist tradition, Martinez represents the individual 
character of Cry Baby via a plastic, ever-transforming amalgamation of cultural 
images of the girl over time. The “lost daughter” of the Freudian family, about whom 
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little is said until she becomes a hysteric or neurotic (and by then it’s too late), and the 
dutiful media representative of every cultural crisis from selfies to sexual predation (as 
either victim or naive perpetrator, but never agential actor), she represents the 
theoretical scraps of societal ideas about gender, the family, and maturity: the leftovers 
of rhetoric gone stale. Like the girls in Ryden’s and Caesar’s paintings, she is 
everything and nothing, a kaleidoscopic sponge for societal woes and the axis around 
which a revolving galaxy of unmoored signifiers spins. 
However, Martinez’s turn in Cry Baby also has significant implications in 
terms of answering the question of how psychosocial disability might be effectively 
represented in performance. There is a growing body of evidence that, after trauma, 
conventional talk therapy is not helpful for everyone, particularly for those with 
chronic PTSD after childhood abuse, molestation, or sexual assault. Regurgitating the 
past “exactly as it was,” some psychologists postulate—that is, conventional modes of 
talk therapy—can actually exacerbate the aftermath of trauma and cement the 
memories for certain individuals. Modes of performative, deliberate, and tactical 
forgetting—of “emptying out,” as it were, and of actively engaging with the past via 
temporal drag and visualization rather than literally recounting traumatic events—it 
logically follows, could thus present potentially productive ways of 
performing/staging invisible disability (particularly psychosocial), and of representing 
the fractured relationship to time and reality that is so common in the aftermath of 
trauma. 
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Cry Baby’s madness/ “sickness,” moreover, occupies the dubious position of 
representing both an actual psychosocial disability and the collective hysterias that 
often come to bear on the Everygirl. Much of the concern about Martinez’s 
performance seems to stem from the cultural fear of the girl as a spectacle with 
nothing at her center, all show and no tell, an ultimately empty decorative object. 
Thus, she is either pegged as “too much,” given to excess, or “not enough.” In a 
reading of the Lolita figure that looks to the reasons for the widespread ambivalence 
towards and confusion regarding the subculture, Lunning writes, “If we look deep 
under the ruffles, within the swirl of constellated objects and the myriad signs of this 
hyperbolic feminine character, we find a dark space of paradox, ambiguity, and loss” 
(19). Kotani similarly warns would-be Lolitas and admirers of the shojo heroine of the 
dangers of taking on a Lolita identity too literally: “A gap between girls and their 
shojo-ness must be inscribed somewhere,” she argues. “Otherwise we will be drawn 
into a hegemonic structure that simply makes girls into girls” (50). (However, that 
seems to be exactly what Martinez is doing—quite deliberately). The neo-Victorian 
Lolita’s willful adoption of the labels assigned to her (commodified, overdone, 
“girly,” and excessive, for example), Lunning also argues, is key to the potential 
power of the neo-Victorian/Lolitan counterpublic; in this vein she writes,  
The profile of a sweet, endearing, but utterly disposable commodity form 
allows for a denial of value and meaning, at the same time it allows her to 
monopolize commercial constructions and advertising. She is a Trojan horse: 
she has appeared at the gates of the patriarchal fortress not as the grown and 
terrifying Amazon of the women’s movement but as a guileless and powerless 
little girl of popular culture. We are ensorcelled, and we have let her in. (18) 
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Indeed, by reducing the girl to a collection of signs divorced from their meanings, pop 
surrealist artists have demonstrated the frequent reduction of the girl to a piece of 
double-sided sticky tape littered with signs herself, more symbol than sign and more 
signifier than signified, but a magnet for every collective affect (and a symbol with 
massive cultural appeal and power) nonetheless. And by embodying that forever-
disembodied girl, Martinez draws from and builds on pop surrealist traditions and calls 
attention to the personal traumas often leveled against girls—ones that often get 
subsumed under the category of “cultural crises” or “trends” and are only rarely 
broken down into their human, lived-reality parts.  
In his initial takedown of the poststructuralist novel and what he termed 
“hysterical realism”—of which Martinez’s work is certainly an example—Wood 
ended his ambivalent critique of the burgeoning genre by asking, “Which way will the 
ambitious contemporary novel go? Will it dare a picture of life, or just shout a 
spectacle?” In Cry Baby, if nothing else, Martinez presents us with a sustained image 
of what it looks like when the perennial spectacle of culture, the girl, begins to shout. 
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Conclusions 
 The concept of a “bedroom culture” was first introduced to youth cultural 
studies in the 1970s by Angela McRobbie and Jenny Garber (1975). They sought to 
account for gender in studies of youth culture that primarily documented the 
subcultural activities of young white males using the concept of social class. 
McRobbie and Garber outlined the reasons why teenage girls were absent in these 
accounts and what they were doing as an alternative. Girls were frequently considered 
as “hangers-on,” associated to subcultures only through their boyfriends. However, 
McRobbie and Garber surmised that teenage girls’ invisibility in these accounts did 
not mean that they were not participating, but rather that their subcultural lives were 
being lived out in an alternative domain: the bedroom. The subculture of girls was 
different from the subculture of boys. In their bedrooms, girls have enacted and 
represented alternative possibilities in this immediate life space. But the performance 
once considered private is now was also turned outward and even captured by the girls 
themselves webcams and social media. Although girls’ bedrooms have been 
considered somewhat ordinary, the practices that take place in this experiential space 
are complex, highly nuanced, and far from trivial. This has allowed traumatic 
experiences and previously hidden or private identities to be shared. The cast-off girl 
is now accessible, not only to others of her kind, but also to anyone with social media. 
At this point, it’s difficult to say whether the cast-off girl is becoming socially 
legitimated through societal exposure or further ostracized. But what becomes 
apparent is that bedroom culture is no longer the secluded space it once was and must 
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be re-examined.  
It's hard not to be struck by the awareness that what you might call the 20th-
century idea of a youth subculture is now just outdated. If we consider bedroom 
culture the counterculture of the teenage girl from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, then 
the changing landscape of the hidden nature of the bedroom calls for re-examination in 
the internet age. Social media has allowed the girl not only to connect bedroom-to-
bedroom with other girls, but also to become part of the driving force of society at 
large: If teens of all genders spend the vast majority of their time online, then the 
demarcation between bedroom culture and boys’ culture outside of the home becomes 
less clear. In this dissertation, I have hoped to look at the proliferation of girlsonas in 
the new modes of communication, but it is clear that the spaces occupied by girls are 
in a period of extreme transition. The changing technological, media, and performance 
landscape calls for further examination of the construction of girlhood in our age.  
Previous depictions of the cast-off girl only found large markets through best-
selling books such as Reviving Ophelia and Hollywood films such as Girl, 
Interrupted, or top-down-oriented stage musicals such as Borderline. Changing 
technologies and modes of performance have enabled the cast-off girl to depict herself 
as she is. Girls such as Emilie Autumn and Melanie Martinez have taken charge of 
their own madness and trauma in order to construct girlsonas over which they have 
primary control. Proceeding from my conception that the cast-off girl exceeds the 
boundaries of girlhood, embodying the perceived aspects of girlhood that are deemed 
inappropriate for public display, there is clearly more work to be done regarding 
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whether this folds into or changes the nature of the abject. The quickly changing 
nature of current media, and how much agency the cast-off girl has in regards to its 
production, will determine whether the cast-off girl is rendered more abject or 
accepted as part of the norm.  
Nonetheless, the benefit of this turning outward of bedroom culture is that, 
through the use of girlsonas, the cast-off girl can depict herself on her own terms and 
from within the confines of her comfortable environment. Seeing Melanie Martinez’s 
videos for the first time, and knowing the creative control that she had over the 
creation, young girls may not be tempted to focus on the confines of the home in the 
bedroom, but rather on the creative possibilities of performance. A great deal of 
Internet culture and new performances is focused around the creation of new material, 
rather than on the consumption of products. For example, in an interview with The 
Guardian, one teen girl explains why teenage girls make YouTube videos about recent 
shopping purchases as such: "It's not just about showing what you've got. It’s a whole 
creative process behind the videos as well, which is what I enjoy about it. Choosing 
the right music, going from the filming to the editing. Sometimes I even storyboard 
things, because I want certain shots, how I can present different items and things like 
that" (Petridis). Going forward, it seems that the concerns of the teen girl might have a 
platform through which to gain legitimacy equal to that of teen boys and adult women. 
Now that girls and boys use the internet in relatively equal numbers, there is more 
inquiry to be done on how the respective genders will be affected.  
Of course, one area in which this dissertation has admittedly lacked is in 
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attending to how racial difference affects the cast-off girl’s interaction with the 
internet. Home life and bedroom culture are not monolithic across various 
demographics, so there is room to do more work on how social media can help or 
hinder the incorporation of mad girls of different racial backgrounds into a more 
public life. 
Nonetheless, I have hoped to re-examine girls who are rarely seen as agential 
cultural actors. Since girlhood is not seen as something someone does, but instead as 
something of which you are a victim, it can be employed to turn a mirror to the 
gendered stereotypes that men adopt for the purposes of reflecting on their own 
imagined womanhoods or feminine sides with the added complication of women 
looking back retrofuturistically into the girlhoods they had, wished they had, are 
reclaiming, or suffered from. There are countless other representations to be exhumed 
from this dumping ground which is full of an assorted collection of “girl troubles.” 
These works that dominant culture has rendered illegible/invisible as performance 
must be further resurrected and reframed in order to assert their artistic and 
performative viability. Across a wide range of media, performances of and by the girl 
are dismissed as existing on a continuum of silly to harmless. The concerns of 
girlhood are dismissed as inconsequential, but when these girls express themselves, 
they are often met with concern, censorship, and handwringing. And it seems this 
concern is not geared at the girls themselves, but at the audiences potentially exposed 
to their messages. The girls are cast off and cast aside. My research started by asking 
how it is that girls’ cultural productions, such as banned Instagram hashtags, can be 
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simultaneously insignificant and dangerous. There seems to be a broader societal 
concern, while disregarding the individual. A significant portion of adult female artists 
and performers retain aspects of girlhood through an overzealous embrace of its 
trappings. Girlhood contains an allure and power prompting these artists to hold onto 
it in spite of its perceived illegitimacy. I aim to call more researchers to examine these 
neglected products of girls of all backgrounds. 
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